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Synopsis
The continued existence of the Russian defence and arms industry, known 
as the Oboronnyi-promyshennyi kompleks (OPK), was called into question 
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Industry experts 
cited the lack of a domestic market, endemic corruption, and excess capacity 
within the industry as factors underpinning its predicted demise. The most 
telling factor was the sudden removal of considerable government subsidies and 
high defence industry wages that had traditionally buttressed the industry’s 
economic viability and encouraged the cream of Russia’s workers into the sector. 
It was a crippling blow. However, the industry’s export customers in China, 
India and Iran during those early years became the OPK’s saving grace. Their 
orders introduced hard currency back into the industry and went a long way 
to preventing the forecasted OPK collapse. Although pessimistic predictions 
continued to plague the OPK throughout the 1990s, the valuable export dollars 
provided the OPK the breathing space it needed to claw back its competitive 
advantage as an arms producer. That revival has been further underpinned by 
a new political commitment, various research and development initiatives, and 
the restoration of defence industry as a tool of Russian foreign policy.
In order to gauge the future prospects for the OPK, it is necessary to examine 
the domestic and external drivers that have either underwritten its success 
to date or are still required to ensure its long-term endurance. Domestically, 
continued success demands a closer collaboration between the OPK and the 
Russian armed forces. It also requires serious efforts to curb endemic corruption, 
further consolidation of the defence industry, and continued development of 
the Russian domestic market for arms. Externally, the strength of the state arms 
exporter, Rosoboronexport, global market diversification and joint military 
ventures with strategic partner countries are essential ingredients for long-term 
OPK success. Cultivating and maintaining the economic and political momentum 
vital for the OPK’s progress will be a daunting undertaking for Russia. However, 
Russia’s accomplishments in these key areas since 2000 suggest that continued 
success is a genuine prospect and that the OPK could potentially grow to be the 
proverbial ‘phoenix from the ashes’.
China and India constitute approximately 60  per cent of the total Russian 
arms transfer market. Trading and cooperation with these two countries has 
provided Moscow with the finances to sustain its defence industry through 
continued orders and valuable finance for research and development programs 
for military hardware. However, post 2012, the Chinese market will be nearing 
total saturation and the Indian market will have contracted somewhat, as the 
indigenous defence industries of these nations can be expected to usurp the 
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demand for Russian equipment. This scenario, together with a more active 
foreign policy under Vladimir Putin has seen Russia launch aggressive marketing 
campaigns into the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Latin America. The strategy 
has already begun to pay dividends, with multi-billion dollar contracts being 
signed by Algeria, Indonesia, Venezuela, and possibly Libya. The Russians hope 
that large sales to these countries will trigger further sales within the respective 
regions. The realised or potential contracts for arms from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, and Brazil suggest that this strategy is producing the desired result.
The short-term future of the Russian OPK looks promising. The rising domestic 
defence order is beginning to challenge the export market as the OPK’s most 
important customer. Meanwhile, exports will be safeguarded by continued 
foreign demand for niche Russian defence products such as cruise missiles and 
air-defence systems, as well as cost effective and user friendly Russian aircraft, 
ships, submarines and land systems. Flexible financing options offered by 
Rosoboronexport will stimulate demand in new or renewed markets such as 
Algeria and Indonesia and sustain the economic viability of the OPK for at least 
the next decade.
Although the long-term future of the OPK is more difficult to predict, Russia’s 
solid research and development foundation and successful international joint 
military ventures suggest that the current thriving trend in exports is likely 
to continue. To preserve traditional markets, Russia will, over time, probably 
permit greater technology transfer and perhaps even shift its exports to 
higher-end niche military equipment. Russia represents the next generation of 
affordable and rugged military equipment for the arsenals of the developing 
world. Coupled with Russia’s growing ability to rearm itself through rising oil 
prices and a more streamlined defence industry, the future of the OPK looks 
bright.
*     *     *
Disclaimer
The opinions and views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone 
and do not reflect in any way those of the Australian Department of Defence. In 
addition, all data included in this paper is available from open source materials.
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Chapter 1 
Phoenix from the Ashes?
As Russia gains economic strength, it will be capable of more assertive 
postures in many areas. Barring a radical reversal of current trends, 
post-Soviet Russia will in the next few years have many options it has not 
yet had in its brief existence as a nation—options in international relations 
vis-à-vis the developed West, the third world, and, most immediately, 
its neighbours from the former Soviet Union. An economically stronger 
Russia will also be able to spend more on its defence.
Clifford Gaddy1
Russia’s defense industrial complex, or Oboronnyi-promyshennyi kompleks 
(OPK), has endured much over the past 15  years. Originally known as the 
military industrial complex (VPK), it became known as the OPK in the late 
1990s. The political, social and economic transition from Soviet Union to 
Russian Federation was far from smooth, and the upheaval surrounding this 
political reversal manifested itself within the OPK. The rampant corruption and 
general disintegration of state systems witnessed during the death throes of the 
Soviet Union and the early years of the Russian Federation was no more evident 
anywhere than in the OPK. 
At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union’s VPK consisted of approximately 
4000  research institutions, design organisations and production facilities. 
These state enterprises always received the lion’s share of talent, technology 
and funding from the state, which unofficially devoted nearly 50 per cent of a 
central government budget of well over US$80 billion to military expenditures.2 
Many cities such as Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) and Nizhny Tagil were 
massive defence plants, with almost all of the population involved in defence 
industry. They lived in company apartments, shopped in company stores and 
ate in company cafes. Up to 80 per  cent of a defence plant’s budget went to 
maintaining these social services;3 all of which fell under the sweeping term 
‘Defence’ within the Soviet budget. These examples highlight the importance 
of state funding to the survival of the VPK. It therefore came as no surprise 
1 Clifford Gaddy, ‘No Turning Back: Market Reform and Defense Industry in Russia: Who’s adjusting to 
whom?’, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, Summer  1996, available at <http://www.brookings.edu/
articles/1996/summer_russia_gaddy.aspx>, accessed 28 April 2009.
2 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Strategic Impact of Russian Arms Sales and Technology Transfers, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 5 April 1999, pp. 10–11, available at <http://www.csis.
org/media/csis/pubs/atstratimpofrussarmsale%5B1%5D.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009.
3 See ‘Military Industry Overview’, GlobalSecurity.org, available at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/russia/industry-overview.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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that the VPK suffered greatly during the early and mid-1990s (especially during 
the 1998 economic crisis), when the newly formed Russian Federation could do 
little to stop the decay of an industry traditionally reliant upon state direction 
and funding. Defence budgets of the new Russia were low on the agenda of 
a Yeltsin Administration facing considerable social upheaval, and hence they 
equated to a fraction of the mammoth amounts of their Communist forebears.
The Communist-era VPK was organised within an authoritarian political system 
that devoted vast amounts of resources and funding to the defence sector. The 
experiences of the Great Patriotic War, nationalism, and Communist ideology 
provided the background for a national security strategy focused purely on 
combating capitalism, chiefly in the form of the United States. This undertaking 
demanded a large defence force and extensive military production to keep pace 
with military developments in the West. Russia’s educated population and 
extensive mineral resource reserves facilitated this.4 The economic growth rate 
slackened in the late 1970s, leading to an increase in the share of defence spending 
within the Soviet economy. Coupled with this development was the fact that 
Soviet military technology at the ‘high end’ did not match Western technology. 
To combat this, Soviet military planners countered Western technology with 
Soviet quantity in the form of ‘middle technology’ weapon systems.5 The 
crippling costs associated with matching US military technological might with 
Soviet numerical might led to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, despite 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s last-ditch attempts to reduce defence spending.6
Faced with political and social upheaval, and a dramatic reduction in the 
resource base during the 1990s, military exports—or arms transfers—became 
the saving grace of many enterprises within the VPK. With little or no domestic 
demand for arms, and vast amounts of half-finished weapon systems sitting in 
the factories, Russian defence companies looked elsewhere, and found eager 
buyers in China, India, and Iran. Valuable hard currency began to trickle in, after 
bribes had been paid to officials from the countries receiving the weaponry, and 
corrupt Russian officials had taken their cut. This precious currency prolonged 
the survival of some of Russia’s more successful defence enterprises, but was by 
no means enough to sustain the industry as a whole. It was during this period 
that pessimistic opinions emerged as to the future of the VPK. Experts, such as 
Vitaly Shlykov, an ex-member of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, and Stephen 
Blank, a respected US-based analyst, predicted an eventual collapse of the VPK. 
4 Paul Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, Memorandum no. 79, The Jaffee 
Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, November 2005, p. 14, available at <http://www.inss.org.il/
upload/(FILE)1188301974.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009.
5 Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, p. 14.
6 Edward A. Corcoran, Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications for US Policy, Cato Policy Analysis 
no. 133, 29 May 1990, available at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa133.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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Moreover, the respected Moscow-based defence analyst Pavel Felgenhauer 
made a statement in 2002 canvassing Russia’s ability to produce conventional 
submarines: 
The ‘Krasnoye Sormovo’ shipyard in Nizhny Novgorod no longer makes 
Kilo submarines after building the last two for China. Admiralteyskaya 
Verf in St. Petersburg is also now only renovating Kilos made for India 
in the 1980s. Specialists say Russia cannot make a single Kilo anymore.7
The predicted collapse of the VPK would result from a combination of endemic 
corruption, insufficient government funding, a ‘brain-drain’ to the lucrative 
defence industries in the West, and the devastating effects of neglecting 
long-term research and development (R&D) programs.8 These problems were 
particularly acute after 1993, when the vast bulk of the half-finished weapons 
had finally found customers and the various defence enterprises actually had to 
build equipment from scratch. 
However, despite the turmoil of the last 15  years, and many pessimistic 
predictions, the VPK (also known as the OPK since late 1990s) still has the 
ability to produce air, land and naval equipment—an indication of the 
industry’s resilience. In stark contradiction to Felgenhauer’s comment, Russia 
signed a multi-billion dollar contract with China for the construction of eight 
Project  636 Kilo-class submarines on 3  May 2002. One of these submarines 
was successfully constructed in the shipyard at Nizhny Novgorod,9 and five 
others at the Admiralty shipyards in St. Petersburg. All eight have subsequently 
been completed and delivered to China. This is one of a number of examples 
highlighting the resilience of the industry—a resilience that continues to 
confound the more pessimistic of the Russian defence industry analysts.
Gloomy predictions for the OPK’s future were still being voiced in 2006; however 
the current environment is a vastly different one from that of the 1990s. The 
trajectory of the Russian defence industry was marked by a precipitous decline 
in the early and mid-1990s, bottoming out in 1997, but was then succeeded 
from 1998 by a rapid recovery—a 37  per  cent rise in output in 1999, then a 
25 per cent increase in 2000.10 Output has increased annually since 2000, sitting 
7 Pavel Felgenhauer, ‘Arms Exports and the Russian Military’, Perspective, vol.  XII, no.  4, March–April 
2002, p. 3, also available at <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/felgenhauer2.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
8 Vitaly V. Shlykov in Steven E. Miller, and Dmitri V. Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004; and Stephen J.  Blank, Reform and the Revolution in Russian Defense 
Economics, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 19 May 1995, available at <http://
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB166.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009.
9 Alexandra Gritskova, Konstantin Lantratov and Mikhail Barabanov, ‘Russia Builds Chinese Navy’, 
Kommersant, 22  December 2005, available at <http://www.kommersant.com/p637658/r_1/Russia_Builds_
Chinese_Navy/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
10 Alexei Izyumov, Leonid Kosals, Rosalina Ryvkina and Yuri Semagin, ‘Market Reforms and Regional 
Differentiation of Russia Defence Industry Enterprises’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, no. 6, September 2002, 
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at around 16 per cent, although recent increases in domestic funding and multi-
billion dollar arms export deals with Algeria, India and Venezuela in 2006, and 
probably Libya in 2007, could see output jump even higher. Even without taking 
future improvement into account, there is considerable evidence that the Russian 
defence sector is thriving thanks to its ability to transform itself through spin-offs 
and selective market developments. David Dyker’s study of Russian economics 
indicated that the military was ahead of other science and technology sectors in 
realising the utility of dual-use technologies as well as in acknowledging that R&D 
should be client-driven.11 To date, this trend has been the norm, with advanced 
technologies such as the Sukhoi Su-30MKI Flanker being sold to India and the 
Project 877/636 Kilo–class submarine/Klub (SS-N-27) missile system combination 
being sold to both India and China. In fact, by far the biggest influence on the 
success of the OPK since 2000 has been the boom in its exports. Russian arms 
exports have grown tremendously—from US$1.1 billion in 1992 to a post Soviet 
peak in 2008 of US$8 billion, and are now the OPKs main source of revenue. As 
one Ministry of Industry and Energy official put it: ‘The OPK cannot survive with 
funds allocated by the government in the Defense Ministry’s budget.’12
The defence industry is one of the few sectors in which Russia can successfully 
compete in international markets. The quality of Russian weapons is close to 
the standard of the best Western producers according to independent industry 
sources (a legacy of the importance placed on military R&D in the Soviet era) 
and at a price that is at least 30–35 per cent lower.13 Russia’s export potential 
in the short-term is strong: the total order book approximately equates to 
US$20 billion as at January 2009.14
Arms transfers have reached record levels since 1991, with 2008 figures estimated 
at US$8 billion.15 Granted, this pales in significance to the levels reached by 
the Soviet Union; however, Soviet-era sales were rarely recompensed with hard 
currency. Moreover, the aim of this thesis is not to compare the two entities. It 
will be a long time, if ever, before Russian arms production and export levels 
match the levels achieved by the Soviet Union. 
To make such a comparison, particularly as an omen for Russian defence 
industry failure, would be to misunderstand the nature of the new industrial 
pp. 959–74 (960), available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/826290>, accessed 28 April 2009.
11 Richard Cooper, ‘Russia’s Economy—The Best Case’, in Putin’s Russia—Scenarios for 2005, Jane’s 
Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 2004, p. 8.
12 Yuri Koptev, in ‘Experts Concerned over Russia’s Military-Industrial Complex’, RIA Novosti, 11 November 
2005, available at <http://en.rian.ru>, accessed 5 February 2006.
13 Benjamin Mahmud, ‘Russian Defence Industry’, Asian Defence Journal, October 2005, p. 39.
14 ‘Defence Production and R&D’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia, Jane’s Information Group, 
Coulsdon, Surrey, April 2009.
15  ‘Russian Federation—Defence Industry’, Jane’s World Defence Industry, Jane’s Information Group, 
Coulsdon, Surrey, 2006, 19 January 2009.
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and export environment. Russia now competes for military exports not only with 
Europe and the United States, but also Belarus, the Ukraine, and other states 
that made up the former Soviet Union. Therefore, a more reasoned approach 
to assessing Russian military output is to compare the Russian OPK with its 
current competitors in Europe, the United States and Asia. This comparison will 
draw more reliable conclusions and provides more credible analysis of the OPKs 
current position. 
Today, Russian sales have risen annually within a flat global market, with 
advanced aircraft, air-defence systems and utility helicopters the most popular 
exports. Even the naval industry, for so long the recipient of the most pessimistic 
survivability predictions, has begun to produce new-build submarines and ships 
rather than refurbished Soviet stock for delivery to China, India and Vietnam. 
Analysis of Russian arms transfers for 2005 indicates that naval equipment 
provided over 40 per cent of the earnings and that it was the primary revenue 
earner for the first time in several years. This being said, air defence systems 
returned to the top earnings place in 2006.16 The competition between sectors 
for the top place each year is a good sign for the defence industry overall, which 
has experienced 14 per cent annual growth since 2000.
So significant has been the impact of exports on the new OPK that its major 
clients are the armed forces of other countries, as opposed to the Russian 
Federation armed forces. Russia’s OPK is the only national defence industry in 
the world where exports account for more revenue than domestic orders. This 
has been a trend since 1991 and has led to some defence industrial R&D and 
production program (such as India’s Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighter variant, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s Pantsyr air-defence system) being tailored for 
export customers rather than the Russian armed forces.
Export customer oriented research and production is a positive development 
for the OPK. It has promoted the longevity of some production lines (such 
as the Sukhoi Su-30) to afford Russia use of them when its defence budget is 
substantial enough. In the case of the Pantsyr air-defence system, the research 
was funded largely by the UAE and the finished product will be available for 
Russian procurement if required.17 When considering the fact that the Russian 
State Defence Order (SDO) was expected to surpass the OPK’s export earnings 
for 2006,18 these foreign funded R&D and production lines will be invaluable for 
the future re-equipping of the Russian armed forces. 
16 Anderson, ‘CAST indicates Russia’s leading 2006 military materiel exporters’.
17 ‘Pantsyr’, in Jane’s Ground Based Air Defence, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 2006.
18 James Murphy, ‘Russia to Increase Defence Spending Following Challenging Period for Defence Industry’, 
in Jane’s Defence Industry, vol. 22, no. 10, 1 October 2005.
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Annual arms transfer earnings will probably not increase much past the 
US$8 billion in 2008; however future export earnings will be augmented by 
the domestic order book. With respect to future domestic production, the SDO 
is the mechanism within the Russian defence budget that provides for the 
equipping and modernisation of military units, as well as the R&D funding for 
the military each financial year. 2006 was probably the first year that money 
from the SDO, including major equipment replacement and refurbishment, 
outstripped exports. According to Vladimir Putin, the 2005 fiscal year was in 
fact the year that heralded this important milestone for the OPK: ‘In 2005 we 
passed a kind of psychological barrier and now Russia is spending more money 
on weapons than it is earning from military exports.’19
Putin’s statement is a slight mistruth, because the 2005 SDO that he was referring 
to—valued at around US$7 billion—covered Russian R&D funding as well as 
procurement for the armed forces. Regardless, it was a psychological barrier 
nonetheless, and will likely be interpreted as a sign of commitment to the OPK 
as a whole. 
Sergei Ivanov announced in May 2006 that the 2006 SDO would equal US$9 
billion, with most of the funding going towards military unit modernisation 
rather than R&D. Furthermore, the 2007 SDO increased to US$11.5 billion, with 
this trend of 20 per cent annual increases projected to continue out to 2015.20 
These figures indicate that procurement and R&D funding has surged from less 
than 20 per cent of the total defence budget in 2002 to 44 per cent in 2007.21 
This has not gone unnoticed by other industry analysts who are forecasting a 
considerably more optimistic future for Russia’s OPK. 
Thus the Russian defence industry could go from strength to strength given the 
right economic conditions, industry consolidation, anti-corruption drives and 
domestic demand. The OPK is currently stable. It may not yet be thriving, but it 
is showing encouraging signs. The pace and extent of developments within the 
OPK will be affected by the success of current reforms, and the attention focused 
on the OPK by Dmitry Medvedev. However, the foundations laid by the Putin 
Administration suggest that the current positive direction is soundly based. 
These domestic orders will be paid for by the growing revenues that Russia is 
reaping from not only its arms exports, but also its primary resource exports. 
19 Vladimir Putin cited in Henry Ivanov, ‘Country Briefing: Russia—Austere deterrence’, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 28  April 2006, available at <http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw060428_1_n.shtml>, 
accessed 28 April 2009.
20 ‘State defense order to grow 20% in 2007’, 6 May 2006, available at <http://en.rian.ru>, accessed 20 July 
2006.
21 Irina Isakova, ‘The Russian Defense Reform’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, March 
2007, pp. 75–82 (76), available at <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/February_2007/
Isakova.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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The bulk of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) comes from primary 
resources, in particular oil and natural gas exports. At the end of the 1990s, 
Russia was pumping 9 million barrels a day. It rivalled Saudi Arabia as the 
world’s largest oil producer and, while it kept more at home for its own use than 
Saudi Arabia, it established itself as the world’s second largest oil exporter.22 It 
seems oil has replaced military might as the mechanism that places Russia back 
on the map as a major international player. 
However, oil and the military are not mutually exclusive, and indeed appear 
to be becoming increasingly complementary in Russian foreign policy. The 
2006 arms deal with Algeria, valued at US$7.5 billion, will be paid for in part 
by the setting up of oil and natural gas platforms in the Sahara by Russian 
companies including Gazprom and Lukoil. The money the Algerians make 
from this venture will then go towards the payment for the arms, as well as the 
US$4.7 billion worth of Soviet-era foreign debt owed by Algeria to Moscow.23 
Moreover, according to industry expert Dimitri Vasiliev: ‘As petrodollars are 
being pumped into the Russian budget, the country’s leadership believes it can 
afford to increase defence spending at a high pace.’24
Current high oil prices have provided the Russian economy with a strong 
platform for growth, contributing to an annual GDP growth of 6–7 per  cent 
over the last three years.25 These positive financial results have enabled the 
government to steadily increase the country’s national defence budget and will 
continue to do so for as long as the price of oil and gas remains high. This 
situation appears likely, with an International Energy Agency report predicting 
that fossil fuels will remain the dominant energy source up to 2030. The report 
predicted that oil would still be the largest individual fuel source by the end 
of the projected period, although natural gas will witness the highest growth 
in demand. Furthermore, it indicates that if current government policies 
around the world do not change, global primary energy demand will grow 
by 1.6 per cent per year from 2003 to 2030—an overall increase of more than 
half.26 These kinds of statistics imply that the resource-rich Russian economy 
will remain robust until at least 2030 and, pending government policy, this 
should equate to robust defence budgets over the same period. These strong 
economic predictions suggest further defence spending increases—a positive 
development for the OPK. 
22 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution, 
Scribner, New York, 2005, p. 278.
23 ‘Algeria signs $5 billion arms-for-energy deal with Russia’, Military Procurement International, vol. 16, 
no. 6, 15 April 2006, p. 1.
24 Dimitri Vasiliev, ‘More money for the 1m strong military?’ 21 December 2005, available at <http://www.
mosnews.com>, accessed 5 February 2006.
25 ‘Country Briefings: Russia—Economic Data’, Economist, 17  October 2006, available at <http://www.
economist.com>, accessed 7 May 2008.
26 ‘Energy Projections’, The International Energy Agency, available at <www.iea.org>, accessed 28 April 
2009.
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The outlook for the Russian economy was not always this rosy. Overall economic 
developments within Russia and the former Soviet Union have traditionally been 
highly unstable. Nikita Khrushchev tried unsuccessfully to make Joseph Stalin’s 
highly centralised and cult-oriented economic system work effectively without 
Stalin. Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reform the Soviet socialist economy, to make 
it more humane and more responsive to the popular will, by introducing certain 
elements of democracy and of a market economy.27 His efforts failed. Boris Yeltsin 
led a revolution that destroyed the keystones of the Soviet planned economy and 
attempted to quickly replace it with the most liberal of market institutions. The 
revolution was a double-edged sword: the planned economy was totally destroyed, 
but this had disastrous consequences for the population at large.28
This chequered past makes the turnaround within the Russian economy since 
1998 all the more impressive. The performance of the Russian economy on Putin’s 
watch has been the best since 1992, when radical reforms were introduced 
by Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar. Helping Putin has been the fact that oil prices 
rose sharply between 1999 and 2007, giving him the funds that Yeltsin never 
had at his disposal to pay for defence and higher living standards. Putin also 
began to take control of the economy by striking at the oligarchs—tycoons who 
benefited from the status quo and therefore opposed economic reform. Putin 
targeted individuals who controlled the media, banking and oil industries, and 
renationalised many of their assets. 
Meanwhile, Russian GDP grew by more than 10  per  cent in 2000. Inflation 
at 21 per  cent was tolerable, and official reserves of gold and hard currency 
increased from about US$13  billion to US$28  billion. The recovery from the 
financial crisis of 1998 was due largely to the increase in the price of oil exports 
and the favourable effect of the 1998 devaluation of the ruble on domestic 
industry. The recovery continued in 2001 and 2002 (but at the lesser rates of 
5.1 per cent and 4.7 per cent respectively), while 2003 and 2004 saw growth of 
7.3 per cent and 7.1 per cent.29 Former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov’s very 
conservative predictions out to 2009 suggest growth of around 5.7 per cent and 
project inflation to drop below 10 per cent.30
Although GDP growth remains below inflation, this is counteracted by the 2005 
budget surplus of 7.5 per cent of GDP: budget surplus plus GDP growth is equal 
to approximately 13  per  cent of GDP, outstripping inflation. Add to this the 
impressive US$120 billion trade surplus, US$245 billion worth of international 
reserves, and a US$70 billion Stabilisation Fund31 to safeguard against a drop in 
27 Dale R. Herspring, Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 
MD, 2005, p. 137.
28 Herspring, Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, p. 137.
29 ‘Country Briefings: Russia—Economic Data’, Economist, available at <http://www.economist.com>, 
accessed 7 May 2008; and ‘Russia—Defence Economics’, in The Military Balance 2006, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2006, p. 150.
30 Mikhail Fradkov in, ‘Russia’s GDP to Grow by Annual 5.7% in 2007–2009’, 29 May 2006, available at 
<http://www.mosnews.com>, accessed 12 October 2006.
31 Andrew Rozanov, ‘Russia and the G7: Time to Spend’, The World Today, vol. 62, no. 7, July 2006, available 
at <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/1403/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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oil prices, and the Russian economy looks to be in good shape. A statement in 
the Economist indicated: ‘When Mr. Putin became President, its GDP was the 
world’s 10th biggest and foreign reserves stood at US$8.5 billion. Today, Russia’s 
economy is the world’s 8th largest, and the reserves are US$407.5 billion.’32
In light of these figures, Putin can view economic developments with some 
satisfaction, but it must be tempered by the fact that the price of oil is not 
controlled by Russia and cannot therefore be credited to his Administration.33 
Even so, Putin has led an economic restoration of Russia, quite different to 
the impact of perestroika and glasnost in the 1980s.34 Russia is on a path to 
protectionism under Putin and now Medvedev, who have re-nationalised the 
resource and defence sectors over the past four years. The outlook for economic 
reform and continued economic growth over the next several years is positive 
and this will directly assist the resurgence of the OPK over the same period. 
Russia’s Growing Share of the Global Arms Trade 
and Developments within its Export Market
Russian arms have performed very well on the global market. While in the West 
some states maintain reservations regarding equipment reliability, successes in 
Asia, the Middle East and now Latin America are irrefutable. In fact, the quality 
of much Russian equipment sold abroad is seen as comparable to the products 
of the United States and European manufacturers.35
From 2001–2004, the United States and Russia dominated the arms market in 
the developing world.36 As is to be expected, the United States ranked first, but, 
interestingly, Russia ranked second (over France and the United Kingdom) in 
each of the aforementioned four years in the value of arms transfer agreements.37 
Moreover, Russia actually managed to increase its sales by approximately 
57  per  cent from 2000–2004, whilst global arms agreements values fell by 
12 per cent over the same period. This is impressive, as it means that Moscow 
actually increased its arms exports during a period of global downturn. Russia 
made US$21.7 billion in arms transfer agreements, or 29.1 per cent of the total.38 
Again, these figures point to a dramatic increase in both Russian sales and sales 
agreements within a relatively flat arms market.
32 ‘Putin’s People’, Economist, 25–31 August 2007, p. 11.
33 Herspring, Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, p. 122.
34 Herspring, Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, p. 137.
35 ‘Defence Production and R&D’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia, Janes Information Group, 
Coulsdon, Surrey, September 2005.
36 For use in Richard Grimmett’s report to Congress, the term ‘developing world’ includes all countries 
except the United States, Russia, European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
37 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997-2004, Report for Congress, 
U.S. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 29 August 2005, available at <http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/52179.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009, summary section.
38 Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997-2004, summary section.
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Importantly, these increases have been accompanied by an important change 
in the profile of the customers. The traditional arms clients of the former Soviet 
Union were more often than not poorer developing countries valued for their 
ideological tendencies and desire for Soviet weaponry, rather than their financial 
credentials. Many of these traditional Soviet client states received substantial 
military aid grants and significant discounts on their arms purchases. 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 these practices were 
greatly curtailed, as newly privatised defence industries began the hunt for 
finance. Faced with stiff competition from Western suppliers, during the global 
downturn in the arms market in the 1990s, Russia gradually adapted its selling 
practices in an effort to regain and sustain an important share of the developing 
world arms market.39 Rosoboronexport, the sole state intermediary agency for 
the Russian arms export market, was largely responsible for this resurgence. 
The strong post-2000 figures are indicative of the success resulting from this 
shift in policy. Figure 1.1 outlines total arms agreement values, by country, from 
1997 to 2004:
Figure 1.1: Arms sales (agreements) ranked by Supplier, 1997–2004  
(in constant 2004 million US Dollars and percentage of world sales)
(Source: The Grimmett Report, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997-2004, Report for 
Congress, U.S. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 29 August 2005, available at <http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/52179.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009)
39 Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997-2004, p. 7.
Book.indb   10 23/12/09   11:24 AM
Phoenix from the Ashes?
11
The important lesson from the data in Figure 1.1 is the fact that Russia has near 
parity with the United States in terms of sales to developing nations. Moreover, 
over the next five years, the likelihood is that Russia will have overtaken the 
United States in sales to developing nations, as Russian equipment gains a 
foothold in a greater number of geographic regions. These developments also 
come at a time when the United States is losing popularity around the globe, 
both politically and as an arms supplier.
More recently, the Russian OPK has become aware of the influence of global 
geo-strategic shifts resulting from the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the United States. These shifts involve the erosion of the previously existing 
alliance between conservative Islamic regimes and the West, primarily the 
United States. From an arms sales perspective, one of the first signs of the 
deterioration of Islamic-American relations began with the 2003 contract 
for the delivery of 18  Sukhoi Su-30MKM Flanker fighters to Malaysia. This 
contract was estimated as only marginally probable prior to the US invasion 
of Afghanistan, and was even less probable when considering the problems of 
serviceability Malaysia had encountered with their other Russian purchase, the 
MiG-29 Fulcrum, and the fact that US F/A-18 Hornet fighters were already in the 
Malaysian inventory.40 Furthermore, Russia made its first arms sale to Morocco 
in 2005 (an agreement for Tunguska air-defence systems) and has exported to 
Kuwait, the UAE and Egypt in the last five years, all of which were traditionally 
recipients of US weaponry. 
Russian encroachment into traditionally Western arms markets is not exclusively 
a result of rising anti-Americanism. It also stems from apprehension within 
many of these countries (such as Indonesia and India) that the United States 
is no longer a reliable source of weaponry because of its policy of embargo. 
Both India and Indonesia have recently had US arms embargoes lifted—India’s 
embargo was imposed after its nuclear tests in 1998, whilst the embargo imposed 
on Indonesia stemmed from human rights abuses. Interestingly, neither of these 
nations have purchased sizeable amounts of US weaponry since the embargoes 
have been lifted, preferring Russian equipment. Indonesia recently indicated 
its preference for new Russian Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker aircraft, rather than spare 
parts and upgrades for existing US F-16 Falcon aircraft. Whilst in some cases less 
advanced (and indeed less expensive) than US equipment, it is perceived that 
at least the Russian equipment and its associated spare parts will continue to 
arrive regardless of any political or human-rights indiscretions. 
40 Konstantin Makienko, ‘Financial Results of Russian Arms Trade With Foreign State in 2004’, Moscow 
Defense Brief, 2005, available at <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2005/at/financial_results/>, accessed 28  April 
2009.
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Traditionally seen as the Achilles heel of Russian arms exports, after-sales 
support has improved markedly in the last few years, and is one area, if 
tackled successfully, that will help maintain large export figures in the long-
term. Concerted efforts have been made by Rosoboronexport and the weapons 
manufacturers to improve the level of after-sales service for their equipment. 
Rosoboronexport has opened affiliated servicing agencies in India and China 
(its primary customers) in an effort to sustain exports and after-sales support—a 
move mirrored to date in 32 other countries.41 This turnaround can be attributed 
to Putin, whose September 2002 decree initiated the process whereby a number 
of OPK enterprises gained independent access to the spare parts market. 
Prior to this, only the arms supplier, Rosoboronexport, provided after-
sales support. Contracts for after-sales service are of little interest to state 
intermediaries such as Rosoboronexport. Unlike arms sales, they require quick 
and operative work and are not as profitable.42 However, Rosoboronexport does 
realise that focusing on after-sales service is a necessary inconvenience, and 
has made its own efforts to rectify the situation. Therefore, with the relevant 
enterprises providing after-sales service in an effort to ease the strain on 
Rosoboronexport in this sector, an altogether more efficient export system is in 
operation. Alexander Denisov, first deputy director of the Federal Service for 
Military and Technical Cooperation stated in December 2005: ‘Deliveries of spare 
parts and components for Russian military hardware have grown tenfold in the 
past two years. In 2003, US$20 million worth of spare parts were delivered, in 
2005 we expect US$300 million.’43
This expectation of revenue was duly received, and in 2006, US$1.5 billion was 
made from after-sales servicing and the provision of spare parts, a 500 per cent 
increase over the previous year.44 According to Denisov, many pieces of Soviet-
era military hardware delivered to various countries are in need of spare parts: 
a market he believed to be worth approximately US$10  billion.45 When it is 
considered that the total volume of the military spare parts market constitutes 
up to 25 per cent of the cost of the equipment serviced, and up to 40 per cent for 
aviation equipment, it is easy to see how a figure of US$10 billion is calculated.46 
With after-sales service now firmly in the radar of the Kremlin policy-makers, 
41 Luca Bonsignore, ‘The Future of Rosoboronexport’, NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, vol.  49, 
no. 1, 2004, p. 178.
42 Konstantin Lantratov; Aleksandra Gritskova and Luiza Ignatyeva, ‘Military Spare Parts: Abroad Oriented’, 
Kommersant, 16 November 2005, available at <http://www.kommersant.com/p625463/r_1/Military_Spare_
Parts_Abroad-Oriented/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
43 Alexander Denisov, in James Murphy, ‘Russian Defence Exports Decline’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
7 December 2005.
44 Viktor Litovkin, ‘Russian arms exports break records’, RIA Novosti, 8 March 2007, available at <http://
www.spacewar.com/reports/Russian_Arms_Exports_Break_Records_999.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
45 Murphy, ‘Russian Defence Exports Decline’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 December 2005.
46 Lantratov, Gritskova and Ignatyeva, ‘Military Spare Parts: Abroad Oriented’.
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its weak reputation in this field is slowly but steadily being rectified, and will 
begin to make itself noticed on the arms export balance-sheet. This factor, in 
conjunction with successful efforts in market expansion, will all help to retain 
the larger arms export figures seen since 2000.
Other than after-sales service, another new trend is appearing within Russian 
arms exports: the growing presence of naval platforms. 2005 was a good year 
for Russian shipbuilders, with approximately 40 per cent of total arms exports 
comprising naval equipment. This has enabled several shipyards in Russia to 
remain open. Shipyards, such as Zelenogorsk, Yantar and Krasnoye Sormovo 
whose future was far from certain a few years ago, have since completed or are 
laying down Gepard frigates for Vietnam, Talwar frigates for India and Kilo-class 
submarines for China respectively. The renaissance in naval exports looks set to 
continue for the foreseeable future. Boosting revenues from naval equipment, 
China received the remainder of eight Kilo-class submarines and two improved 
Sovremennyy destroyers from a 2003 contract valued at over US$3  billion in 
late 2006. Short-term sales are also being complemented with much interest 
in the export versions of the new generation Project  20380 Steregushchyy 
frigates47 and Project 677 Lada-class submarines,48 both fresh from the Russian 
design bureaux. Indonesia, Algeria and Venezuela may have already ordered 
the Steregushchyy as part of opaque deals with Moscow—along with Project 
636 Kilo-class submarines, while India has shown strong interest in the Amur-
class submarine.
Geographically too, there has been a significant shift in the location of Russia’s 
defence exports. The Far East represents one of the most important geographical 
areas for Russia as far as arms exports are concerned. Historically second behind 
the Middle East in terms of arms purchases, Far East Asia moved into first place 
during the period 2001–2004. Delving further into the figures, Russia actually 
ranked first in Asian arms deliveries in the 2001–2004 period, with US$4.5 billion 
more in sales than the United States.49 Indeed, Richard Grimmett, author of the 
Congressional Research Service report to Congress entitled Conventional Arms 
Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997–2004, sees this trend continuing for the 
foreseeable future: 
Until such time as the Indians and the Chinese stop buying as much as 
they have, and until such time as the Middle Eastern oil barons start 
making major buys, I don’t see this trend changing in the next year or 
so, it’s going to take a while.50
47  The export variant is known as the Project 20382 Tigr.
48 The export variant is known as the Amur class.
49 ‘Asia overtakes M. East as developing world’s arms market’, 3 September 2005, Agence France-Presse, 
available at <http://www.inq7.net>, accessed 6 February 2006.
50 Richard Grimmett cited in ‘Asia overtakes M. East as developing world’s arms market’.
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Asia has a significant role to play in helping Moscow revive its defence industries. 
Such a revitalisation, in turn, would provide an important pillar supporting 
Russia’s rebirth as a major power. China and India have most consistently 
dominated the list of Russia’s defence-related markets in recent years. Trade 
links have increased and both countries are continuing to produce Russia’s most 
advanced products such as the Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 Flanker fighters under 
licence. These links will remain a core market for Russian military products, 
despite the projected contractions within these markets.51 The crucial part these 
two nations play with regard to the success of Russian arms exports will be 
examined below, and in further detail in chapters 4 and 5.
Arms sales and military technology transfers to China expanded rapidly in the 
mid-1990s, although many Russian defence officials had strong reservations 
about sharing advanced technology with such an unpredictable neighbour. 
From China’s perspective, Russia is a source of sophisticated, reasonably 
priced armaments that are unavailable to them from the West. For Russia, 
China is another source of hard currency and another market to stimulate OPK 
resurgence.52 China has made it clear to Russia that it is interested in developing 
its armed forces through local weapons development programs based on foreign 
technologies. Increasing Russian arms sales to China are but one very important 
sign of a growing alliance between Moscow and Beijing aimed at undermining 
the US position as the world’s sole superpower. After several years of stagnation, 
Russian arms sales to China were restored in 1991 with 26 Su-27 Flanker fighter 
aircraft worth an estimated US$1 billion.53 In fact, China was the OPKs primary 
customer throughout the 1990s. 
In particular, China’s focus has been on boosting its air and naval force 
capabilities. Between 1991 and 1996, Russian weapons sales to China were 
worth an estimated US$1  billion per year. Between 1996 and 2001, the rate 
of sales doubled to US$2 billion per year.54 These figures constituted the bulk 
of total Russian arms exports until 2000–2001, when Indian contracts became 
more substantial, and Putin, Sergei Ivanov and Rosoboronexport made inroads 
into other markets as part of an export diversification drive.
China is building a modern air force to operate over the East China and South 
China Seas. Between 1993 and 1997 it acquired 74 more Su-27 Flankers, and the 
rights to produce 200 more under Russian licence. Su-30MKK multi-role fighters 
as well as in-flight refuellers and helicopters have also been made. Moreover, 
51 Robert A. Karniol, ‘Russian industry hunts out a future for itself’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 March 2000.
52 Dmitri V. Trenin, ‘Russia between America and China’, 23 June 2005, available at <http://www.carnegie.
ru/en/pubs/media/72788.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
53 Trenin ‘Russia between America and China’.
54 Ariel Cohen, The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in Eurasia?, 
Backgrounder no. 1459, Heritage Foundation, 18 July 2001, available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/
RussiaandEurasia/BG1459.cfm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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China has clearly achieved breakthroughs in missile technology by importing 
systems and prototypes from Russia. It is deploying long-range S-300 (SA-10 
Grumble and SA-20 Gargoyle) air defence systems to protect its short-range 
ballistic missile bases that are deployed to target Taiwan. It is also developing 
indigenous surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as the HQ-9, which is based on 
the aforementioned long-ranged and capable S-300 Russian design.55 As for 
naval hardware, since 1994 China purchased eight Russian diesel-powered Kilo-
class submarines and four Sovremennyy-class guided missile destroyers. Ariel 
Cohen, a reputable Sino-Russian defence analyst observes:
The relationship between China and Russia is symbiotic. China is 
acquiring capabilities to counter U.S. naval and air power in the Far 
East and intimidate neighbors like Taiwan. Russia is seeking to become 
a regional rival to the United States, maintaining its defense industrial 
base and using money from arms sales to China and others to modernize 
its own armed forces.56
Ever since arms transfers from Russia to China began in 1992, the Chinese market 
has been the recipient of between one-fifth and one-half of Russian arms exports. 
No doubt, against the background of the collapse of Russian domestic military 
procurement in the 1990s, this has helped a number of arms manufacturers 
to survive. Over the past decade and a half, mutual dependencies have been 
formed between Russia and China. Essentially, the Russian Government and the 
defence establishment are satisfied that the Chinese war machine, now and in 
the foreseeable future, is not focusing on the north, but rather on the east and 
southeast.57
However, the Chinese market will inevitably contract in the coming years as their 
own indigenous industries improve, so Rosoboronexport and the independent 
exporters within the OPK have been actively fostering other markets. These 
include customers in Latin America and Southeast Asia, but these markets have 
a more limited capacity than that of China. However, in combination with more 
Middle East contracts, they should ensure that the annual takings for Russian 
arms remain above US$6 billion.
India and Russia have a tradition of cooperation in armaments that dates back 
to the 1960s. During the late 1990s, in view of ongoing arms imports by its 
traditional enemy Pakistan and persistent suspicion of neighbouring China, India 
needed new equipment from Russia to modernise its armed forces. Among key 
purchases were Russian technology for armoured vehicles, artillery, and naval 
systems in addition to aircraft. In early 1996, experts estimated that as much as 
55 ‘HQ-9’, in Jane’s Ground Based Air Defence, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 2006.
56 Cohen, The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in Eurasia?.
57 Trenin, ‘Russia between America and China’.
Book.indb   15 23/12/09   11:24 AM
Phoenix from the Ashes?
16
70 per cent of India’s armaments had been purchased from Russia. As a result, 
India still relies heavily on Russia for its arms and Moscow enjoys the rewards of 
being New Delhi’s largest supplier. New Delhi has bought US$33 billion worth 
of weapons from Moscow since the 1960s and Russian weapons account for 
nearly three quarters of India’s arsenal. For instance, the former Soviet Union 
and Russia together have built a total of 67 naval vessels for India.58
In January 2004, Russia and India signed nearly 20  contracts involving the 
provision of Russian weapons and technology. One of these contracts, estimated 
to be worth US$1.5  billion, involved the Russian upgrade of the Admiral 
Gorshkov aircraft carrier and its delivery to India by 2010. India will only pay 
Russia for the refurbishment of the Admiral Gorshkov, which will cost around 
US$650  million. Additionally, US$730  million will be paid for sixteen MiG-
29K Fulcrum carrier-borne multi-role fighters, and eight Kamov helicopters.59 
Furthermore, Indian reliance upon Russian expertise was highlighted by a 
development in the licence production of 140  Su-30MKI Flanker aircraft by 
Indian air company Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The original agreement 
included full licence production of a number of the aircraft, while the others 
would be sold by the Irkut company in kit form or fully assembled. However, 
it became clear in 2006 that completing the order with Indian construction of 
Russian-made kits, rather than full licence production, would not only save on 
costs, but also shave three to five years off the final delivery date. This option 
was duly exercised by the Indians, and has thus given the OPK more work 
and Irkut an additional US$350 million.60 Russia has also provided India with 
130  T-90S tanks, with 180 more sent in kit form for Indian assembly, and a 
further 690 to be produced under licence in India up to 2020.61
Cooperation between Moscow and Delhi has also seen more than 10  000 
Indian military officers educated and trained in the Soviet Union and Russia.62 
In order to maintain the momentum in arms cooperation, Moscow and New 
Delhi have been steadily advancing their military cooperation into fields such 
as joint research, development, and co-production. For example, they jointly 
developed and successfully launched the BrahMos cruise missile. India is also 
collaborating with Russia on joint production of a medium transport aircraft, 
creatively named MTA. The hope is that this collaboration will prove successful 
58 Rouben Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, Special Assessment: 
Asia’s Bilateral Relations, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2004, p.  1-1 to p.  1-8 (1-6), 
available at <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/Russia-IndiaRelationsAzizian.
pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009.
59 Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, p. 1-6.
60 ‘Production of Sukhoi Su-30MKI to be hastened, new deadline 2012’, 1 September 2006, India Defence, 
available at <http://www.india-defence.com>, accessed 14 January 2007.
61 ‘Army to acquire nearly 1000 additional T90 tanks by 2020’, 4 October 2006, India Defence, available at 
<http://www.india-defence.com/reports-2577>, accessed 28 April 2009.
62 Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, p. 1-6.
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enough to warrant a medium fifth-generation fighter joint venture that would 
complement Russia’s own heavy-weight PAK-FA fifth-generation program. More 
broadly, India is the only country collaborating with Russia on joint production 
of sophisticated and futuristic weapon systems.63
Partly because of the predicted reductions in export contracts with China and 
to a lesser extent India, concerns that the Russian OPK would struggle to export 
arms at a level equating to the previous post Soviet record of US$5.78 billion 
in 2004 have been significantly allayed. As stated previously, the 2008 figure 
reached US$8 billion. A figure between US$6 billion and US$7 billion seems to 
be the commonly cited prediction for exports over the next few years. This is 
in large part thanks to the market diversification drive that has seen renewed 
successes in Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. 
It must also be remembered that revenues from arms exports will be augmented 
with an ever-increasing SDO that reached US$11.5 billion in 2007.64
There is currently a Russian arms market diversification triangle that covers 
three geographic regions: Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. 
In 2006 Russia signed multi-billion dollar arms contracts with Venezuela and 
Algeria, and Indonesia’s acceptance of a US$1 billion export credit offer confirmed 
that Russian diversification efforts into all three geographic regions have been 
successful. Rosoboronexport, the state-owned arms exporter, has championed this 
diversification effort and hopes that the sales to Venezuela, Algeria and Indonesia 
will stimulate further sales within these countries’ respective geographic regions. 
Recent Russian arms contracts with Mexico, Brazil and Morocco indicate that this 
ploy has been successful and that the Indonesian arms agreement may generate a 
similar response within Southeast Asia.
In the Middle East, Iran could potentially return to its pre-2000 status as a strong 
customer, although the current political situation regarding resumption of their 
nuclear program will play a major role in future arms deliveries. Agreements 
during the 1990s between Russia and Iran saw deliveries of Mig-29 Fulcrum and 
Su-24 Fencer aircraft, T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), and Project 877 Kilo-class 
submarines.65 A subsequent Russian agreement with the United States, the 1995 
Gore-Chernomyrdin Protocol, saw the suspension of arms deliveries until 2000. 
In fact, despite small-scale, post-2000 deliveries, a major contract did not occur 
until December 2005, when a significant US$1 billion contract for air-defence 
systems renewed the relationship after a long hiatus. 
63 Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, p. 1-7.
64 Andrey Frolov, ‘Russian Defence Procurement in 2007’, Moscow Defense Brief, 2007, available at <http://
mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2007/item1/item2>, accessed 28 April 2009.
65 Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997–2004, p. 8.
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Russia has strengthened its commercial position in other Middle Eastern 
countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria, where it sees a significant 
market not only in sales, but also replacement and refit of the huge Soviet-era 
stocks still operated by these countries. The recent US$7.5 billion agreement 
with Algeria included ships, tanks and aircraft, including a ‘buy-back’ scheme 
where Algeria returned two Soviet-era aircraft in exchange for one modernised 
Russian aircraft—a scheme sure to spike the interest of Libya and Syria, 
whose arsenals are flush with Soviet equipment. Expansion of the Middle East 
market has been very successful and has enabled sales to Morocco, Kuwait and 
significant sales to the UAE—all traditional purchasers of Western equipment. 
Furthermore, Yemen, a traditional Soviet arms recipient, bought no arms from 
Russia in the 1990s. Since then, however, it has placed and received significant 
orders from Russia for state-of-the-art MBTs (T-90), Armoured Personnel 
Carriers (APCs) (BMP-2 upgrade) and aeroplanes (MIG-29SMT).66
Arms exports to Latin America immediately after the Cold War were modest, 
but the market opened up in the second half of the 1990s. The first exports 
were in the field of cargo aviation, and especially helicopters. Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and now Venezuela are the countries from this region that have 
completed the most important business deals with Russia, including a recent 
Mexican order for Su-27 Flanker fighter aircraft.67 The military relationship 
between Russia and Venezuela was established quite recently, but it shows good 
dynamics and looks to have a very good future.68 An agreement signed by Hugo 
Chavez and Vladimir Putin in Moscow in 2001 laid the framework for military 
cooperation and it bore fruit in 2005 with contracts for small arms, transport 
and attack helicopters being signed. Future deliveries may include submarines 
and fighter aircraft, as Caracas moves steadily away from the US camp. This 
would change the balance of power in South America, necessitating future 
procurement by Venezuela’s neighbours—an action sure to stimulate future 
Russian sales to the region. 
Russian flexible finance policies for arms sales, including possible arms for 
energy deals, and a visibly increasing presence within Southeast Asia’s arms 
shows, have begun to make an impact in this region. Strong export growth 
in Southeast Asia has occurred through repeat customers such as Vietnam, 
Malaysia and Myanmar. These customers have been augmented in recent years 
with newer customers such as Indonesia and Singapore. The most notable 
arms agreements for Russia include an unconfirmed ‘arms for oil’ deal with 
Myanmar in early 2006 and an export credit offer of US$1 billion to Indonesia. 
66 Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997–2004, p. 8.
67 Antonio Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 56, no. 5, July 2004, pp. 687–706 (691).
68 ‘Naval Equipment in Total Russian Arms Exports Equals Over 50 Percent’, Agentstvo Voyennykh 
Novostey, Moscow, 23 August 2005, available at <http://www.interfax.com>, accessed 8 February 2006.
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The breakdown of the hardware pertaining to the Indonesian deal included two 
Kilo-class submarines and an assortment of helicopters and armoured vehicles. 
This was formalised in September 2007 during Putin’s Jakarta visit.
While most recent Russian arms sales have been to developing countries within 
Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, some success is evident in Europe. 
Russia has managed to sell arms to Greece, France and the United Kingdom, 
and sales have mainly been of air defence systems (the UK purchase was for 
Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) to be utilised in an anti-terrorist 
training role)69. Sales to France are so far confined to the guided Krasnopol 
artillery shell. On the other hand, a number of examples of collaboration 
between Russia and France/Italy/European Union has been observed with the 
MiG Advanced Trainer (MiG-AT), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and Russian 
Regional Jet collaboration respectively. 
The other intriguing development within the European arms market has been 
Russian interest in the defence giant EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and 
Space Company). Although Putin ruled out a hostile takeover of the company, 
Vneshtorgbank, Russia’s state-run foreign trade bank, acquired a 5.02 per cent 
stake in EADS in September 2006. There is a possibility that the Vneshtorgbank 
shares of EADS could be transferred to the new Russian Unified Aircraft 
Corporation (OAK), if Russian industrial participation within EADS is agreed 
upon.70 Needless to say, Russian state involvement in EADS will be beneficial for 
its own defence industry in the longer-term.
Niche Russian Military Products and the Big 
Sellers
An important element in the resurgence of arms exports has been the 
particular niche that many Russian systems occupy. Russian weapon systems 
offer excellent value for money, as they are both competitively priced and 
technologically advanced. Russian-made fighter aircraft and helicopters are 
durable, inexpensive to maintain and come with armour-plating, which enables 
them to sustain damage from small arms and rocket fire.71 All of these qualities 
set them apart from the bulk of their Western equivalents. 
A contributing factor to the resurgence of Russian arms exports is the unique 
capabilities some of these arms possess. Although much of the weaponry is 
69 Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry’, p. 692.
70 James Murphy, ‘Putin moves to allay fears over EADS share buy’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 October 2006.
71 ‘Defence Production and R&D’, in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia, Janes Information Group, 
Coulsdon, Surrey, September 2005.
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criticised for being less advanced than its US or European counterparts, there 
are some systems that the West can not better or indeed match. Russian missile 
technologies, specifically surface-to-air and anti-ship varieties, are widely 
regarded as being in a class of their own. Furthermore, thermobaric munitions 
and thrust-vector technologies (TVT) for aircraft engines are fields in which 
many experts regard Russia as master. Thermobaric munitions are essentially 
a fuel-air explosive that disperses an aerosol cloud of fuel which is ignited by 
a detonator to produce an explosion.72 The shockwave produced from such 
an explosion flattens all objects within close proximity of the explosion, and 
further out, soft targets such as personnel face such horrors as the rupturing of 
internal body organs. These munitions were used to devastating effect during 
the two Chechen conflicts and, because of their relatively low cost and ease of 
use (some warheads may be fitted as a standard Rocket-Propelled Grenade), they 
are an appealing export item. 
As ingenious as thermobaric munitions, but far more expensive, is the concept of 
all-aspect TVT. This is a field in which Russia also excels—US experimentation 
with TVT still only enables vertical movement (as on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) variant). This technology has been fitted 
on late-model Sukhoi Flanker variants, and the MiG-35 Fulcrum. TVT enables 
‘super-manoeuvrability’ which aids dog-fighting, anti-missile manoeuvres and 
safety at low air speeds.73 Russia hopes that such technologies will increase the 
longevity of some of their best-selling defence systems.
Below are the most prolific export items that Russia has sold since the end of the 
Cold War. Certainly, the T-72, T-80 and T-90 MBTs have sold relatively well, as 
have the new generation of wheeled BTR family APCs, and tracked BMP family 
APCs. However, these items are exported at levels far lower than their Soviet 
forebears, whereas those mentioned below have sustained or surpassed their 
level of export during the Communist era.
Project 877/636 Kilo-class submarines
These Soviet-era submarines are still very capable platforms, due to the high 
potential for upgrade and the fact that, prior to upgrade, they were already 
one of the quietest submarines in the world. The original design was the 877, 
while the 636 variant has improved range, firepower, acoustic characteristics 
and reliability.74 Both variants have been widely exported, including to Algeria, 
72 ‘Fuel/Air Explosive (FAE)’, GlobalSecurity.org, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
systems/munitions/fae.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
73 ‘Russia Aims to Make its MiG-35 Fighter the Pinnacle of ‘Fulcrum’ Development’, Jane’s International 
Defence Review, 1 January 2006.
74  ‘Project 877 Kilo class’, GlobalSecurity, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
russia/877.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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Iran, Poland and Romania who received the 877 variant. The biggest customers 
were India, who received ten 877 variants (all of which are now upgraded), and 
China, who received two 877 and ten 636 variants. These submarines can be 
or are already armed with the ‘Klub-S’ missile system, which fires the vaunted 
Novator 3M-54 Alfa (SS-N-27) missile. The major selling-point for the Kilo family 
of submarines is their acoustic characteristics and the impressive weapons fit 
that can include a mix of anti-ship or anti-submarine missiles and long-range 
wake-homing torpedoes. Export orders are expected to continue, with interest 
from repeat customers such as Algeria and China and new customers such as 
Indonesia, Venezuela and Vietnam. 
Sukhoi Su-27/30 Flanker Family Fighters
Perhaps the best performing Russian defence export product since 1991, the 
development of these remarkable aircraft was far from smooth. After the first 
12 had been produced, a complete redesign took place and it is a credit to the 
aircraft and its design that it survived such upheaval in its early years. In fact, 
the aircraft went on to break 34 world records in terms of performance and 
quality of weaponry, and was the basis for a whole family of high-performance 
aircraft.75 The beauty of the aircraft from an export perspective is the ability to 
modify the basic design to suit client preferences. Moreover, the aircraft has 
proved itself through evaluation against US F-15 Eagles and in Indian exercises 
against both Singaporean F-16 Falcons and French Mirage-2000s. This glittering 
record, in conjunction with a very competitive sale price, has led to sales in 
Africa, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Venezuela, Vietnam and the 
former Soviet republics, as well as interest from Thailand. 
MiG-29 Fulcrum Family Fighters
Like the Flanker family, the Mig-29 Fulcrum design benefits from ease of 
major modification and upgrade. This has preserved its longevity and given 
the aircraft a new lease of life. Widely exported between 1989 and 2000, the 
Mig-29 has been exported to approximately 20 countries. A lull in sales then 
ensued, whereby the only exports were of old Russian Air Force stock to poorer 
African nations. However, shrewd marketing by RSK MiG, and the introduction 
of a new, very capable derivative that includes the option for current operators 
to upgrade their existing fleet and/or procure new aircraft, has seen sales rise 
markedly since 2003. India, Algeria and Yemen have procured large numbers of 
the new variant, known as the MiG-29SMT, and Venezuela is another potential 
customer. The SMT variant rectifies low combat-radius and low airframe lifetime 
75 Ian Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 143.
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issues that were associated with the original design and also provides an air-to-
ground capability not available on earlier variants.76 India is perhaps the biggest 
potential customer for this fighter, as it already operates a large number of the 
aircraft. India has also signed a contract for the navalised variant, the Mig-29K, 
to operate from the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft-carrier, also bought from Russia 
and currently undergoing refit. India’s interest lies not in the SMT variant, but 
rather the MiG-35, designed with Indian export in mind. This variant is the 
pinnacle of Fulcrum development, and is powered by the uniquely Russian all-
aspect TVT. It is a front-runner in the widely publicised Indian requirement 
for 126  medium multi-role combat aircraft. It is estimated that fulfilling the 
requirement will cost India around US$9 billion and, if MiG is successful, it will 
preserve the company’s viability for many years to come.
Air-Defence Systems
Cold War military doctrine has played a major part in the success of Russian 
made air defence systems. The former Soviet Union believed in an umbrella 
ground-based air-defence network that ranged from shoulder-fired SAMs, to 
the huge long-range and high-altitude systems that began with the SA-1 Guild 
missile complex. US doctrine evolved to combat such defences and, as such, 
focused on deep-penetration aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom II, armed with 
anti-radiation missiles designed to knock out Soviet air-defence radars. Today, 
the legacy of such doctrine is clear to see, with US air-defence systems almost 
exclusively based on the Patriot or recently retired I-Hawk systems. Russia’s 
ground-based air-defence systems are far more numerous, and continue to 
evolve. The most current systems are: the short-range SA-19 Grisom missile, on 
which the mobile Tunguska and Pantsyr systems are based; the medium-range 
Tor system (SA-15 Gauntlet); and the pinnacle of SAM development, the 400 km 
range, anti-missile capable S-400 Triumf system.77 All of these complexes, or 
derivatives of them, have been or are expected to be widely proliferated and are 
well respected by Western analysts. 
Mil Mi-8/17 Utility Helicopters
Far less exotic than the air-defence systems, but nonetheless just as important 
from an export perspective, are the Mil Mi-8/17 family of helicopters. Over-
engineered, rugged, and combat-proven, these helicopters have been exported 
to over 70 countries and remain popular due to their almost legendary reliability 
76 ‘MiG-29 SMT Fulcrum’, GlobalSecurity, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
russia/mig-29smt.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
77 ‘Russia successfully tests new S-400 air defense system’, RIA Novosti, 13 July 2007, available at <http://
en.rian.ru/russia/20070713/68912072.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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and low-maintenance.78 The helicopter has seen over 40 years of service and 
the latest variant, the Mi-17, is still a popular export choice, with Venezuela 
the latest customer. Indeed, it was widely rumoured that the United States 
was a keen potential customer during Operation Enduring Freedom. The Mi-
17 high-altitude variant was designed as a direct result of Soviet helicopter 
experiences in Afghanistan and the United States begrudgingly conceded 
that it was the best helicopter for the job within Afghanistan’s rugged and 
mountainous regions.
The Future of the OPK out to 2015 and Beyond
The aforementioned Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indian markets will 
inevitably contract in the coming years as their own indigenous industries 
improve. This has led Rosoboronexport and the independent companies within 
the OPK to actively foster other markets. These include customers in Latin 
America and Southeast Asia—markets that have a more limited capacity than 
those of India and China. However, in combination with more Middle Eastern 
contracts, they should ensure that the annual takings for Russian arms remain 
above US$6 billion. The US$20 billion worth of export contracts will guarantee 
the workload of the country’s defence industry over the next five years. 
Moreover, domestic orders through the 2006 SDO equated to US$9  billion, 
of which nearly 70 per cent (US$6 billion) was spent on procurement and 
maintenance, and 30 per cent for military R&D.79 This was followed in December 
2006 by the signing of a US$189 billion State Armaments Program 2007–2015, 
which stipulates that 80 per cent (US$149 billion) of the funding will be spent on 
procurement and maintenance, and the rest on R&D.80 Even if these optimistic 
figures are not adhered to, what does come from the government, in conjunction 
with the growing export order, will see OPK production lines running steady 
until the end of the program. The short-term viability of the OPK was never 
really in doubt. It is the longer-term, beyond 2015, that will require buttressing 
from domestic and external drivers to ensure OPK longevity.
Predicting the success of the OPK past 2015 is more difficult. There are a number 
of domestic and external drivers that are required to keep the industry bouyant 
within this timeframe. Domestically, there are six key drivers. The first is to 
ensure a more concrete linkage to army reforms within the OPK restructure. 
Attempts have been made to facilitate this, particularly with the introduction 
78 See entry for ‘Mil Mi-8’ in Wikipedia, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-8>, accessed 
28 April 2009.
79 The Military Balance 2006, p. 151.
80 Isakova, ‘The Russian Defense Reform’.
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of the Military Industrial Commission in 2006, headed by First Deputy Prime 
Minister Sergei Ivanov. This role has given Ivanov more control and input into 
the structure and workings of the OPK. The second is the promotion of more 
active attempts to battle endemic corruption within the industry. The current 
policies must be sustained and more focused, as the problems are deep-rooted 
and enduring. The third driver has been the most successfully implemented 
to date: the restructuring of the OPK. This has led to greater efficiency and 
coordination across the industry as a whole. Fourth, Dmitry Medvedev and 
Ivanov must ensure that Russia itself becomes the number one customer for 
its defence industry, by modernising and upgrading significant sections of the 
defence forces. Rather than the piecemeal attempts that have been witnessed to 
date, wholesale replacement of Soviet-era equipment must occur so as to sustain 
large production lines within the defence industry.
The remaining two domestic drivers for long-term OPK success are closely 
linked to the external drivers. These are the continued success and utilisation 
of the state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and the requirement of the OPK to 
commission new joint ventures with India. These joint ventures will provide 
the OPK with valuable R&D funding, which will sustain it in the long-term as it 
develops new technologies.
The external drivers required for OPK longevity involve sustaining export 
earnings from arms transfers. This will occur through the continuation of 
Rosoboronexport’s market diversification drive into Latin America, the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia. Diversification efforts will pay dividends for the OPK as 
it will counteract the predicted contraction within the more traditional overseas 
markets. To ensure that these traditional overseas markets do not contract too 
much, Russia will probably permit greater technology transfer, or even shift 
its exports to higher-end niche military equipment. These actions will enable 
Russia to maintain the high exports figures it has worked so hard to achieve 
over the last three years.
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Chapter 2  
The Origins and the Nature  
of the Russian OPK
The structure of the Russian defence industry can be very confusing to 
Westerners and even to industry analysts. The industry differs fundamentally 
from any Western model because of its Soviet, centrally-planned economic 
heritage. In order to unravel the complexities of the industry, one needs to look 
into the history of the Soviet-era military-industrial complex (VPK) and examine 
developments in the industry under the Yeltsin and Putin Administrations. This 
background creates a necessary platform for an increased understanding of the 
contemporary Russian defence-industrial complex (OPK).
The Late Soviet-era VPK
The embryo for Soviet economic advancement—including the evolution of 
the VPK, came in the form of Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan beginning in 1928. 
The first of twelve Five-Year Plans, it spawned spectacular industrial growth, 
especially in capital investment. More importantly, it laid the foundation for the 
centralised industrial planning so often associated with the Soviet Union. Heavy 
industry received much greater investment than light industry throughout the 
Stalin period, and this set the precedent for the considerable size of the late 
Soviet-era VPK.1 In the post Second World War period, and for the next 40 years 
of its adversarial relationship with the United States, the Soviet Union tried to 
compete militarily with an economy several times its size. Viewed in an historical 
light, the militarisation of the Soviet economy perhaps appears to have been 
inevitable. However, other nations, even though not as frequently involved in 
conflicts as the Soviet Union, have passed in and out of wars without their 
economies being so totally and lastingly dominated by the military sector as did 
the Soviet Union.2
Josef Stalin and his successors, influenced by the Soviet Union’s victory over 
Nazi Germany, believed that the Soviet Union’s national security depended on 
a tried and tested strategy. This involved massive conscript armies, numerical 
superiority, robust hardware, advanced technologies and extensive military-
industrial capacities and reserves. These factors would allow it to fight and 
1 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies: Soviet Union, available at <http://lcweb2.
loc.gov/frd/cs/sutoc.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
2 Clifford G. Gaddy, The Price of the Past: Russia’s Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy, 
Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 33.
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win prolonged wars against other mass armies and defend against blitzkrieg 
assaults. This national strategy put the Soviet Union in a position where it was 
outspending its post-war adversaries in the field of military procurement. It also 
made Kremlin leaders receptive to the ingratiation of the VPK, which sought to 
simultaneously advance its institutional interests while serving the country.3 
The General Staff, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the VPK never tired of 
discovering new military vulnerabilities and devising programs to redress them. 
These programs usually succeeded in an economy where consumers and rivals 
could not compete for resources in the marketplace.4
VPK expert, Vitaly Shlykov, underscores this reality with two insights. First, 
he points out that the Kremlin was not entirely oblivious of consumer needs. 
Structural militarisation was pursued through a policy of ‘guns and margarine’, 
which provided the population with a no-frills living standard while freeing up 
all other resources for defence purposes.5 Second, this militarisation continued 
unabated as technological progress increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
because military doctrine required the MoD and VPK to plan not just for the 
worst case, but for the unimaginable as well. Therefore, it was imbued in Soviet 
policy that there could never be too much defence. This modus operandi began to 
change with the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, who was concerned 
with the size of the defence budget, as a proportion of total Soviet GDP. His 
calculations were simple: whatever the Soviet Union gained by spending so 
much on its military was being threatened by its inability to make the rest of 
the economy work, especially in attempting to raise the living standards of 
its people.6 This assessment proved tragic for the Soviet Union in its brutal 
simplicity and accuracy.
The sheer scale of Soviet weapons production and defence spending is 
remarkable, especially in light of the post-Communist downward revision in 
Soviet purchasing power parity in 1989, as computed by Aleksei Ponomarenko, 
then deputy director of Goskomstat. It indicated that US Gross National Product 
(GNP) was three times higher than that of the Soviet Union at that time. The 
Kremlin devoted a disproportionate share of the nation’s resources to military 
activities. The best estimates indicate that the VPK employed 16 million people 
as well as supporting 6 million soldiers and up to 20 million reservists.7 The 
most important attribute of the Soviet production system was its structural 
militarisation. The institutionally embedded demand for weapons was seemingly 
limitless and supply capacities were continually expanded. As a consequence, 
3 Steven Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 52.
4 Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, p. 52.
5 Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, p. 51.
6 Gaddy, The Price of the Past, p. 49.
7 Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, p. 51.
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the defence share of GDP rose to 25–30 per cent during the post-war period, 
with the civilian share diminishing reciprocally. As a result, the only economic 
success the Kremlin ever achieved was mass weapons production. 
With the notable exception of Gorbachev, Soviet leaders have always emphasised 
investment in military production over investment in the civilian economy. 
This had very positive effects on the production of armaments within the 
Soviet Union, some of which were widely regarded as the world’s best. The 
downside was the Communist country’s inability to produce basic consumer 
goods of satisfactory quality or in sufficient quantities. The high priority given 
to military production has traditionally enabled military-industrial enterprises 
to commandeer the best managers, labour and materials from civilian plants. In 
the late 1980s, however, Gorbachev transferred some leading defence industry 
officials to the civilian sector of the economy in an effort to make it as efficient 
as its military counterpart.
The Soviet-era VPK also experimented with production of civilian goods. It 
was during the Brezhnev era that the Soviet Government began to turn to its 
defence plants for the production of civilian necessities. Though conversion to 
civilian production was not the order of the day, ‘conversion’ of the defence 
sector was attempted through the establishment of factories geared towards the 
development and manufacture of civilian products within a defence framework. 
These efforts, however, had very limited results (results that Boris Yeltsin would 
have benefited from examining prior to his OPK conversion drive in the 1990s). 
Even though the defence industry was well ahead of the civilian sector in terms 
of its scientific, technological, and professional standards, a technology gap 
remained within the defence sector between its civilian and its military level of 
production.8 Overall, defence factories produced a maximum of 22 per cent of 
all consumer goods other than food.9 This production of civilian goods within 
the VPK, like that of military products, was heavily subsidised by the state.
The numerous ministries and factories that made up the Soviet-era Military-
Industrial Complex were coordinated by the Military-Industrial Commission 
(also known as VPK). Officially, eight ministries fell under the direct control 
of the VPK, but numerous other so-called ‘civilian’ ministries also produced 
military equipment. In fact, nearly all of the industrial sectors within the Soviet 
economy were involved in the production of goods used by the military.10 This 
formed a vast military-industrial complex that dominated the Soviet economy 
8 Mikhail I. Gerasev and Viktor M. Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for 
Arms Exports’, Russia in the World Arms Trade, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 1997, p. 11.
9 Gerasev and Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for Arms Exports’, p. 10.
10 Mikhail Agursky, The Soviet Military Industrial Complex, The Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1980, p. 7.
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and ultimately led to structural militarisation: ‘The Military-Industrial 
Commission represented the keystone of the entire system, controlling and 
coordinating all levels of activity.’11
Below the ministries were the defence research and design bureaux, and the 
factories that made up the Soviet Union’s VPK. Western analysts placed these 
entities into three broad categories during the Cold War: research institutions, 
design organisations, and production facilities. The research institutions were 
responsible for scientific research that could be applied within the design 
organisations. Their responsibilities included planning for new products and 
machines, and designing new processes, installations and machinery. The new 
weapons and military material projects developed by the research institutions 
were progressed from concept to prototype, and then handed off to the production 
enterprises. The production enterprises were responsible for manufacturing the 
new product, or applying the process developed by the research and design 
facilities.12 For example, there was no single company that designed, built and 
sold the Sukhoi series of aircraft. There was the Sukhoi design bureau that was 
responsible for developing the designs and prototypes of the Su series aircraft, 
but these aircraft were subsequently built by a number of factories located in 
different regions—the most important being the Irkutsk plant (NPK Irkut) and 
the Komsomolsk-on-Amur aviation plant.
The Soviet Union of the late 1980s had the largest centralised economy in 
the world. The regime established its economic priorities through central 
planning—a system under which administrative decisions rather than the 
market determined resource allocation and prices. The integration of the 
Communist party, government, and military within the Soviet Union was most 
evident in the VPK. It was the Military-Industrial Commission that coordinated 
the activities of the Defence Council and the Defence Industry Department 
of the Central Committee.13 The Defence Council, made up of high-ranking 
military personnel, was the overarching head of the various research and design 
bureaux, and it made decisions on the development and production of major 
weapon systems. Meanwhile, the Defence Industry Department of the Central 
Committee was the overarching head of the production facilities. The State 
Planning Committee (or Gosplan) had an important role in directing necessary 
supplies and resources to military industries.
11 Thierry Malleret, Conversion of the Defense Industry in the Former Soviet Union, Institute for East-West 
Security Studies, Westview Press, New York, 1992, p. 7.
12 Refer ‘Russia/Soviet Military Industry’, GlobalSecurity.org, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/russia/industry.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
13 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies: Soviet Union.
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Soviet-era VPK Structure
Figure 2.1: Soviet-era VPK Structure 
(Source: Cameron Mitchell, based on details noted in Thierry Malleret, 
Conversion of the Defense Industry in the Former Soviet Union, Institute 
for East-West Security Studies, Westview Press, New York, 1992)
In 1989 the defence industry consisted of a number of industrial ministries 
subordinate to the Military-Industrial Commission. The names of most of these 
ministries were not indicative of the types of weapons or military equipment 
they produced. The Ministry of Medium Machine Building manufactured 
nuclear warheads. The Ministry of General Machine Building produced ballistic 
missiles. Other ministries (such as the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural 
Machine Building) also produced military equipment and components, but to 
a lesser extent of their total output.14 This meant that defence finances were 
spread amongst a number of ministries, thereby ensuring funds allocated to 
defence were far higher than was ever publicly admitted by the government.
For example, in 1988 military spending was a single line item in the state 
budget, totaling 21  billion rubles, or about US$33  billion. Given the size of 
the military establishment, however, the actual figure was estimated to be at 
least ten times higher. Western experts have concluded that the 21 billion ruble 
figure reflects only operations and maintenance costs.15 Other military spending 
(including training, military construction, and arms production) may have been 
concealed within the budgets of all-union ministries and state committees. The 
amount spent on Soviet weapons R&D was an especially well-guarded state 
14 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies: Soviet Union.
15 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies: Soviet Union.
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secret. According to US government sources, from the mid-1980s to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, between 15 and 17d per cent of annual GNP was annually 
devoted to military spending.16 Officially, current Russian Federation defence 
expenditure (listed as ‘National Defence’ within the budget) runs at around 
2.7 per cent of GNP annually, but, like the Soviet Union, many defence related 
expenses fall under the responsibility of other ministries. According to the Jane’s 
Information Group, in recent years the aggregation of these extra revenues has 
boosted defence related expenditure within the Russian Federation to nearly 
5 per cent of GDP:17 it seems old habits are deeply entrenched in the Russian 
system, and are hard to shake.
Post Soviet Union, the defence-industrial complex went through two distinct 
phases. The years 1991 through 1997 saw a steep decline, with a focus on 
privatisation of the defence industry and unsuccessful efforts to restructure 
defence output into production of civilian goods. From 1998, the emphasis shifted 
towards increasing and modernising the production of military items. Vladimir 
Putin revitalised this process in 1999–2000, and also began to renationalise and 
restructure a large part of the defence industry. These actions have all reinforced 
the viability of Russia’s arms industry in the twenty-first century.
1990–99: The Transition of the VPK to OPK
The term Oboronnyi-promyshennyi kompleks (OPK) was introduced in the late 
1990s in an effort to distance the Russian Federation defence-industrial complex 
from its Soviet military-industrial complex predecessor. The term was also 
assessed to be less aggressive: changing the ‘military’ to ‘defence’. In reality 
little changed except for the name. It was a facade and the hard work associated 
with restructure came with the accession of Putin and Sergei Ivanov. This 
restructure, in conjunction with a greater number of export orders and growing 
natural energy prices, has finally given the OPK a new identity that goes deeper 
than just a mere change of title.
The final years of the Soviet regime and the beginning of the 1990s saw 
increasingly erratic supplies to military producers, a failure of conversion 
programs from military to civilian production, a further reduction in defence 
spending, and plummeting exports—all of which caused a decline in defence 
sector output. Moreover, the military managed to squeeze resources out of the 
16 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Studies: Soviet Union.
17 ‘Russia: Defence Spending’, in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, 
Surrey, 2006.
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state budget, in return for their support during the final year of the Communist 
regime, and consequently defence spending in 1990 was higher than in any 
other year during the entire Cold War.18
The bubble finally burst in dramatic fashion and, between 1991 and 1995, 
2.5  million of the 6.1  million employees left the defence sector. Despite this 
41 per cent loss in manpower, in 1996 only 10 per cent of the industry capability 
was being utilised, rather than the assumed 59 per cent.19 Between 1992 and 
1995, production in the defence sector fell by 60 per cent annually. This was 
the result of both the sharp deterioration in economic conditions and the lower 
priority given to the military under Yeltsin. The volume of resources allocated 
for defence was not enough to finance the reorganisation of defence industries. 
Until the early 1990s, the Soviet state was at the centre of the defence industry, 
providing direction and control to all elements involved in the development of 
weapon systems. The various elements or enterprises in the VPK did not have 
Western-style contractual relationships. The plants were all state owned and 
production complied strictly with the orders of the Party. The state ensured all 
the enterprises worked together and that no money changed hands between 
enterprises due to the centralised economy. Furthermore, thanks to a special 
pricing and taxation system, the defence sector obtained eight times more value 
for its money than the commercial sector in its procurement of equipment. 
Economic preferential treatment propelled the VPK to a leading position in the 
Soviet economy. 
Technology advances resulting from the states VPK bias enabled the Soviet 
Union to successfully compete with the defence industries of the United States 
and Western Europe throughout the Cold War period.20 This system broke 
down with the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russian OPK’s adjustment to 
market economy conditions was difficult because the Soviet-era VPK was always 
heavily supported and subsidised by state financial resources, inventories, and 
research/technical personnel.21 In contrast, the Yeltsin Administration of the 
early and mid-1990s had neither the ability nor desire to support or subsidise 
Russia’s OPK. Instead, efforts went into restructuring defence output with a 
focus on conversion of military production into civilian production. Moreover, 
the new Russian Government tried to transform the system into a market-based 
one. It proved to be too much change in too short a period for the industry to 
cope with. Some 75 years of forced conformity had taken its toll on the average 
18 Paul Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, Memorandum no. 79, The Jafee 
Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, November 2005, p. 16.
19 Robert H. Donaldson, ‘Domestic influences on Russian arms sale policy’ Presented to the 43rd Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 24 March 2002, p. 7, available at <http://
www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/domestic.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
20 Gerasev and Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for Arms Exports’, p. 10.
21 Gerasev and Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for Arms Exports’, p. 9.
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Russian defence industry worker’s sense of capitalism. However, slow transition, 
longevity of some key Soviet-era technologies and Russian practicality and 
resourcefulness all helped to ensure OPK survival during this turbulent period.
The serious depression in the defence industry was the result of government 
neglect and a global downturn in the demand for arms and was a major contributor 
to the severe domestic economic crisis in Russia throughout the 1990s. Unlike its 
Soviet predecessor, the Russian Government could no longer arbitrarily set and 
maintain artificially low prices for military hardware. Nor could it force privately 
owned parts suppliers and subcontractors to fulfil defence orders against their 
will.22 Following the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the Russian 
Federation inherited a defence sector consisting of 1200 military factories with 
a workforce of some 4 million. Many more enterprises were partially engaged 
to fulfil defence orders. Together, they accounted for between 70–80 per cent 
of the R&D potential and some 80 per cent of the manufacturing capacity of 
the former Soviet VPK.23 However, Russia’s opportunities to independently 
develop and produce even model arms and equipment in the early 1990s 
turned out to be limited because of the need for component supplies from other 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The figures speak 
for themselves: between 1992 and 1996 munitions production plummeted by 
93 per cent, radio engineering products by 93 per cent, and electronic products 
by 95 per cent.24
Soviet industry specialist Dr Michael Checinski noted that maintaining a massive 
arms capacity within the new Russian Federation could only be transformed 
into operational reality if three issues were examined: (1) the number and type 
of weapons to be produced; (2) the time scale for fulfilling the production plans; 
and (3) how to overcome the bottlenecks in production and distribution that 
were ever present in Soviet industry.25 Soviet economic planning gave high 
priority to addressing these problems and the state-directed pricing policy 
was one important element in this planning system. As in a market economy, 
prices were seen as instrumental in achieving efficient distribution of goods and 
services. However, efficiency was measured only in terms of military security 
and not against wider social and economic considerations.26 Soviet methods 
that were utilised to achieve such efficiency were unacceptable in a democracy 
(more specifically, were unaffordable in Yeltsin’s democracy) and, therefore, the 
OPK of the Russian Federation suffered accordingly. The OPK today, however, 
22 Steven E. Miller, and Dmitri V. Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 2004, p. 160.
23 Gerasev and Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for Arms Exports’, p. 13.
24 Gerasev and Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for Arms Exports’, p. 13.
25 Ian Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 225, 
available at <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=162>, accessed 28 April 2009.
26 Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, p. 225.
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has no requirement to match Soviet-era production and has been able to make 
considerable progress in adapting to a quasi-market protectionist economy 
under Putin. 
The subsequent difficulties facing the OPK during the immediate aftermath 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union included the distribution of intellectual 
property rights, the privatisation of plants and design bureaux, and delayed 
R&D and production. These difficulties were all attributed to a system of 
separate research, design and production. Pushing Communist-era structures 
into a capitalist environment was akin to ‘putting round pegs in square holes’. 
Yeltsin’s early 1990s campaign to demilitarise the OPK, the so-called ‘conversion’, 
was an attempt to stop it from relying on a dwindling State Defence Order 
(SDO) and produce consumer products required within a supply and demand 
environment. Conversion was the main restructuring policy applied in the 
industry during the first years of the Russian Federation. 
Unfortunately, the quality of civil use goods produced by Russian defence plants 
were questionable and export experience to that point had been exclusively with 
military equipment and commodities. The scheme unsurprisingly produced poor 
results—the Sukhoi design bureau was known for its aircraft, not its washing 
machines or refrigerators. This scheme, combined with a lack of free-market 
experience and a dearth of government funding, were the main contributors to 
the gloomy OPK prospects during the 1990s. Even today, civilian use products 
from Russia are exported at a fraction of the rate of defence related exports, 
and it is the companies such as RSK MiG and Sukhoi Corporation, or products 
such as the AK-47 Kalashnikov, that are the most widely recognisable in the 
West. The policy was considered a failure by the mid 1990s, and post 1997, 
the Ministry of Economy took over the running of the defence industry and 
changed the direction of reform. From 1997, the aim was still to restructure 
the defence industry, but by using arms production itself as a fundamental 
reference point.27
Compounding the OPK’s problems was the dramatic fall in world oil prices during 
the early Gorbachev years—a 40 per cent decline between 1985 and 1989, the 
bulk of the decline occurring in 1986. As a result, the Soviet Union had already 
suffered substantial losses on actual revenues from arms sales. Oil-producing 
countries that had been able to pay in dollars for arms could no longer afford 
to pay in hard currency. In most cases, however, this did not lead to suddenly 
decreased orders or deliveries; the arms kept flowing, and it took some time before 
payment was due. But that was not a concern for the producer plants—that was 
for the government to resolve. As far as the enterprises were concerned, it was 
27 Antonio Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 56, no. 5, July 2004, p. 687.
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business as usual. It took the collapse of the Soviet Union’s Eastern European 
empire in 1989–90 to actually affect the producers, because actual orders dropped 
then as well. In 1990, there was also a shift in Russia’s foreign aid policy. This 
made it more difficult to justify or mask the subsidising of arms sales even to 
Soviet non-oil client states.28 At the end of the Cold War, Russian defence plants 
lost nearly 80 per cent of government funding.29 At the same time export earnings 
were declining due to loss of traditional Soviet bloc markets—especially Eastern 
Europe. The general decline in the world arms market, and the abundance of 
cheap, pre-produced Cold War stocks were complicating factors. It was only the 
slow trickle of hard currency still received from exports to China that kept the 
industry alive during this transitionary period. 
Many analysts believed that the very existence of the Russian defence industry, 
as well as the nation’s military high technology, was in jeopardy. This would 
have had far-reaching implications for the defence sector and its scientific and 
technological potential, along with the country’s natural resources, which 
remained the only assets on which to base the ultimate success of economic 
reform and the retention of Russia’s status as an industrially developed nation.30
The decline in government contracts for military equipment also had grievous 
social consequences. Russia lost about one third of its scientific potential over 
the years of various industry and economic reforms. Scientists involved in 
computing mathematics, genetics and bio-technologies were usually the first 
to leave Russia, for the greener pastures of the West. The ‘brain drain’ became 
especially active at the end of the 1990s, when specialists started leaving Russia 
in large groups. According to expert estimates, the total number of people 
involved in scientific and research works halved from 1990 to 2002.31 More 
specifically, the exodus of qualified personnel from defence enterprises has been 
great. During the first half of 1994, the number of production staff in the defence 
sector diminished by 15 per cent, up from 12 per cent in 1993.32 The exodus was 
mainly attributable to low wages and can still be felt today, although far less so 
than the mid 1990s levels.
When these exodus statistics are considered, it is amazing that Russia still 
possesses one of the world’s largest defence R&D establishments, both in terms 
of the number of research centres and employees.33 The R&D base continues to 
28 Gaddy, The Price of the Past, p. 62.
29 Refer ‘Russia/Soviet Military Industry’, GlobalSecurity.org, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/russia/industry.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
30 Gerasev and Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for Arms Exports’, p. 9.
31 Refer ‘With brain drain declining after the period of perestroika, Russia’s national intellect is still in 
danger’, Pravda, 17 December 2005, available at <http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/351/16590_scientists.
html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
32 Gerasev and Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for Arms Exports’, p. 15.
33 Miller and Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, p. 160.
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survive by maintaining its significant capacity and in many cases prospers—in 
particular in the cases of developments in aero-engine, submarine, and missile 
technology. For example, Jane’s Information Group has stated that Russia’s 
S-300 family of air-defence systems is highly procurable and also well respected: 
‘The Russian S-300 surface-to-air anti-missile system is superior to the US-made 
Patriot air-defence system and is also cheaper.’34
While the needs of the Soviet armed forces were the dominant factor in 
planning, at various times the existence of foreign suppliers and foreign markets 
were probably helpful from both a production perspective (to fill gaps in any 
given production line) and also in price setting. Goods produced for export 
were integrated into the overall defence order alongside goods produced for the 
Soviet armed forces. Furthermore, the chief purpose for exporting these goods 
was political rather than financial. Soviet foreign policy wielded weapons sales 
as a means of safeguarding foreign allies’ loyalty and enlarging the communist 
camp. Financial recompense was rarely received if indeed expected—many 
nations are still paying off Soviet-era debt to Russia to this day. This deficiency 
in domestic demand, coupled with the lack of market-economy experience in 
arms exports, were the sources of the subsequent problems faced by the OPK 
post 1990.
With the dramatic reductions in the volume of state orders, the relative 
importance of arms exports to the defence industry increased. During the 
1990s, the arrears on state payments to the military production facilities 
came to a figure equivalent to domestic military procurements themselves. In 
1996 for example, the accumulated arrears made up nearly half the value of 
the domestic military procurements accumulated since 1992 and were greater 
than the orders solicited that year. In 1999, they represented one third of the 
cumulative internal military orders. This points to the importance of exports for 
the defence industry. Exports allowed some sense of continuity to be maintained 
in some parts of the defence industry, which enabled it to avoid the brunt of 
the economic crisis, as well as the destructive phenomena associated with it.35 
Since 2000, exports have taken on a whole new level of importance, generating 
a quadrupling in earnings.
1999–2006: The Putin Factor and the OPK
Under the Putin Administration, it became evident that the Kremlin intended 
to use ownership as its primary control instrument of the OPK. Putin kept 
34 ‘Russia: Defence Production and R&D’, in Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Jane’s Information Group, 
Coulsdon, Surrey, 2006.
35 Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry’, p. 691.
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requisitioning powers in the background and minimised budgetary subsidies 
at a time when state weapons procurement programs were smaller than those of 
the Soviet past. 
Ilya Klebanov, former Deputy Prime Minister and now Minister for Industry 
Science and Technology, is Putin’s architect for the OPK reform program. 
Klebanov hopes to reestablish state control over domestic military-industrial 
activities while creating new entities, such as the Unified Aircraft Corporation, 
in the anticipation that they will capture a larger share of the global arms 
market.36 The melding of design and production makes the new consolidated 
OPK structures potentially more responsive to domestic and foreign weapons 
demand and also ensures that designers such as RSK MiG do not rely on regular 
sales of their products for survival. In essence, more state control over the arms 
manufacturers will safeguard their survival as they will no longer have to exist 
solely on the success of their exports.
From 1999, the fundamental principles underpinning defence-industrial reform 
have consisted of substantially reducing the size of the industry by expelling 
organisations from the sector and changing to the state controlled structure. As 
for the policy on arms exports, there has been a tendency to concentrate external 
orders in a smaller number of companies and, in particular, to assign orders to 
only a few companies from all of those that could complete them.37 For example, 
the military’s decision to develop a new tank based on the T-90 at the Ural Coach 
Works in Nizhny Tagil means that the Transmash factory in Omsk with its T-80 
loses out, as the T-80 design was discarded as an option for further development. 
Furthermore, the MoD approves new designs and finances R&D activities that 
subsequently bring export revenues to the enterprises and the MoD decides 
whether or not to permit the sale of various types of armaments abroad. That 
means any duplication in arms production is avoided. The advantage of this 
policy revolves around the fact that although there is less variety of production, 
the country’s defensive capacity is not reduced and the government maintains 
control over the defence industry as a whole.
The aforementioned policies for OPK reform were made official with the advent 
of the Putin Administration. The Russian Prime Minister in 2001, Mikhail 
Kasyanov, was the key signatory of government Resolution 713 ‘On Reforming 
and Developing the defence-industrial complex in 2002–2006’. He proposed the 
‘civilianising’ of some 1200 enterprises and institutions, stripping them of their 
military assets, including intellectual property, and transferring this capital to 
500 amalgamated entities called ‘system-building integrated structures’, which 
the media refers to simply as ‘holdings’. The aim is for these holdings to be 
36 Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, p. 94.
37 Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry’, p. 699.
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51 per cent state owned and to be able to compete with defence giants such as 
Lockheed Martin Corporation and Europe’s EADS. The plant equipment and 
intellectual property of the more than 1000 enterprises no longer considered a 
part of the OPK would be transferred into the new holdings.38
This rearrangement will increase the military focus of the OPK by divesting 
it of its civilian activities and also strengthen the defence lobby and augment 
state ownership. Also, the government is to have a controlling stock of the 
lead companies (design bureaux) of the system-building integrated structures. 
This equates to the termination of traditional Soviet separation of design from 
production and the creation of integrated entities capable of designing, producing, 
marketing and servicing OPK products.39 In January 2002, Putin approved this 
armaments program that called for the ‘coordinating, management, and control 
functions’ held by federal entities that manage the OPK to be transferred to 
so-called system-building integrated structures by 2010.40 In essence, the plan 
called for an increase in state ownership throughout the sector by rethinking 
the privatisations of the 1990s, which officials say lost the government billions 
of dollars worth of intellectual property. The license production agreement for 
Sukhoi Su-27 manufacture in China signed in 1994 is a good example.41
Up to this point Putin’s plan has been largely successful, albeit behind schedule. 
In 2001, Defence minister Sergei Ivanov was quoted as complaining that: ‘About 
70 per cent of the military budget is being spent merely to maintain troops and 
bureaucrats, leaving precious little to maintaining and upgrading equipment.’42
However, the following six years have proved that statements such as this have 
not fallen on deaf ears, and indeed, Ivanov himself has contributed to rectifying 
the problems aired in his own statement. The SDO has risen every year since, 
and schedules aside, both Putin and Ivanov are pushing defence industry 
reform towards ensuring a rise in domestic procurement orders.
As discussed, the main mechanism favoured by Putin and Ivanov for reforming 
the OPK is the increase in governmental ownership of the complex. This 
follows the trend set within the energy industry. In the past two years Putin 
has moved aggressively to reassert state control over Russia’s huge oil and gas 
reserves, which had fallen into private hands in the early 1990s. Putin seems 
to be ‘socialising the guns and privatising the butter’ within Russia. There has 
been little drive to reassert state control over non-primary industry. Primary 
industry is the main focus, as Mikhail Khordokovsky, the jailed oligarch and 
38 Miller and Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, p. 167.
39 Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, p. 92.
40 Miller and Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, p. 166.
41 Catherine Belton, ‘A Call to Arms’, 3  December 2001, available at <http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/01_49/b3760127.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
42 Donaldson, ‘Domestic influences on the Russian arms sale policy’, p. 7.
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former head of Yukos, Russia’s largest oil company, found out to his detriment 
after a questionable and highly publicised trial process. As a result, the Kremlin 
has already regained more than 30 per cent of the country’s oil industry. As the 
journalist Michael Franchetti wrote in early 2006: ‘It’s about making the state 
more powerful. And it’s about controlling what Putin thinks are strategically 
important companies.’43
Putin sees the OPK as having strategic importance; hence the move to exercise 
further state control over the defence industry. Currently 40 per cent of OPK 
enterprises are state owned, 17 per cent are stock companies with some form of 
state participation, and 43 per cent are in private hands.44 These figures were 
taken with the understanding that a private company had less than 25 per cent 
state ownership, a state company had 100 per cent state ownership and the 
remaining 17  per  cent of companies had state ownership between 25 and 
100 per cent state ownership. Officially, by the end of 2006 (but realistically three 
or more years thereafter), the government was expected to have a controlling 
stock in all the head companies of the system-building integrated structures. 
As a rule, the head company running a holding will be a design bureau. As 
previously noted, design bureaux were separate from production plants during 
the Soviet era and were the best known entities of the VPK in the West. Design 
bureaux such as Tupolev, MiG and Mil were more recognisable than their 
associated production plants near Moscow, Gorkii and Rostov-on-Don. The new 
program is intended to put an end to this separation by integrating the design 
bureaux and production plants into new, vertically-oriented system-building 
structures. In addition, the state’s shares in the remaining enterprises in the OPK 
holdings will be put into trusts held by the head companies.45 So in effect, Putin 
is striving to wrest control of one half of the Russian defence industry from the 
private sector and orient each of the new entities that are created in such a way 
that they can research, design and produce the requisite weapon system.
Given the unwillingness of the production plants to share their profits with the 
state, the government has decided to convert these plants into new holdings 
(that is, system-building integrated structures). Within the aforementioned 
government Resolution 713, there would be two stages, both of which are still 
being implemented with delays from their original deadlines. In the first stage 
(officially 2002–2004, but now behind schedule), head companies were chosen to 
develop new weapons and equipment and to establish new integrated structures 
(holdings) along the lines of existing defence industry branches. The fewer than 
500 companies of the OPK that are to remain once the restructure concludes 
43 Mark Franchetti, ‘Putin Flexes Muscles of ‘Kremlin Inc’, 1  January 2006, available at <http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article783971.ece>, accessed 28 April 2009.
44 ‘Ownership Structure in the Russian Defense Industry’, Moscow Brief, February  2005, available at 
<http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2005/facts/owner/>, accessed 28 April 2008.
45 Miller and Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, p. 167.
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will then be divided into these holdings. The plan consists of 40–45 such 
holdings, with potential options for further consolidation of assets. Integrated 
holdings have or will shortly be created in aviation, shipping, automobile, 
radio-electronics, information technology, missile space, ammunition and 
conventional armaments sectors.46
In the second stage (officially 2005–2006, and also behind schedule), the program 
calls for the creation of new kinds of diversified research and production 
complexes that will combine enterprises from different branches of industry, 
produce both military and civilian goods, and be capable of competing in 
the global market.47 The composition of every structure, at both the first and 
the second stages, must be approved by presidential decree. The Ministry of 
Industry and Energy is responsible for the program overall. The Ministry of 
Atomic Energy, the Aviation and Space Agency, the Control Systems Agency, the 
Shipbuilding Agency, and the Ammunition Agency were originally responsible 
for achieving the program’s objectives within their respective branches.48 
However, yet another restructure, this time at the governmental level, now 
sees the Industry Agency, within the Ministry of Industry and Energy, solely 
responsible for achieving the program objectives, and this streamlining will 
greatly assist the overall process of restructure. The overall completion of the 
reforms within the OPK, factoring in the slippage from the original 2006 goal, 
is expected in 2010.49
Most of the reform policies currently in place or being considered are the 
concepts of Putin and Ivanov. At the very least, these policies must receive 
approval from one or both of these figures; thus their importance in the reform 
of the OPK cannot be underestimated. There have been delays associated with 
the reform deadlines; hence the discrepancy in the 2002–2006 timeline for 
the implementation of Resolution 713. However, the overall process is being 
stubbornly implemented regardless of delay, by Putin and Ivanov and then 
down the chain of command. The reforms have assisted the OPK to date, but 
whether the end product ensures that the OPK resembles the phoenix rising 
from the ashes remains to be seen.
46 Irina Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA, November 2006, p. 45, available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.
cfm?pubID=740>, accessed 28 April 2009.
47 Miller and Trenin (eds), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, p. 171.
48 ‘Special Report—Russian Defence Industry Rises Again’, Jane’s Defence Industry, 12 January 2005.
49 Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, p. 46.
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Chapter 3  
Domestic Drivers for 
Russian OPK Success
Essentially, the long-term success of the Oboronnyi-promyshennyi kompleks (OPK) 
success hinges on six key tenets. First, a more concrete linkage of army reforms 
and the restructure of the OPK is required. Attempts have been made to facilitate 
this, particularly the introduction of the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) 
in 2006, which has given Sergei Ivanov more direct control and input into the 
OPK. Second, active attempts must be made to battle endemic corruption within 
the industry. Again, attempts have been made in this area too, but it must be 
sustained and more focused, as the problems are deep-rooted and incessant. 
Third, and perhaps the most actively attempted to date, is the restructuring 
of the OPK into a more consolidated sector. The current government push for 
greater state control over the industry may or may not be beneficial in the 
longer term; however it is the restructuring itself that is important. Fourth, 
Vladimir Putin and Ivanov must ensure that Russia itself becomes the foremost 
customer for its defence industry, by re-equipping significant sections of the 
Russian defence forces. Rather than the piecemeal attempts that have been 
witnessed to date, wholesale replacement of Soviet-era equipment must occur 
so as to sustain large-scale production within the defence industry. The two 
remaining domestic drivers for long-term OPK success are both closely linked 
to the external drivers. They include the continued success and utilisation of 
the state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and the commissioning of new joint 
ventures with other states. These joint ventures will provide the OPK with 
valuable research and development (R&D) funding, which will contribute to 
the viability of the OPK in the long-term as it continues to develop new military 
technologies.
Linking Armed Forces Reform with OPK 
Restructure
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, reform of the armed forces has been one of 
the most frequently cited objectives of the Russian state; but also one of the most 
resistant to realisation. The sinking of the submarine K-141 Kursk on 12 August 
2000 and the elusiveness of victory in the second military campaign in Chechnya 
only added a few more pixels of resolution to an already clear picture: after nine 
years under Boris Yeltsin the Russian Army was a shambles. Efforts at armed 
forces reform had been ill-conceived and inadequately supported financially 
Book.indb   41 23/12/09   11:24 AM
Phoenix from the Ashes?
42
and politically, and were thus ultimately fruitless.1 The rise to power of Putin 
in 1999–2000 signified a change in this area. The military was one of Putin’s 
political tools and strongest partisans during this transitionary period. The 
new president’s initiatives included a National Security Concept and Military 
Doctrine in 2000; a package of military reform measures in January 2001; and 
pronouncements of an acceleration of the ‘professionalisation’ of the army in 
November 2001. These were followed by a reiteration of the importance of 
military reform in an address to the Federal Assembly in April 2002, suggesting 
that the Kremlin was finally resolved to address the problems afflicting the 
armed forces.2
The announcement that the military would focus more on modernisation than 
reform was a key element to underpinning future OPK economic success, as it 
meant that re-equipping of units with new military hardware would occur. In 
October 2003 further policies were tabled in the Duma, this time for the armed 
forces rather than the OPK, in the form of a Defence White Paper, also known 
as ‘Defence Doctrine’, ‘Priority Tasks’ or ‘Ivanov Doctrine’. This comprehensive 
74-page document outlined Russia’s strategic environment; the tasks of the 
armed forces; priorities for defence ‘modernisation’ as opposed to ‘reform’; and 
Russia’s multilateral commitments, particularly with the CIS.3 Putin emphasised 
the need for civilian control over the armed forces, as well as the need to improve 
defence management and the structure of the armed forces. As respected Russian 
defence industry analyst Ruslan Pukhov suggested: ‘Ingredient one [for OPK 
success] is the linking of the reforms within the military and the OPK.’4
On 28  March 2001 Putin announced a reshuffle of ministers in Russia’s 
security apparatus. Two senior posts in the MoD went to civilians, with Sergei 
Ivanov and Lyubov Kudelina assuming the posts of Defence Minister and 
Deputy Defence Minister respectively. These executive changes had positive 
implications for financial reform in the military, with Kudelina’s budgetary 
expertise5 complementing Ivanov’s political influence.6 Moreover, removing 
Army Generals from these key posts assisted Putin in pushing reforms through 
the military more quickly and curbed the negative effects of nepotism and 
corruption within the reform process. Ivanov left the Defence Minister’s post, 
1 Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott (eds), Russian Military Reform 1992–2002, Frank Cass, London, 
2003, p. 41.
2 Aldis and McDermott (eds), Russian Military Reform 1992–2002, p. 41.
3 Colonel C. Langton (ed.), The Military Balance 2004–2005, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 97.
4 Ruslan Pukhov, in an interview conducted at the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 
Moscow, 6 June 2006.
5 Lyubov Kudelina was a graduate of economics from the Moscow Financial Institute, with over 20 years 
experience in the Finance Ministry before taking her post within the Ministry of Defence.
6 Aldis and McDermott (eds), Russian Military Reform 1992–2002, p. 287.
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being replaced in March 2007 by another Putin ally, Anatoliy Serdyukov. The 
move allowed Ivanov to focus on his ultimately unsuccessful candidature for 
the Russian Presidency in 2008. 
Within the OPK, the Reform and Development of the Defence Industrial 
Complex Program 2002–2006, signed by then Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 
in October 2001, reveals that the Kremlin is moving towards a reconsolidation 
of state authority. The reforms are driven in part by the ageing of the OPK’s 
capital stock; and also underemployment, low pay, and poor enterprise 
finances.7 As discussed in chapter  2, the plan envisions the downsizing of 
the OPK, which currently consists of 1000  enterprises and organisations 
located in 72  regions, ‘officially’ employs more than 2 million workers (more 
realistically 3.5 million), and produces 27 per cent of the nation’s machinery 
and 25 per cent of its machinery exports. The Voennyi-promyshlennyi kompleks 
(VPK) was wholly state-owned at the beginning of the post-Communist epoch. 
As at 2006, 40 per cent of its holdings remained state owned, 17 per cent were 
mixed state/private stock companies, and 43 per cent were fully privatised.8 All 
of these entities are responsive to the market but retain a collective interest in 
promoting government patronage, meaning they can be quickly commandeered 
if state procurement orders revive, which is expected to occur between 2006 
and 2015.9 In the meantime, large contracts for arms from China, India and now 
Algeria will provide the OPK with the orders it requires to sustain the various 
production lines of military equipment.
Both Putin and Ivanov realise that if modernisation of the armed forces is 
achieved, it will greatly assist the longevity of the OPK. The key comparison 
between Putin’s approach and the various reform plans that were put forward 
during Yeltsin’s time is that Yeltin’s plans read like a laundry list of items that 
need to be fixed. Putin’s problem-solving approach meant that he preferred to 
look at specific problems and explore the options to deal with them one at a 
time.10 Putin’s aim was to set the scene for the large-scale resumption of Russia’s 
domestic procurement program, which in terms of raw finance is now matching 
arms export revenues. Putin was also trying to scale back the bureaucracies 
that frustrate both the deployment of new weapons and the operation of 
conventional arms exports. According to the 2003 White Paper, the proportion 
of advanced weapons and hardware in the armed forces’ entire inventory of 
military equipment will be raised to 35 per cent by 2010; the armed forces will be 
totally re-equipped by 2020–2025; and the ratio of the expenditure on weapons 
7 Steven Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 91.
8 ‘Ownership Structure in the Russian Defense Industry’, February 2005, available at <http://mdb.cast.ru>, 
accessed 13 June 2006.
9 Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century, p. 91.
10 Dale R. Herspring, ‘Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia’, European Security, vol. 14, no. 1, 
March 2005, p. 141.
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and hardware to National Defence spending will be raised to 50–60 per cent by 
2025.11 Whether or not Russia can achieve the stipulated deadlines remains to 
be seen. There will probably be some delays if the reforms and modernisations 
achieved to date are anything to go by. 
In another area of military reform, Putin initially chose to set a rather ambitious 
target of ‘abolishing’ conscription by 2010. This policy has since changed to 
dropping the conscription period to one year by 2008 and the introduction of a 
program pushing for more contract manning over the same period.12 Putin’s ‘one 
problem at a time’ approach is evident within the military reforms, which began 
with troop reductions, then focused on contract manning, and finally soldiers’ 
pay and conditions. The approach is also evident within the breakdown of 
funds within the State Defence Order (SDO). SDOs from 2000–2005 saw the 
majority of the funding going towards R&D, whilst the 2006 SDO looked to be 
the first of many that devote the bulk of the funding towards procurement of 
military equipment. 
Putin, to a greater extent than his predecessor, understood the dire condition of the 
armed forces. He cared very deeply about their plight, which is understandable, 
given his own background in the KGB. The magnitude of the crisis is not lost on 
him, but the question remains whether he will succeed in achieving real reform, as 
opposed to ‘paper reform’. In appointing Ivanov, a close colleague and a civilian, 
as Defence Minister, Putin strengthened his own control over the armed forces. He 
also enhanced the authority of the MoD in forming security policy at the expense 
of the General Staff.13 Up to 2004, the General Staff wielded significant power, and 
had been a thorn in the side of both Ivanov and Putin’s reform efforts. On 19 July 
2004, Army General Anatoly Kvashnin, who had served as chief of General Staff 
for seven years, was discharged. He was replaced by First Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff Yuri Baluyevskiy. Kvashnin, a staunch advocate of a strong ground 
force, had fallen out with his civilian boss Ivanov over the nature of armed forces 
reform and the shift to a contract-based recruitment system.14 Ivanov stressed that 
the General Staff should be strengthened by clearly redefining the functions and 
duties of the upper tier of the military. Moreover, he openly criticised the General 
Staff arguing in 2005 that: 
It spends too much time on superfluous administration and day-to-
day management of the troops, to the detriment of its main purpose; 
situational analysis and development of troop deployment plans.15
11 ‘Russia—Tightening State Control’, East Asian Strategic Review 2005, National Institute for Defense 
Studies, Tokyo, 2005, p. 183.
12 Aldis and McDermott (eds), Russian Military Reform 1992–2002, p. 268.
13 Aldis and McDermott (eds), Russian Military Reform 1992–2002, p. 262.
14 ‘Russia—Tightening State Control’, East Asian Strategic Review 2005, p. 179.
15 Sergei Ivanov, in Dale R. Herspring, ‘Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia’, European Security, 
vol. 14, no. 1, March 2005, p. 151.
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The removal of the General Staff from a position that wielded considerable 
influence within policy decisions undoubtedly gave Ivanov more power and 
flexibility in carrying out further modernisation of the armed forces. In turn, this 
has given the OPK a greater chance of securing state finances. Ivanov’s successor, 
Anatoliy Serdyukov, was no doubt relieved that he now wielded this power as 
Defence Minister, because by the 2008 election he needed to have achieved 
the reduction of conscript service to one year, the introduction of a contract-
manning system for non-commissioned officers, and the implementation of a 
mortgage accumulation scheme of housing provision to servicemen as stipulated 
in the White Paper. The advantage he now has is that he will no longer have to 
compete with the Chief of the General Staff in policy decisions, and in addition, 
he now has a sizeable central staff (unprecedented in either Tsarist or Soviet 
military organisations) numbering around 9000 personnel with which to achieve 
these reforms.16
A subsequent Presidential decree in August 2004 ensured that the General Staff 
was relieved of non-military duties including managerial and administrative 
tasks. The legislation also removed two of the deputies within the General 
Staff in an effort to de-bloat it. Now there would be only four. In addition the 
General Staff now assumes the position Ivanov believed appropriate; it has 
become what the now legendary Chief of the General Staff under Josef Stalin, 
Boris Shaposhnikov, had called ‘the brain of the army’. It no longer attended 
to operational matters. Essentially, when this bill was adopted by the Duma, 
Ivanov was placed in charge of all aspects of military affairs.17 This was clearly 
aimed at instituting more civilian control over the armed forces and ensuring 
timelier modernisation programs. For the first time in Soviet and Russian history, 
the government had established a central control and management apparatus 
within the MoD and thereby brought all major central staff organisations under 
the Defence Minister’s immediate direction.18 These moves all appear aimed at 
strengthening the authority of the Defence Minister over the armed forces as 
a whole, and follow the general trend of civilianising key positions within the 
Defence structure. 
The stress that Putin has placed on the White Paper as being a modernisation 
drive, rather than a reform package was purely political. This stipulation had 
two important electoral benefits for Putin as he chased a second term in office 
in 2004. First, this sentiment is popular within the military itself, especially 
at higher levels, because it does not threaten the existing order. Moves for 
significant reform and reductions in the size of the military appear threatening 
16 Herspring, ‘Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia’, European Security, vol. 14, no. 1, March 2005, 
p. 151.
17 Herspring, ‘Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia’, pp. 150–51.
18 ‘Russia—Tightening State Control’, East Asian Strategic Review 2005, p. 180.
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to many of Russia’s generals. Second, calling it a modernisation drive supports 
the President’s claim that the era of instability and crisis is over, and therefore 
supports his electoral goals in the population as a whole.19 The most important 
implication of the White Paper for military reform is its basic assumption that 
no more significant changes to the size or structure of the armed forces are to be 
undertaken; it states: ‘Major Armed Forces reductions are not envisioned in the 
future—their strength has been reduced to the level of defensive sufficiency’.20
This implies that the main focus of the MoD is on modernisation—improving 
training, pay, doctrine, and equipment—rather than on deeper reform. This of 
course plays straight into the hands of the OPK, as larger and larger SDOs will 
be forthcoming as the Russian armed forces re-equip themselves with weaponry 
from Russian defence industries.
In June 2005, all of the proposals within the White Paper were approved at a 
sitting of the Russian Security Council. The 18-month period between drafting 
and passing the White Paper was an indication of the potentially massive change 
the White Paper will have on the Russian armed forces.21 If the goals within the 
White Paper are achieved, it will go a long way to assuage the bitter feeling 
of many members of the Russian military. Russian Army General Vladimir 
Shamanov summed up the feeling of many Russian Generals when he said: 
Thank God our public has finally begun to discuss the state of the army. 
Maybe our strategic nuclear forces will protect the country for another 
decade, but then what? A strong Russia is impossible without a strong 
army.22
Regardless of the terminology, Putin has begun to take the first steps required 
for genuine Russian military reform. He has pushed the military closer to 
necessary reforms in the last four years than in any time since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. The reform plan is in place, its funding has increased, 
some weapons modernisation has begun, and most importantly Putin placed the 
position of Chief of General Staff under the Defence Minister. Compared with 
Mikhail Gorbachev, who was not interested in the military, or with Boris Yeltsin, 
who starved and undermined it, Putin seems to understand its importance and 
appears committed to dealing with its problems.23 As Lilia Shevtsova pointed 
out in her recent book on Putin: ‘Whereas Boris Yeltsin was revolutionary, a 
19 Matthew Bouldin, ‘The Ivanov Doctrine and Military Reform: Reasserting Stability in Russia’, Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 2004, p. 627.
20 Bouldin, ‘The Ivanov Doctrine and Military Reform: Reasserting Stability in Russia’, p. 628.
21 Yuriy Baluyevskiy, ‘Igor Baluyevskiy: We do not intend waging war with NATO’, Moscow Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, Moscow, November 2005, p. 2.
22 General Vladimir Shamanov, in ‘Iraqi defeat jolts Russian Military’, 16 April 2003, available at <www.
csmonitor.com>
23 Herspring, ‘Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia’, p. 137.
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man who destroyed the pre-existing Communist system, Vladimir Putin is 
a bureaucrat, a man who considers his primary task is to bring stability to 
Russia.’24
Putin believes that organisational structures of state ministries such as defence 
can only be changed by continually coaxing them, and gradually changing 
their structures, attitudes and personnel. This is why those observers who 
expected Putin and his hand-picked Defence Minister Ivanov to take the kind 
of bold decisions necessary to make military reform a reality in a relatively short 
period of time, were mistaken. Making bold and hasty decisions are not part of 
Putin’s leadership style, and as Russian defence analyst Dale Herspring put it: 
‘He [Putin] is more the tortoise than the hare—and we all know that in the end 
it was the tortoise that won the race’.25
Perhaps the most important development in the linkage of military reform with 
OPK restructure occurred in November 2005. Ivanov, while retaining his post 
as Defence Minister, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility 
for oversight of the arms industry and its relations with the armed forces.26 
Furthermore, in March 2006 Putin approved the formation of the MIC. Ivanov, 
although retaining his other posts, was appointed chairman. However, the First 
Deputy Chairman, Vladislav Putilin, exercised day-to-day leadership. 
The MIC, much like its Soviet predecessor, is a permanent body exercising 
oversight of the long-term strategy and planning, and performing operational 
management of the R&D and procurement projects, but it will also monitor the 
overall restructuring of the OPK. The body also defines the main parameters 
for SDOs, including timing, pricing, and personnel policy in the defence 
enterprises.27 Its creation has centralised and strengthened the operational 
management of the OPK, and will no doubt greatly assist the restructuring 
policies currently in place for the OPK.
Battling Corruption
The problem remains, however, that a large amount of the SDO finance devoted 
to procurement does not reach the arms manufacturers, and this is why they 
focus output on the export market. As Konstantin Makienko, of the Centre for 
Analysis of Strategic Technologies, encapsulated:
24 Herspring, ‘Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia’, pp. 137–38.
25 Herspring, ‘Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia’, p. 138.
26 Julian Cooper, ‘Developments in the Russian arms industry’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 437.
27 Irina Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA, November 2006, p. 13, available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.
cfm?pubID=740>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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Where does the State Defense Order go? You can suppose two reasons 
only: either all the funds are funneled to the nuclear deterrence forces, 
to production of Topol and Bulava ballistic missiles, or all budget 
appropriations disappear in defense ministry lobbies. Only small crumbs 
make their way to enterprises involved in the State Defense Order.28
Steps are being taken to combat the issue of corruption and funds misappropriation 
within the OPK. According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, at the political 
level, the accountability and transparency of the procurement process has 
increased as a result of tighter regulatory controls exercised by the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade. The Cabinet has adopted new procurement regulations, 
and their implementation is expected to push the overall cost of the defence 
contract down by 15  per  cent. One of these regulations stipulates that all 
procurement contracts are now to be awarded on a tender basis. Furthermore, 
bidders will now be allowed to sign contracts only in the first quarter of each 
calendar year in an effort to tighten fiscal discipline. The cabinet is to introduce 
a new, 3-year fixed-price type of contract in order to manage procurement costs 
more efficiently.29
Taking over from the old system of individual branch procurement is a new 
arms procurement agency, the Federal Defence Order Service. It has been set up 
under the MoD, and its function is to root out corruption and increase efficiency 
within the military. It has the responsibility of implementing a unified state 
policy in the areas of development, production, unification, and standardisation 
of armaments and general-purpose military equipment.30 The agency, whose 
management will report directly to Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, is 
to put an end to the practice whereby branches of the armed forces themselves 
sign and oversee defence contracts.
Until recently, all combat arms and numerous directorates within the MoD 
had the power to commission weapons. This gave the military direct control 
over substantial cashflows, leaving plenty of room for corruption and funds 
mismanagement.31 One such case involved the Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the 
Russian Air Force, General Dmitri Morozov, who used factories and the budget 
of the Air Force to enrich himself, his family members and his aides. The Russian 
news journal Versiya obtained documents, from which it emerged that, since 
1997, 20 repair workshops for aircraft had been used to generate profits from 
commercial activities. These profits were laundered through a special Air Force 
28 Konstantin Makienko, in Konstantin Lantratov, ‘Airplanes Will Give in to Submarines. A List of Major 
Defense Companies Drafted’, 9 June 2005, available at <http://www.kommersant.ru>, accessed 18 June 2005.
29 ‘Procurement’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia, Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 
March 2006.
30 ‘Procurement’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia, March 2006.
31 ‘Procurement’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia, March 2006.
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‘charity fund’, which was processed and managed by a Moscow bank founded 
by Morozov and members of his family. The money was used, among other 
things, to buy luxurious apartments in Moscow for Morozov and his family, the 
directors of the companies of the repair workshops, the main financial controller 
of the Air Force, and others who participated in the fraudulent scheme. After 
this was published in Versiya in 2004, Morozov requested retirement.32 This 
case is indicative of the culture of corruption that is undermining Putin’s efforts 
to reform the military and OPK. This is the key reason behind the serious efforts 
that are currently being made to combat corruption. 
The appointment of Anatoliy Serdyukov to the post of Defence Minister had 
two purposes: first, to ensure Ivanov could focus on his Presidential prospects in 
2008; and second, to improve the accounting and supervision of MoD spending 
(Serdyukov was formerly head of the Federal Tax Service). The need to fight 
corruption, improve purchasing in the defence sector and the ineffectiveness of 
the MoD’s own supervisory institution all played a role in the choice of Ivanov’s 
successor.33
Cabinet officials stated that, in the near future, financial controls over the defence 
budget implementation are to be tightened even further. The MoD is hiring an 
external auditor to conduct research on market costs of major weapon systems 
in which the Ministry has an interest. Its procurement and finance agency will 
introduce a uniform tender format for all armed services and non-MoD security 
agencies. Weapons will be purchased at fixed prices and the MoD suppliers will 
be bound by tighter quality control requirements and delivery schedules.34 This 
process will be overseen by Ivanov and Putilin within the MIC. It is too soon to 
assess the probability of success these efforts will have in curbing corruption, 
but it is noteworthy that this is the first time corruption has been attacked head 
on. It is certainly a step in the right direction.
Corruption associated with the export of arms to foreign states has also been 
sharply curtailed, although not eradicated. The November 2000 formation 
of Rosoboronexport assisted in quelling the rampant corruption within its 
predecessors, Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport. The government divided 
its arms export components between these two companies: Rosvooruzhenie 
managed the complex export contracts requiring the coordination of many OPK 
enterprises, while Promexport was tasked with managing the spare parts and 
after-sales support market, as well as any excess Russian military stock.35 Putin’s 
32 Vadim Saranov, ‘Generals of the air force enrich themselves’, Versiya, Moscow, 25 October 2004.
33 Irina Isakova, ‘The Russian Defence Reform’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 1, March 
2007, p. 81.
34 ‘Procurement’, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia, March 2006.
35 Ian Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p. 105.
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decision to create Rosoboronexport was supported by the many OPK enterprises 
disenfranchised with Rosvooruzhenie’s questionable financial practices. 
The corruption problem associated with Rosvooruzhenie was compounded 
with widespread customer dissatisfaction with Promexport’s poor after-sales 
support. Both were telling factors in the creation of Rosoboronexport, which 
has subsequently diminished, although not completely removed, the corruption 
problem. Rosoboronexport will be discussed in more detail shortly.
OPK Restructure
The past year [2005] has turned out to be remarkably productive for the restructuring 
of the defence industry.36
Given the scarcity of past domestic financing, the inflows resulting from exports 
were, and still are to an extent, essential for the OPK’s survival. The current 
approach from the government has been a restructuring policy that uses 
domestic finances to back those high priority armament programs that cannot 
receive foreign financing due to international sensitivities (for example, nuclear 
missiles). Likewise, those organisations that develop high-priority programs 
that do have the capacity to export may also receive state financing. However, 
for these last programs and organisations, as well as for those of medium or 
low-level priority, the financial flows resulting from exports will be of vital 
importance.37 Therefore, the companies in which export orders are being 
concentrated will go on to constitute one of the most important pillars of the 
future Russian defence industry. Furthermore, their products will be the basis 
on which domestic military needs are covered and some of the most important 
Russian arms development programs are established. The policy of arms exports 
has thus been used as an economic tool to restructure the defence industry and, 
in the future, it seems that it will play a much more dynamic role in this regard.38
Recent defence restructure has focused on industry consolidation, in particular 
on the aircraft and helicopter sectors. These attempts all stem from the policies 
tabled in the Reform and Development of the Defence Industrial Complex 
Program 2002–2006. In 2005, realising the program would expire in one year, 
the Russian Government ramped up its efforts to integrate the defence industry. 
According to Makienko, of the Centre for Analysis of Strategic Technologies, the 
attempt to create a Unified Aircraft Corporation (Obyedinyonnaya Aviasroitelnaya 
Korporatsiya or OAK) was the most important instance of this policy and 
36 Konstantin Makienko, ‘Evolution of Russia’s defence industry in 2005’, Moscow Defense Brief, no.  5, 
2006, available at <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2006/industrial_policy/item1/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
37 Antonio Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 56, no. 5, July 2004, p. 701.
38 Sánchez-Andrés, ‘Arms Exports and Restructuring in the Russian Defence Industry’, p. 703.
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plans for the integration of the electronics shipbuilding industries are also 
underway.39 The close attention paid by political leaders and bureaucrats to the 
defence industry is unprecedented in the post-Soviet era. The state has taken 
the first steps towards financing large-scale projects in the aviation industry and 
integration policy has become less improvised than before, reflecting careful 
planning. 
The OAK is to be created by means of a horizontal integration of the aerospace 
companies and enterprises within the sector, with the aim of optimising 
production lines and minimising losses. The OAK intends to bring together 
all of Russia’s main civilian and military companies for building fixed-wing 
aircraft, together with the main design bureaux. It is envisaged that the state 
will initially own 75 per cent of the shares of the OAK, but this stake may be 
later reduced to 51 per cent.40 However, the procedures involved in the creation 
of the OAK have been drawn out and the participation of some companies such 
as RSK MiG could take some time. 
Regardless of OAK developments, a kind of informal alliance of former Soviet 
design bureaux, together with affiliated production facilities, has formed 
around the axis of MiG-Irkut. At the same time, Sukhoi has preserved and 
strengthened its status as a strong, autonomous player having the best Russian 
design bureau among its assets. It is moving forward with the civilian Russian 
Regional Jet project, is quite self-sufficient and can in principle (barring 
government intervention) ignore processes of integration. Thus, until such time 
as the OAK forcibly unites the sector through government intervention, the 
aviation industry will retain its bipolar structure, with MiG-Irkut and Sukhoi 
as its two poles.41 Indeed, with the MiG-Irkut and Sukhoi alliances acting as 
magnets for the other aerospace designers and manufacturers, a conglomeration 
of the industry has already occurred. 
The consolidation of the helicopter construction industry made considerable 
headway in 2005, with a leading role played by a Rosoboronexport controlled 
company, Oboronprom. Acting quietly and effectively, without guidance from a 
government strategy document, Oboronprom overcame the silent opposition of 
regional governors and factory managers to consolidate a significant part of the 
nation’s helicopter assets. It has acquired controlling stock in Mil Helicopters, 
Kazan helicopter plant, Ulan-Ude aviation plant, and Kamov Holdings—
effectively the entire Russian helicopter industry except for the company 
Rostvertol, which it is also keen to take over. All of these firms are expected 
to be united under a management company called Russian Helicopters, with a 
39 Makienko, ‘Evolution of Russia’s defence industry in 2005’.
40 Cooper, ‘Developments in the Russian arms industry’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006, p. 439.
41 Makienko, ‘Evolution of Russia’s defence industry in 2005’.
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possible listing on the Russian stock market.42 Rosoboronexport’s control over 
Oboronprom is an important factor, as Sergei Chemezov, the Rosoboronexport 
general director, has since stated that the company now intends to take an 
ownership stake in all the newly created integrated companies of the arms 
industry.43
Indeed, Rosoboronexport’s consolidation of the helicopter industry into 
Oboronprom was so successful that it has been tasked with overseeing the 
process of creating all of the holding companies within the OPK.44 The firm will 
continue to act as Russia’s arms exporter, giving Chemezov an important and 
influential role in the OPK’s development.
The Federal Agency on Industry proposes two state-controlled management 
companies for the naval construction sector: the Centre for Subsurface 
Shipbuilding and the Centre for Surface Shipbuilding. The high concentration 
of private ownership in surface shipbuilding will make the creation of the latter 
centre an onerous task, involving drawn out negotiations between the state 
and the private sector. Still, the most important development in the surface 
shipbuilding industry has been the merger of the two largest (and traditionally 
two of Russia’s most important) shipyards in St. Petersburg: Baltiysky Zavod 
and Severnaya Verf. This deal finally brought to an end the long-lasting and 
destructive conflict over who would lead structural reform in the shipbuilding 
industry. Yet, a tender to construct the second batch of Talwar frigates for 
India was awarded to Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad (which had struggled to 
secure contracts prior to this), thereby implying that Yantar could potentially 
compete at the same level as the St. Petersburg shipyards if further contracts are 
forthcoming.45 Regardless, Makienko suggested that the industry overall had 
made a step in the right direction: ‘The defence industry saw during 2005 the 
birth of some preconditions for a real breakthrough [in sector consolidation].’46
Other OPK reforms are afoot, with a new government agency, the Federal 
Agency for Defence Manufacturing, to be created to supervise further reform. 
Ilya Klebanov, the former Minister for Industry, Science and Technologies, 
is expected to head the new body. The government hopes this measure will 
help it to control the prices of defence products, thereby maintaining a large 
number of domestic arms deliveries. In 1997 the then President Boris Yeltsin 
abolished the forerunner (the Defence Industry Ministry) to this agency, which 
led to the bankruptcy of some defence companies and worsened the state of the 
42 Makienko, ‘Evolution of Russia’s defence industry in 2005’.
43 Cooper, ‘Developments in the Russian arms industry’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006, p. 439.
44 Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends, p. 46.
45 Makienko, ‘Evolution of Russia’s defence industry in 2005’.
46 Makienko, ‘Evolution of Russia’s defence industry in 2005’.
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Russian defence industry.47 The two initiatives, and their subsequent outcomes, 
highlight the differing approaches of the two Russian presidents: Yeltsin’s 
obsession for privatisation and an OPK governed by market forces, a policy 
which clearly fell short of its objectives; and Putin’s more bureaucratic approach 
of a more centralised and consolidated OPK, which has so far yielded far more 
promising results.
The Rise of Rosoboronexport
Rosoboronexport is the sole state intermediary agency for the Russian arms 
export market—known in Russia as military-technical cooperation. There are 
currently six manufacturing plants within the OPK that are also allowed to 
export to foreign customers, however, unlike Rosoboronexport, exports from 
these companies must only consist of products constructed at the plant.48 The 
state corporation was formed on 4  November 2000, following a Presidential 
decree that merged the two previous export companies: Rosvooruzhenie and 
Promexport.
Currently, Rosoboronexport has the right to deliver a full range of modern 
weapon systems to foreign countries and to render services on their operation 
and upkeep. This right sets it apart from the other six OPK enterprises that 
have the authority to export only the equipment manufactured within their 
factories.49 Moreover, Rosoboronexport collaborates with over 700  OPK 
manufacturing plants, acting on their behalf in foreign trade activities. This 
enables the corporation to sell the entire range of Russia’s export inventory; 
from Kalashnikov assault rifles to submarines. This state approach to arms 
trading serves two major functions: first, it does not allow too many potential 
producers to get access to foreign markets because of the possibility that 
existing rules and procedures for arms exports will be violated; and second, 
it prevents competition between Russian arms producers for the same market, 
thereby promoting the longevity of the OPK as a whole. As Pierre Litavrin and 
Ian Anthony note in their book Russia and the World Arms Trade, ‘lack of 
coordination between Russian exporters also resulted in a harmful competition 
among themselves that weakened the position of Russia on the world market’.50
More specifically, unauthorised contracts by Russian arms producers with 
foreign counterparts in the period 1992–94 had a detrimental effect on the 
47 ‘Defense Industry set for Reform’, The Russia Journal, available at <http://beta.russiajournal.com>, 
accessed 4 January 2007.
48 Luca Bonsignore, ‘The Future of Rosoboronexport’, NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, vol.  49, 
no. 1, 2004, p. 177.
49 Sergei Chemezov in, ‘This is Rosoboronexport’, Military Technology, vol. 28, no. 9, September 2004, p. 39.
50 Pierre Litavrin in, Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, p. 107.
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military potential of Russia, which Putin does not wish to repeat.51 For example, 
the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker contract with China signed during this period 
gave intellectual property rights away free of charge. The creation of a state-
owned military export enterprise largely did away with these problems, as the 
government managed to exercise control over the private OPK enterprises by 
forcing them to export arms via Rosoboronexport. Several programs undertaken 
by Rosoboronexport are of vital importance to the long-term sustainability 
and profit of the Russian arms export market, including repairs and spare-
parts delivery, construction of defence infrastructure within the target market, 
modernisation of old weapon systems, and a flexible financing policy to ensure 
the previous programs are affordable.52
The after-sales support (repairs and spare parts) market is one in which the 
Russians have traditionally struggled for credibility. This began to impact on 
the prosperity of some contracts as the poor repair record deterred a number 
of potential customers. In response, Rosoboronexport embarked on a public 
relations campaign aimed at restoring credibility within the service and 
maintenance sector. This saw the creation of workshops in India, China, Vietnam, 
Ethiopia, and Mexico, that will provide after-sales support for the weaponry 
previously sold to these countries. However, the Russian Government has also 
allowed the various defence enterprises to repair exported defence systems 
without Rosoboronexport input, to maximise customer satisfaction through the 
utilisation of the company best placed to repair the weaponry in question. The 
improvement in this sector was mentioned by Nikolai Novichkov, a Russian 
defence industry reporter: ‘Over the last three years the supplies of spare parts 
for previously supplied military hardware grew fivefold, and this tendency will 
persist.’53
The market for after-sales support is estimated to be worth US$10 billion, thus 
both Putin and Ivanov are eager to improve upon the US$1.5 billion earned from 
it in 2006, be it through Rosoboronexport or the individual defence enterprises.
Rosoboronexport has provided technical assistance for the production of defence 
infrastructure within many of the countries to which it has exported arms. The 
construction is often used as a ‘sweetener’ for potential arms contracts. The 
Sukhoi Su-27/30 licence-production in both China and India required Russian 
assistance to organise the production lines and generally prepare the defence 
industries of both nations for such a large undertaking. It is a policy that few if 
any Western arms manufacturers follow, which gives Rosoboronexport an edge 
when it comes to competing for large military hardware tenders.
51 Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, p. 107.
52 For details about Rosonboronexport, see <http://www.sovereign-publications.com/rosoboronexport.
htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
53 Nikolai Novichkov, ‘Russian defence exports surpass targets’, Jane’s Defence Industry, 1 March 2006.
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Modernisation of previously exported Russian-made equipment is obviously 
undertaken in cooperation with the original manufacturers, but it is 
Rosoboronexport that instigates the agreements. Thanks to this program, 
Russia is able to cater to poorer nations who could not otherwise afford direct 
replacement of their old weapon systems. Furthermore, it provides on-site 
training for operators of the updated systems. Potential financial gains from this 
modernisation policy are such that some of Moscow’s R&D budget allocation 
has in the past been devoted specifically to the upgrade of 1960s or 1970s 
vintage systems. Some examples include the successful MiG-29SMT upgrade 
program (for nations including Yemen, Algeria and India) and the Pechora-2M 
upgrade package for the S-125 (SA-3 Goa) air-defence system. It makes perfect 
business sense for Moscow to focus its efforts on the upgrade of its most widely 
proliferated Soviet-era weapon systems. 
Closely linked to the many equipment modernisation programs is the Russian 
Government’s flexible financing policy. In order to meet customer requirements 
and requests, Moscow introduced new forms of accounts with foreign clients. 
Some forms of financing include deliveries of equipment in return for the 
liquidation of Soviet-era debts (South Korean procurement of tanks, APCs and 
hovercraft); supplying arms for payment in exchange for the settling of Russian 
credit (Algeria); barter agreements (utilised by many Southeast Asian nations); 
and various financial offset programs.54 This policy has directly boosted 
Rosoboronexport’s sales since the company’s inception.
The problem of utilising a state-run company like Rosoboronexport for arms 
exports is that the process prevents maximum financial return for the OPK 
enterprise responsible for constructing the arms in question: Rosoboronexport 
is the ‘middle-man’. However, the system’s benefits far outweigh its detriments. 
Rosoboronexport ensures greater government control over exports and enables 
poorer importers such as Vietnam and Indonesia to procure Russian weaponry 
through the flexible financing options that would otherwise not be available 
to them. The figures speak volumes: in 2000 Rosoboronexport accounted for 
US$3 billion of the total US$3.68 billion of arms exports, and in 2004 accounted 
for US$5.1 billion of the total US$5.7 billion sales figure.55 Table 3.1 outlines the 
magnitude of Russian military exports facilitated through Rosoboronexport, 
and its predecessor Rosvooruzhenie:
54 Sergei Chemezov in, ‘This is Rosoboronexport’, Military Technology, vol. 28, no. 9, September 2004, p. 39.
55 O. Gertsev, ‘Five Years of Rosoboronexport: Trends and Prospects’, Moscow Voyenno-Promyshlennyy, 
Moscow, 26 October 2005.
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Table 3.1: Russian Arms Exports: 2000–2008 
Value of deliveries in billions of USD 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 3.681 3.705 4.81 5.4 5.78 6.126 6.5 7.3 8.0
Including through
Rosoboronexport 2.97 3.32 4.03 5.075 5.12 5.2 5.3 Unk Unk
(Source: Moscow Defense Brief, Centre for Analysis and Strategic Technologies, available at <http://mdb.
cast.ru>, accessed 19 January 2009)
Joint Ventures
Despite reticence to allow too much foreign investment within the OPK, the 
growth in joint ventures over the last 12 years has been impressive. European 
defence companies such as EADS have been a valuable source of scientific and 
technical knowledge, whilst Indian companies such as Hindustan Aeronautics 
Limited have been a valuable source of research funding. 
Specifically, the BrahMos Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM), Medium Transport 
Aircraft (MTA), and potentially, the fifth-generation fighter programs have been 
conducted in conjunction with India. Russian preference for joint ventures 
with India stems largely from the fact that India has never needed to directly 
invest in a Russian company, thereby avoiding potential legal and ownership 
issues within the OPK.
Joint ventures with European companies include the Yak-130 advanced trainer 
and Mi-38 helicopter. Despite the more complicated legal and ownership issues 
associated with European investment in the OPK, the Yak-130 and Mi-38 have 
been or are set to be the most successful European joint ventures with Russia’s 
defence manufacturers.
Russia’s flagship joint venture to date has been the BrahMos. It is a supersonic 
cruise missile named after the Brahmaputra and Moscow rivers, and is 
designed and manufactured by Russia’s Mashinostroyenia and India’s Brahmos 
Corporation. Its cruising speed is between Mach 2.5–2.8, setting it apart from 
the subsonic Harpoon, its Western counterpart which is about three times slower 
than BrahMos.56 The missile has been a stunning success, with India’s Rajput 
and Delhi-class destroyers, and Talwar frigates all being fitted with the missile. 
Air and submarine launched variants as well as land attack variants are also 
being tested, suggesting that the missile has great utility and good prospects for 
further orders. 
56 ‘BrahMos’, at Wikipedia, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahmos>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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The BrahMos experiment proved so successful, that the bulk of the joint 
ventures either completed, underway or under consideration by the OPK, are 
with Indian companies or government organisations. India is perceived as a tacit 
ally by Moscow, and its joint ventures do not include attempts at investment 
within the OPK. The MTA is due to make its maiden flight in 2012, and is one 
such joint venture. The MTA would be designed, developed and manufactured 
jointly and, as its name suggests, would fulfil medium airlift requirements for 
both the Russian and Indian Air Forces. Furthermore, India has indicated a 
preference for MiG as the producer of its joint fifth-generation fighter. Indian 
Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee publicly acknowledged that India was keen 
to take part in the development and financing of a MiG fifth-generation fighter 
with Russia during his November 2005 visit to Moscow.57 With the success of the 
BrahMos missile, and the high expectations for the MTA and fifth-generation 
fighter, Indo-Russian joint ventures have paid the most dividends for the OPK 
to date—plans are now afoot to collaborate on a next generation MBT. The 
emphasis placed upon them by both the Indian and Russian Defence Ministers 
suggest that the joint venture concept is one that both countries will continue 
to adopt in the future.
Although not officially a joint venture, the Yak-130 Mitten advanced jet trainer, 
which will enter service with the Russian Air Force in 2006 was assisted by Italy. 
A contract was signed in 1994 for the development of the Yak-130 between the 
Italian aerospace company Aermacchi, Promexport (one of Rosoboronexport’s 
predecessors), the Yakovlev Experimental Design Bureau and Nizhny Novgorod 
Sokol Aircraft Plant. Because of its inability to finance the Yak-130 project on 
its own, Russia turned to a NATO member state and its competitor on the arms 
market for military-technical cooperation. The Yakovlev design bureau received 
the necessary US$77 million, and the Italians received the plans for the basis 
of their own M-346 advanced jet trainer.58 The majority of foreign companies 
that produce aviation equipment cite the main problem with joint projects in 
the Russian Federation as the onerous limitations placed on them by Russian 
legislation. Article 12 of the law ‘On State Regulation of the Development of 
Aviation’ of 8 January 1998 limits the share of foreign investors in the authorised 
capital of Russian aviation enterprises to 25  per  cent minus one share and 
forbids their participation in their management bodies.59 Furthermore, in March 
2006 both the Ministry of Industry and Energy and the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade proposed a draft law limiting access by foreign investors 
to ‘strategic sectors,’ which includes ‘development, production, overhauling 
57 ‘Mukherjee invites RAC MiG to present concept of fifth-gen plane’, 2005, available at <http://news.
indiainfo.com/2005/11/18/1811-mukherjee-rag-mig-concept.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
58 Alexandra Gritskova and Konstantin Lantratov, ‘Foreign Aircraft Builders Prepare for Soft Landing’, 
16  May 2006, available at <http://www.kommersant.com/tree.asp?rubric=3&node=25&doc_id=673459>, 
accessed 28 Apri 2009.
59 Gritskova and Lantratov, ‘Foreign Aircraft Builders Prepare for Soft Landing’.
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and testing aviation equipment, including dual-use aviation equipment.’60 
What impact this action will have on future foreign investment within Russia’s 
aerospace sector remains to be seen, but it probably will not be very positive. 
What is certain is that the decision to approve or reject the draft law will have a 
considerable effect on the future of foreign investment within the OPK.
The Mi-38 project is a good example of the investment issues faced by foreign 
companies within the Russian defence industry. The helicopter was built by 
Euromil (a consortium featuring Mil Helicopters and Kazan Helicopters from 
Russia) and the EADS subsidiary Eurocopter, from Europe. It was conceived as 
a successor to the Mi-17, sharing many components, but featuring a six-blade 
main rotor and a redesigned cockpit with new avionics supplied by Eurocopter. 
After Euromil’s creation in 1994, the company was split into 33 per cent shares 
owned by Mil, Kazan and Eurocopter.61 After the Russian laws were passed 
limiting foreign investment in Russian aviation companies to 25  per  cent, 
Eurocopter was forced to withdraw from the project, although this occurred 
after the maiden flight of the Mi-38 in December 2003. Production began 
in 200762, with state-run Russian oil and gas companies placing orders. This 
happened without Eurocopter’s stake in Euromil, but the legal and ownership 
issues associated with the program obviously caused unnecessary delays in the 
helicopter’s development.
Despite the problems associated with foreign investment within the OPK, 
joint ventures are still pushing ahead, especially with India (as it has not yet 
attempted to directly invest in Russia’s defence industry). Russian investment 
in EADS could also see fewer hurdles arising from that company’s association 
with Russian defence companies. Realistically, however, Russian preference for 
dealing with India appears to be the most sound plan of action, as it is the one 
most likely to have the least number of issues in the long term. 
Re-equipping the Armed Forces: A Rising State 
Defence Order
From a purely economic standpoint, arms exports were originally viewed in 
Russia as the only way to steer the troubled OPK out of its crisis and to save 
60 Gritskova and Lantratov, ‘Foreign Aircraft Builders Prepare for Soft Landing’.
61 Refer ‘Euromil Mi-38’, Flug Revue, available at <http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRtypen/FRMi-38.
htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
62 Refer <http://www.euromil.ru>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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national scientific and high-tech industrial potential. Arms exports were also 
considered to be one of the most important political tools to promote Russia’s 
influence in the world and to boost its international status.63
Supporting this argument is the fact that the only OPK enterprises that have 
managed to thrive are producing arms for China, India, Iran and other foreign 
buyers. However, should Russia’s economic growth and high oil prices continue, 
it would provide even more resources for the military and security services. In 
the past 10–12  years, the Russian armed forces have not commissioned large 
consignments of military hardware and equipment64. This is one of the factors 
behind Defence modernisation being one of Putin’s stated priorities. As Russia’s 
ongoing Inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) force modernisation program 
shows, deterrence of both the United States (explicitly) and China (implicitly) 
remains a prime military security strategy. These nuclear weapons will give 
the Russian high command the breathing space it needs to compensate for the 
growing gap in Russian conventional capabilities and military technology.65 
Until the Kremlin is satisfied with its nuclear force, its modernisation will 
continue to impact on conventional weapons development programs, as 
considerable amounts of funding continue to be diverted to the nuclear triad. 
It is no coincidence then that as the export market peaks so too will the level of 
funding being devoted to the nuclear forces, which Putin stresses are currently 
being optimised for quality rather than quantity. All signs point to larger slices 
of the defence budget being directed to conventional weapons procurement.
The traditional reliance on exports to sustain the OPK seems to be in decline. 
Most industry analysts suggest that a US$5 billion annual export order book 
should be expected for the foreseeable future. This figure is perhaps slightly 
conservative, when figures from the previous two years are taken into account—
around US$6-7 billion, probably a more likely figure. The SDO for 2007 is stated 
to be nearly US$11 billion, higher than the level of export earnings, and is set 
to rise annually.66 Putin has stated that the armed forces should receive many 
new types of military hardware in the next few years. There is reportedly a 
special allocation in the budget stating that 150 per cent more money was to be 
allocated to the rearmament of the Russian military in 2006.67 This has meant 
that the Russian armed forces was to have received 6  ICBMs, 31  T-90 tanks, 
63 Mikhail I. Gerasev and Viktor M. Surikov, ‘The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications for 
Arms Exports’, in Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin (eds.), Russia in the World Arms Trade, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 1.
64 Alexander Golts, ‘Arming the World: Russia’s Lethal Exports’, Moscow News, 24 February 2005, available 
at <http://www.mosnews.com>, accessed 28 June 2006.
65 Steven E. Miller and Dimitri V. Trenin (eds.), The Russian Military: Power and Policy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 2004, p. 229.
66 Ruslan Pukhov, in Aleksey Nikolskiy, ‘The VPK is Losing Clients: Russian Arms Are Not All That Popular 
in the World’, Vedomosti, Moscow, 16 June 2005.
67 Olga Belova, (Television Presenter), in ‘Segodnaya’, Moscow NTV MIR, 1000 GMT, 9 November 2005.
Book.indb   59 23/12/09   11:24 AM
Phoenix from the Ashes?
60
125 APCs, 3770 trucks, three submarines, a Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack strategic 
bomber, several Sukhoi Su-34 (Flanker derivatives), and eight Mil Mi-28N 
Havoc attack helicopters in 2006. For all intents and purposes, these purchases 
are mainly aimed at supporting the weapons manufacturers. Furthermore, the 
SDO for 2006 covered the upgrade of 139 tanks, 125 artillery pieces, 104 aircraft 
and 52 helicopters.68 A 2004 report entitled ‘Rearming Russia’ stated: 
Given that the Russian military is equipped with weapons manufactured 
in the 1970s–1980s, we expect to see a massive increase in purchases of 
new military products in the next decade. But consolidation is the key 
to survival. We believe that only those enterprises which join the newly 
formed holdings will have a chance of survival.69
In November 2005, Putin announced that the country’s economy was robust 
enough to increase spending on the development of the armed forces. Speaking 
at a gathering of Russia’s top military commanders, he said that, by the end 
of 2015, the Russian armed forces will have gone through a sustained period 
of receiving new and refurbished military equipment: ‘Only this way will we 
be able to advance in substantial technical modernisation of the armed forces 
rather than patching up holes’.70
It seems evident from this statement that Putin understands that small-scale 
equipment delivery and refurbishment will not suffice. The fact that National 
Defence spending had doubled in nominal terms underscores the priority the 
Putin Administration attached to rebuilding Russia’s armed forces.71
These preconditions for armed forces modernisation resulted in the 
aforementioned State Armaments Program 2007–2015, adopted in December 
2006. Unlike its predecessors which focused chiefly on R&D and the creation of 
military prototypes, this program stipulates a shift towards full-scale production 
of military equipment.72 Moreover, it was the first to be formulated by the newly 
created MIC and 63 per cent of the US$186 billion allocated is devoted to the 
purchase of new weapon systems.
Since the program was released, there have been some doubts raised regarding 
the ability of the OPK to satisfy demand. It is already flush with foreign 
68 Henry Ivanov, ‘Russia details weapon procurement plans for 2006’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 
2005.
69 E. Sakhnova, ‘Rearming Russia’, United Financial Group (UFG), 2004, available at <http://www.
ufgresearch.com>, accessed 12 March 2006.
70 ‘Putin for Increased Spending on Military Upgrades’, RIA Novosti, 9  November 2005, available at 
<http://en.rian.ru>, accessed 13 June 2006.
71 The Military Balance 2006, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 151.
72 Ruslan Pukhov and Mikhail Barabanov, ‘Challenges to the Reform of Defense R&D in Russia’, Moscow 
Defense Brief, Issue 1, 2007, available at <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2007/item3/article1/>, accessed 28 April 
2009.
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contracts for arms over the next five years, and the additional domestic demand 
will require of the industry an output not seen since the end of the Cold War. 
For this reason, the program prudently puts off major purchases to 2009–2010, 
taking export demand into consideration, and therefore allowing for a gradual 
shift towards full-scale military production.73 Moreover, the MIC under Ivanov 
has pushed for government funding to be channeled into the OPK to assist its 
overall production capacity. The government will devote US$11.5 billion of the 
US$19 billion required for modernisation and retooling across the OPK, with 
the rest to come from within the increasingly profitable defence sector. It is the 
export successes which have enabled the OPK to front up with the remaining 
funds that will enable it to keep up with demand out to 2015. 
Overall, Russian defence industries have proven remarkably adaptable to the 
post-Soviet transitional economy. Initially there were dire predictions: foreign 
economists envisioned failed efforts to turn tank factories into tractor plants. 
Such predictions proved as inaccurate as the false projection of the attempted 
shift from defence production to civilian production within the OPK.74 Russia’s 
OPK now possesses the preconditions for improvements in efficiency, including 
a change in the position of the state with Putin and Dmitry Medvedev rather 
than Yeltsin at the helm, the stabilisation of the economic situation, and a 
favourable situation within global markets for primary energy resources. Now 
the main prerequisite for the sector’s further development is the existence of 
a strategic vision for the future and defining the most promising avenues for 
financial injections into the high technology complex (that is, R&D).75
73 Ruslan Pukhov and Mikhail Barabanov, ‘Report on Russia’s plan for Military Industrial Complex reform’, 
New Delhi Force, 1 July 2007.
74 Mark Galeotti and Ian M. Synge, ‘Russia’s Economy—The Best Case’, Putin’s Russia—Scenarios for 2005, 
Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey 2005, p. 8.
75 ‘Defense Industry Complex: Punish or Pardon? Does the State need Wings?’, Ekonomicheskiye Strategii, 
Moscow, 24 February 2005, p. 1.
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Chapter 4  
External Drivers for OPK Success: 
Arms Transfers to China
In the late 1980s, with the advent of glasnost and perestroika, some 25 years 
of Sino-Soviet antagonism ended. Intensive cross-border movements of people 
and goods were renewed, including the transfer of Russian weaponry for the 
first time since the ideological divergence that led to the Sino-Soviet split in 
the 1960s. From 1980 to 1991, China’s Gross National Product (GNP) grew at 
an annual rate of 9.4 per cent, peaking at 13 per cent in the mid 1990s. Since 
then, GNP growth has held steady between 8 and 10 per cent.1 GNP growth 
allowed the Chinese military budget to expand: it doubled between 1990 and 
1995, doubled again between 1995 and 2000, and doubled yet again from 2000 
to 2005.2 In March 2006 China announced that its annual defence budget would 
increase by 14.7 per cent over the previous year. This increase sustained a trend 
of defence growth rates exceeding overall economic growth that had persisted 
since the 1990s.3
An expanding defence budget has enabled China to carry out major military 
reforms by refining the numbers of its military and simultaneously improving 
the quality of technology, weapon systems and training. However, the 
publicly announced increases in defence spending of around 18  per  cent in 
recent years are difficult to confirm, given the well-known opacity of Chinese 
figures and statistics, especially with regard to defence.4 What little public 
information China releases about defence spending is further clouded by a 
multitude of funding sources, subsidies, and cutouts at all levels of government, 
and in multiple ministries.5 It is likely that this announced spending reveals 
only the tip of a vast and growing iceberg of military expenditure. The US 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) believes that the officially published figures 
substantially underreport actual expenditures: ‘DIA estimates that China’s 
total military-related spending will amount to between US$70  billion and 
UD$105 billion in 2006—two to three times the announced budget.’6
1 Pavel Felgenhauer in, Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin (eds), Russia in the World Arms Trade, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 1997, p.  89.
2 ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006’, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, p. 19, available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20
Report%202006.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009.
3 ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006’, p. 7.
4 Stephen Blank, ‘China-Taiwan Arms Race Quickens’, 24 February 2004, available at <http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/China/FB24Ad01.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
5 ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006’, p. 20.
6 ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006’, p. 20.
Book.indb   63 23/12/09   11:24 AM
Phoenix from the Ashes?
64
Since the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, China has been subjected to a 
Western arms embargo and has had very limited options in obtaining military 
equipment. Chinese interest in Russian weaponry stems from its limited 
alternative sources of arms supplies and the commercial benefits associated 
with dealing with Russia. Commercially, the price of Russian weapons has been 
lower than other alternative sources. As early as May 1991, the Chinese Central 
Military Commission drafted a report emphasising that the cost of modernising 
Chinese military forces with Russian weapons was comparatively cheaper than 
other sources. It concluded that modernising the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA)’s military hardware through imports from Russia would help China 
realise economies of scale within its weapons imports.7 China’s strong desire 
for Russian defence equipment was compatible with equally strong pressure 
by Russian arms manufacturers to sell their products to any and all interested 
parties.8 China’s burgeoning defence budget was a perfect match for Russia’s 
‘preferred supplier’ status, selling its weaponry at extremely competitive prices. 
The Sino-Russian arrangement resulted in a large volume of equipment transfers.
In the early 1990s, the Chinese military continued to lag behind its Western 
counterparts, both in terms of military doctrine and equipment technology. 
Chinese authorities deemed the situation critical at the conclusion of the 1990–
91 Gulf War, when it became clear that the PLA would be ill-prepared to fight in 
the air and on the seas against the leading industrialised nations, and some of its 
closer neighbours.9 The impact of the Gulf War on Chinese defence strategists 
was significant, as it demonstrated that large numbers of men and matériel with 
poor command and control were no match for a smaller, technologically advanced 
force with state-of-the-art weaponry. The modernisation and refinement of troop 
numbers in the PLA since the Gulf War was the result of this lesson. The vast 
majority of the imported military equipment required for this modernisation 
has come from Russia. According to the Pentagon, China buys about 95 per cent 
of its new weaponry from Russia, with a focus on aircraft, submarine, destroyer 
and air-launched, anti-ship-cruise, and surface-to-air missile procurement.10
Even though Russia has withheld some of the most advanced technologies that 
have been sought by China, there is little doubt that Russian assistance in the 
modernisation of China’s armed forces has had a positive impact on their bilateral 
relationship. In fact, Russian arms sales to China are such a prominent feature 
of their bilateral relationship that it represents the main link between the two 
countries—one that motivates and forms the basis of their closer affiliation. 
7 Ming-Yen Tsai, From Adversaries to Partners? Chinese and Russian Military Cooperation after the Cold War, 
Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2003, p. 120.
8 Pavel Felgenhauer in, Pierre and Trenin (eds), Russia in the World Arms Trade, p. 91.
9 ‘China’s Confident Bow; China’s increase in defence spending’, Economist, 10 March 2001, p. 1.
10 ‘Russia to maintain military cooperation with China—Putin’, RIA Novosti, 15 June 2006, available at 
<http://www.rian.ru>, accessed 25 October 2006.
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Other than the transfer of weaponry, large numbers of Russian scientists and 
engineers with long-term contracts also work in Chinese design bureaux and 
defence plants and Chinese engineers and pilots are partaking in training at 
Russian facilities and airfields.11 By 1996, the leaders of the two countries were 
publicly describing their relationship as a ‘strategic partnership’ and it became 
routine for Russia and China to issue joint statements criticising US policy 
on such issues as NATO expansion, the US-led military intervention in the 
Balkans and the development of ballistic-missile defences.12 The Sino-Russian 
partnership was formalised in December 2000 when the two states drafted the 
Treaty on Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation. The Treaty was officially 
signed in July 2001. 
Although the alliance itself is becoming increasingly significant within the 
international system, the most important foundational element of the post Cold 
War Sino-Russian relationship was the arms trade between the two countries.13 
Russian defence industry expert Robert H.  Donaldson has suggested that 
‘Russia sold arms to China in order to buy time and secure the resources needed 
to ameliorate its most urgent issue, stabilising … the domestic arms industry’.14
The trade of arms from Russia to China was more than just an economic 
transaction. For China, it accelerated its military modernisation process and 
provided valuable advancements within its defence industries during a period 
of arms embargo by the United States and the European Union. For Russia, it 
provided not only currency, but also the valuable time and resources required 
to sustain its own defence industry until such time as Russian domestic arms 
orders became more tenable. 
Political and Military Considerations
The transfer of Russian arms to China began somewhat tentatively and fitfully 
in the early 1990s, but has broadened in scale and scope in subsequent years.15 
It is likely the Russians believe that they can control the flow and scope of 
these transactions, and that Russian industry will retain control over specific 
technologies vital to the performance of various higher-end weapon systems. The 
level of technological sophistication of weapon systems sold to China remains 
11 Robert H. Donaldson, ‘Domestic influences on the Russian arms sale policy’, Presented to the 43rd Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 24 March 2002, p. 14, available at <http://
www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/domestic.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
12 Ted. Galen Carpenter, ‘Part 4: Managing the US-China-Russia triangle’, 14 November 2002, available at 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DK14Ad01.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
13 Donaldson, ‘Domestic influences on the Russian arms sale policy’, p. 15.
14 Donaldson, ‘Domestic influences on the Russian arms sale policy’, p. 15.
15 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s, SIPRI 
Research Report No. 15, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 15.
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relatively low, considering what the Russian OPK is capable of producing. This 
policy stems partly from the conservative military-technical strategy of the 
Chinese leadership. More importantly, it is also a natural consequence of the 
limits on arms transfers imposed by the Russian military, due to longstanding 
mistrust and fears of a resurgent China. 
For Russia, the major difference in its perception of China and India—its two 
largest defence customers—is that, traditionally, China has been perceived as 
a potential security threat to Russia while India has not been viewed as such. 
Despite the ease of production and delivery of second-tier military systems 
to China, Russian policy on arms transfer has provoked much grievance from 
some isolated Chinese quarters. Ming-Yen Tsai, author of From Adversaries to 
Partners, interviewed several Chinese experts, who complained that Russia 
had not sold China its best weapons.16 Under these circumstances, China has 
continued to develop next-generation weapons indigenously. In explaining why 
China sought to develop the JH-7 (FB-7 Flounder) fighter-bomber, the aircraft’s 
general designer, Chen Yi-jian, stressed: ‘China is unlikely to buy the latest 
weapons from abroad. Foreign states usually retain important technologies 
while exporting arms.’17
A supporting example was the delivery of the Su-30MKK multi-role fighter to 
China. Whilst the Su-30MKK is a capable platform in its own right, the Indian Air 
Force received the more capable Su-30MKI during the same period. The Indian 
variant possessed thrust-vectoring engines, canards to assist manoeuvrability, 
and an improved avionics suite. 
The net result is that China receives large deliveries of well-tested armaments 
with minimal risk of technological failure. Chinese orders are simple and are 
executed without the major delays and problems with quality control that 
have plagued Indian orders. By the end of 2003 China had already received 
about 150 Su-27SK/UBK and Su-30MKK fighters, not including the 100 or so 
fighters acquired through licenced assembly. By that time India, in comparison, 
had only received 40 Su-30K/MKI fighters.18 Russian arms industry specialist 
Konstantin Makienko commented on arms transfers to China in 2004: ‘Chinese 
contracts concluded after 1999 involve high volume serial production and make 
relatively few demands for modernization of base models. Such terms are well 
suited to the Russian military-industrial complex in its present state.’19
16 Ming-Yen, From Adversaries to Partners? Chinese and Russian Military Cooperation after the Cold War, 
p. 126.
17 Ming-Yen, From Adversaries to Partners? Chinese and Russian Military Cooperation after the Cold War, 
p. 126.
18 Konstantin Makienko, ‘The Russian-Chinese Arms Trade: an Attempt at Qualitative Analysis’, Moscow 
Defense Brief, 2004, available at <http://mdb.cast.ru>, accessed 22 November 2005.
19 Makienko, ‘The Russian-Chinese Arms Trade: an Attempt at Qualitative Analysis’.
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However, there are indications that the mutual distrust and wariness is easing 
somewhat between the two powers. Politically, this is symbolised by the creation in 
2001 of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO consists of Russia, 
China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and, officially, its raison 
d’être is to combat Islamic extremism. However, as various SCO statements and 
communiques make clear, an important secondary motive has emerged—namely 
to offset America’s increasingly dominant position in Asia.20
Militarily, the easing of mutual distrust was highlighted by the combined arms 
exercise known as Peace Mission 2005. In essence, it was a large military exercise 
comprising Russian and Chinese forces held on China’s Shandong Peninsula in 
August 2005. The code-name Peace Mission 2005 appeared in the press in June 
2005 following a meeting between China’s Assistant Chief of Staff, Major-General 
Chzhan Tsinyein, and Russia’s Commander of the Far Eastern Military District, 
General Yury Yakubov, in the Russian far-eastern city of Khabarovsk.21Peace 
Mission 2005 was split into three phases: a counter-terrorism exercise, seaborne 
and airborne troop deployment, and an anti-shipping exercise, utilising both air 
and naval assets from both countries. Russian forces included strategic bombers, 
advanced early warning, transport, refueling and fighter aircraft along with 
modern naval vessels, suggesting the exercise also served as a showcase of 
Russian equipment to prospective Chinese buyers.22 Observers from Iran and 
India were also present, allowing the capability of the equipment on show to 
also be demonstrated to military officials of these countries. It was the first 
event of its kind for the Russian and Chinese armed forces and, following the 
successful conclusion of the second such exercise in August 2007, it looks set to 
be an ongoing biennial event. 
These political and military developments between the two states are clear 
indications of closer ties, and future arms transfers may well be more advanced in 
nature than those seen previously. Indeed, immediately following the exercise, 
China flagged its interest with Rosoboronexport in acquiring 34  Il-76 Candid 
transport aircraft and four  Il-78 Midas airborne refueller variants.23 Later in 
2005 a contract was subsequently signed for delivery of both aircraft types, 
which were present at the Peace Mission 2005 exercise. It was the first time that 
Russia had agreed to sell airborne refuellers to China.
20 Carpenter, ‘Part 4: Managing the US–China-Russia triangle’.
21 Mikhail Lukin, ‘Peace Mission 2005: A 1970s Template for Sino-Russian ‘Peacekeeping’’, Moscow Defense 
Brief, 2005, available at <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2005/af/peacekeeping/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
22 ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006’, p. 2.
23 Marcel de Haas, ‘Russian–Chinese military exercises and their wider perspective: Power play in Central 
Asia’, Conflict Studies and Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, Wiltshire, 
2005, p.  1, available at <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20051000_cscp_haas.pdf>, accessed 
23 April 2009.
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State of the Chinese Market
The systems China purchased prior to the Il-76/78 aircraft include the Su-27/30 
fighter, advanced air-to-air missiles, S-300 (SA-10/20) and Tor (SA-15) anti-
aircraft missile systems, Sovremennyy destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines with 
the associated Klub (SS-N-27) missile system. These weapons have been described 
in Jane’s Intelligence Review by a Chinese source as ‘stopgap acquisitions’. It 
is also telling that, according to Russian sources, China is purchasing more 
technologies for production from Russia than actual weapon systems.24 China’s 
aim in doing this has been to develop an indigenous capacity for producing 
advanced weapons in an effort to reduce its reliance on military imports from 
foreign states. For example, China has utilised the technologies acquired from 
Russia to build its own indigenous weapon systems: the new Type  052 air-
defence destroyers now under construction, the J-10 fighter aircraft, and the 
Yuan-class submarines. At present, the Chinese continue to rely on critical 
Russian components for several of its weapon production programs and, in some 
cases, has purchased the production rights to Russian weapon systems. Russia 
continues to cooperate with China on technical, design, and material support 
for numerous weapons and space systems.25 Thus, it is acquiring, according to 
most estimates, US$2 billion worth of arms and technologies annually from the 
Russian defence industry. 
Russian industry experts are also talking about selling China even more advanced 
systems to maintain Chinese demand and remain technologically competitive 
after China’s indigenous defence industry assimilates the technology that 
is currently being provided by Russia.26 This would be a departure from the 
traditional Russian reticence to export its most advanced military capabilities 
to China and could indicate that the Russian defence industry has even more 
advanced military technology under development. Conducting exercises such 
as Peace Mission 2005 with China is an astute method for providing the Russian 
General Staff with an insight into how the Chinese armed forces operate and 
what their current capabilities are.27 The export of technologically advanced 
weapon systems could then be regulated accordingly, thereby ensuring Russia 
maintains the technological edge over China. Table 4.1 outlines Russian military 
sales to China from 1999 to 2006: 
24 Blank, ‘China-Taiwan Arms Race Quickens’.
25 ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006’, p. 21.
26 Blank, ‘China-Taiwan Arms Race Quickens’.
27 de Haas, ‘Russian-Chinese military exercises and their wider perspective: Power play in Central Asia’, 
p. 5.
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Table 4.1: Deliveries of Russian military equipment to the PRC from 1999 
to 2006
Armament Designation Producer Delivery Quantity Remarks
Weapons for Air Forces
Fighter Su-27SK
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After examining the weapons sold to China, it is clear that air and naval weaponry 
has accounted for the vast bulk of Russian arms exports. This trend highlights 
China’s intention to upgrade its power projection capabilities, thereby enhancing 
control over its maritime approaches and, if necessary, its ability to act in 
response to a Taiwan contingency. The deployment of the various air, naval and 
missile assets along the coastline opposite Taiwan is testament to this strategy, 
as is China’s likely contract for six Zubr (Pomornik) heavy-assault hovercraft 
from Russia28—perfect assets for a Taiwan invasion. Old Chinese concerns over 
land borders have been discarded in favour of seeking air and naval supremacy 
over China’s east and southeast. This is reflected in its procurement plans, which 
have shifted away from seemingly endless production runs of clunky armour, 
infantry weapons and other 1960s weaponry to more sophisticated air and naval 
assets, both domestic and Russian.29 This has helped to allay Moscow’s concerns 
over Chinese intentions, as Beijing’s focus is now apparently on geographic 
regions devoid of Russian interests. This in turn has also helped to sustain the 
level of bilateral trade for arms, and may even be a factor behind the provision 
of more advanced Russian weapon systems for export to China.
Future Prospects
The warming of Sino-Russian relations post SCO and Peace Mission 2005 has 
meant Russia’s option to sell more advanced weapon systems to China is looking 
increasingly realistic. Beijing’s intensified efforts to modernise its armed forces is 
resulting in rapid increases in defence expenses and currently makes China the 
main strategic partner for Russia in military-technical cooperation. According 
to Russian defence industry expert Konstantin Makienko, China will continue 
focusing its efforts on improving its Air Force and Navy: 
The main objective in aviation is the modernization of the fleet of Su-
27SK and J-11 aircraft. It would be most reasonable if these aircraft are 
upgraded to the Su-27SKM version, but it is also quite possible that 
far less reserved variants of modernization will be provided, including 
with integration of phased array radars.30
In terms of naval equipment, the most likely future transfer from Russia to 
China is more advanced air defence missile systems. Furthermore, Russia may 
assist the Chinese Navy in enhancing its amphibious capabilities, allowing 
licence-production of Zubr (Pomornik) or Murena-E assault hovercraft to 
28 ‘China to but 540t Zubr class assault hovercraft’, Military Procurement International, vol.  16, no.  19, 
1 October 2006, p. 1.
29 Bates Gill, ‘China’s Newest Warships’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 January 2000, p. 30.
30 Konstantin Makienko, in ‘China to Remain Russia’s Main Arms Market—Expert’, 20  March 2006, 
available at <http://www.mosnews.com>, accessed 25 March 2006.
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complement the six Zubrs likely to be signed for in 2007. However, the largest 
cooperation project may involve Russia assisting China in building its desired 
aircraft carrier fleet. The main contribution Russia can make to this project is 
to allow licence-production in China of the Su-30 Flanker navalised variant, the 
Su-33.31 If they come to fruition, these options are significant for two reasons. 
First, they would indicate that Russia does not fear a military threat to its own 
interests from China, at least in the near term. Second, the bulk of recent and 
potential future arms sales have involved air and naval weapons that would be 
required in any clash between China and the United States over Taiwan, but are 
of little use to China in a future war with Russia.
The next decade or so will likely see a continuation of the trends of the last decade; 
that is, significant Chinese business for Russian arms manufacturers. China will 
probably continue to purchase Russian naval, air, and air-defence systems from 
Russia in an effort to fill niche gaps in capability and to make up for deficiencies 
in its indigenous production lines. However, as Chinese technologies develop, 
and Chinese satisfaction in receiving second-tier military hardware from Russia 
dwindles, Russia will risk losing a key customer. Often discussed in the Western 
press, the potential removal of the European Union’s arms embargo from China 
will have no less of a negative impact on Russian sales than Chinese defence 
industrial advancement. In fact, the majority of Chinese arms trade experts 
agree that, in general, EU expansion into the Chinese market poses only a very 
minor threat to Russia’s position. The Europeans have a competitive position 
only in those sectors where Russia has nothing of significance to offer, namely 
communications, optical-electronic and laser-based systems.32
The Sino-Russian military technical nexus is alive and well. Despite the inherent 
risks to these traditional adversaries within the relationship, both sides are also 
managing to derive tangible benefits. China is receiving new weapon systems 
faster than it could without Russian assistance, as well as slowly mastering 
a great deal of new Russian-sourced military technology. Russia is receiving 
not only the finance to assist the development of its OPK but also the orders 
of military equipment that are required to keep many military production 
lines operating. This position will probably remain for the next decade. The 
downside for Russia is that there is an increasing chance that China will catch 
up technologically and lower its demand for Russian arms. If this does occur, 
it will be beyond the next decade, by which time a combination of Russia’s 
own domestic orders and the Rosoboronexport sales drive into the Middle East, 
Latin America and Southeast Asia will have compensated for the contraction in 
the Chinese market. Considering the 2006 US$3 billion and US$7.5 billion arms 
31 Makienko, in ‘China to Remain Russia’s Main Arms Market—Expert’.
32 Makienko, ‘The Russian-Chinese Arms Trade: an Attempt at Qualitative Analysis’.
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orders from Venezuela and Algeria respectively, Russia seems well on the way to 
compensating for the potential future loss of its traditionally most prized arms 
customer.
Book.indb   72 23/12/09   11:24 AM
73
Chapter 5 
External Drivers for OPK Success: 
Arms Transfers to India
Russia has sold weapons worth over 10bn dollars to India over the last 
five years and contracts worth another US$9 billion dollars are currently 
being worked on.1
Aleksandr Zhukov, March 2006
India’s choice of Russian military hardware is determined by a host of factors, 
such as their easy accessibility, the defence requirements of India’s armed forces, 
the quality of weapons, and pricing considerations. It is no secret that Russia 
sells similar weaponry at half the price demanded by European countries.2 
For example, a Russian Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine currently costs 
around US$200 million, whilst the less capable German Type 209 diesel-electric 
submarine costs around US$450  million. The Indian Navy operates 10  Kilo-
class submarines but only four Type 209 submarines. A further factor is the 
inertia created by India’s four decades of heavy dependence on Russian military 
hardware. India’s strategic analysts have argued a case against this reliance, 
pointing out that India must diversify its sources of weapons procurement 
because of the threat associated with reliance upon a single supplier. However, 
these warnings continue to go unheeded by the Indian Government, which 
retains its preference for Russian equipment. According to Western sources, 
signed deals and prepared future transactions in defence procurement 
between Russia and India for the next 8–10 years were estimated to be at least 
US$12 billion. This was in 2003. After Vladimir Putin’s late 2004 visit to India, 
the expected sum of the contracts for arms destined for India over the next 
15 years skyrocketed to US$30 billion.3 By 2004 about 40 per cent of Russian 
military exports were destined for India. For the next 20 years New Delhi plans 
to allocate about US$100 billion for the procurement of military hardware, and 
the Russians will most likely receive the lion’s share of this figure. 
An Indo-Russian defence accord, set to expire in 2010, was extended for a 
further ten years. This was decided at the fifth meeting of the Indo-Russian Inter-
Governmental Commission on military-technical cooperation in November 2005. 
1 Aleksandr Zhukov, in ‘Russia boosts military and technical cooperation with India’, India Daily, 16 March 
2006, available at <http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/7453.asp>, accessed 28 April 2009.
2 B.M. Jain, ‘India and Russia: Reassessing the time tested ties’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3, Fall 2003, 
p. 384.
3 Alister Maunk, ‘Military Cooperation of Russia and India In 1991–2005’, 3 June 2005, available at <http://
www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=140>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee stated at this meeting that Russia 
would continue to assist Indian shipyards, as it did in April 2005, with the 
laying down of the 37 500 tonne aircraft carrier (Air-Defence Ship or ADS) at 
Cochin Shipyard. As an aside, India has no indigenous carrier-based aircraft and 
so will probably exercise its option to procure another 30 MiG-29K navalised 
Fulcrum aircraft for this new aircraft carrier to complement the 16 it has already 
ordered for the Admiral Gorshkov. 
India has also entered into an agreement to lease two Russian Akula II nuclear 
attack submarines to develop the sea leg of its three-tier strategic deterrent. The 
first boat underwent sea-trials in the Russian Far East and was expected to enter 
service sometime in 2008. Mukherjee also told a press conference in Moscow that 
India would join Russia in developing and financing a fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft project, as well as agreeing to utilise the Russian Glonass navigational 
satellite system, an alternative to the US-controlled Global Positioning System.4 
India’s preference to source strategic systems such as nuclear submarines and 
satellite systems from Russia is due to the fact that it has few sourcing options 
for such systems and its perception that Russia is a reliable provider unlikely to 
impose sanctions for political or human rights indiscretions.
Moscow seems to be more relaxed about offering military technologies to India 
than to China. An idea of the staggering Russian influence on Indian defence 
procurement is provided by the fact that about 60 per cent of the Indian Army’s 
military hardware is Russian-made, while 70  per  cent of naval systems and 
80 per cent of air force hardware is Russian-made or of Russian origin. Overall, 
70  per  cent of the military hardware in the Indian armed forces comes from 
Russia.5 In this light, it is easy to see why India will remain a key market for 
Russian arms well into the future. Russia has sold over US$10 billion worth 
of weapons to India between 2001 and 2006 and contracts worth another 
US$9  billion are currently under consideration.6 This will ensure that India 
remains a key customer well into the next decade.
Indeed, Russia’s presence within India’s defence industries is almost omnipresent, 
with licence-production of Russian designed tanks and aircraft in the form of 
1000 T-90 MBTs, 140 Su-30MKI fighters, and 64 MiG-29SMT fighters. Indian 
warships currently under construction also have a Russian influence due to 
the presence of Russian advisors and engineers within the Indian shipyards. 
These vessels range from an aircraft carrier, air-defence destroyers and frigates, 
to nuclear submarines. When complete, many of these vessels will incorporate 
Russian designed and developed missile and radar systems. Notable direct sales 
4 Rahul Bedi, ‘India, Russia to renew accord for 10 more years’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 November 2005.
5 I. Dimitryev, ‘Hello to Arms’, Versiya, no. 19, 22–28 May 2006, p. 9.
6 Aleksandr Zhukov, in ‘Russia: Over $10 billion worth of weapons exported to India’, Press Conference, 
Interfax, 16 March 2006.
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over the last few years have included six Talwar frigates to compensate for the 
slow delivery of Indian platforms, as well as Smerch multiple launch rocket 
systems, and Tunguska air defence systems to compensate for the problems 
inherent within India land defence industries.
India’s traditional reliance on Russian hardware has meant that revenues 
continue to flow well after the last piece of hardware has been sold. For example, 
Russia has been upgrading India’s 1960s and 1970s fleet of MiG-21 Fishbed and 
MiG-27 Flogger  D fighter and ground-attack aircraft over the last five years, 
which could potentially net Russia US$800 million. As previously discussed, 
Indo-Russian relations are not, however, narrowly confined to a ‘buyer-seller 
relationship’. They have gone beyond that stage and show that the two nations 
trust each other, as evidenced in their joint design and production of weapons 
such as BrahMos ASCM.7 Table 5.1 is a summary of key Russian arms contracts 
with India since 1999: 
Table 5.1: Key Russian Arms Contracts with India from 1999
Contract Price Delivery Notes
Admiral Gorshkov aircraft-carrier 
equipment package $1.6bn 2008
Cost is for overhaul and 
upgrade, and the delivery of 
16 MiG-29Ks.
Construction of three Talwar 
frigates $1bn 2004
The first two, the Talwar 
and the Trishul, delivered in 
2003.
8 Su-30K and 32 Su-30MKI 
fighters 2004   
6 Il-78 MIDAS air tankers $150m 2003   
310 T-90S tanks $800m 2003
124 tanks delivered, and 
186 licence produced in 
India.
5 Ka-31RLD helicopters $108m 2002   
Upgrade of 5 Il-38 MAY anti-
submarine aircraft for the Indian 
Navy
$205m 2007
Upgrade involves the 
installation of Sea Dragon 
radar system. 
40 Mi-17 helicopters $170m 2001   
Licensed production of 140 
Su-30MKI in India $3bn
2012–
2017   
Several hundred Igla MANPADs $32m 2001   
1000 Krasnopol-M laser-guided 
artillery shells $35m 2000   
Construction of three Talwar 
frigates $1.1bn 2012   
7 G. Fernandes in, B.M. Jain, ‘India and Russia: Reassessing the time tested ties’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 76, 
no. 3, Fall 2003, p. 385.
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Contract Price Delivery Notes
36 Smerch multiple launch Rocket 
Systems, with rockets $500m 2007   
Upgrade of 66 MiG-29 Fulcrum c.$890m c.2011   
License production of 1000 T-90S 
tanks c.2020
Deliveries over the next 15 
years.
Fitting-out and leasing of two Akula 
II nuclear submarines c.$1.8bn 2007–08
First hull currently being 
readied for sea trials.
24 Tunguska-M1 air-defence 
systems $400m 2007   
140 RD-33 aero-engines $250m 2007
120 for license production 
for the MiG-29 upgrade. 
Could give Russia advantage 
in c.$9bn Indian tender for 
126 multi-role fighters.
Mi-17 1V helicopters c.$662m 2007–08
(Sources: Moscow Defense Brief, Centre for Analysis and Strategic Technologies, available at <http://mdb.
cast.ru>, accessed 12 February 2007, Jane’s Defence Weekly, and <http://www.mosnews.com/money>, 
accessed 12 February 2007)
Historical Basis
Since the early 1950s, New Delhi and Moscow have built friendly relations on 
the basis of realpolitik. India’s nonalignment policy enabled it to accept Soviet 
support in areas of strategic congruence such as disputes with Pakistan and 
China, without subscribing to Soviet global policies or proposals for Asian 
collective security.8 The most intimate phase in relations between India and 
the Soviet Union was between 1971 and 1976. This phase was characterised by 
the 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation of August 1971, which 
committed the parties ‘to abstain from providing any assistance to any third 
party that engages in armed conflict with the other’ and ‘in the event of either 
party being subjected to an attack or threat thereof … to immediately enter into 
mutual consultations’. This Treaty led the Soviet Union to support the Indian 
position on Bangladesh, to India’s benefit, and acted as a deterrent to Chinese 
involvement within the dispute.9 By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union became 
India’s largest trading partner.
Upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India was faced with the difficult 
task of reorienting its external affairs and forging relations with the 15 Soviet 
8 Rouben Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, Special Assessment: 
Asia’s Bilateral Relations, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, October 2004, p. 3, available 
at <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/Russia-IndiaRelationsAzizian.pdf>, 
accessed 28 April 2009.
9 Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, p. 3.
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successor states, of which Russia was the most important. Russia’s first 
government made relations with the United States and the West its priority and 
it expressed diminished interest in Asia, signaling a strong will to distance itself 
from the legacy of Soviet foreign policy.
Russia’s foreign policy, however, soon reverted from the idealism of the early 
1990s to traditional realpolitik, which prompted urgent diplomatic efforts 
to repair the damage in relations with India. President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to 
India in January 1993 laid the foundation for the reinvigoration of bilateral 
relations. Yeltsin expressed strong support for India’s position on Kashmir and 
pledged not to provide arms to Pakistan. Yeltsin signed a defence cooperation 
accord aimed at ensuring the continued supply of Russian arms and spare 
parts in order to satisfy the requirements of India’s military and to promote 
the joint production of defense equipment.10 The Russian Prime Minister at 
the time, Yevgeny Primakov, visited New Delhi in December 1998, resulting 
in the formation of seven agreements with the Indian Government. One of the 
agreements was a long-term military cooperation pact until 2010, and was of 
particular importance. Commitment to the agreements has since been reaffirmed 
by both states. Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee has stated: ‘After 
2010 we will review the progress and have another 10-year programme. Our 
defence cooperation with Russia is a continuous process and some projects will 
overlap the 2010 threshold.’11
In March 1999, India and Russia signed a further agreement to train Indian 
defence personnel in key Russian military academies. These actions set the 
platform for continued Indo-Russian cooperation throughout the 1990s and 
into the early twenty-first century. In turn, four more major agreements in the 
field of defence were signed in New Delhi on 4 October 2000. The agreements 
were significantly concluded against the background of the visit of President 
Vladimir Putin and the signing of the Declaration on Strategic Partnership 
between India and Russia. 
Of these four agreements signed in October 2000, the first relates to the 
establishment of the Indo-Russian Inter-governmental Commission on Military 
Technical Cooperation, signed by then Indian Defence Minister George 
Fernandes and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov. The Commission 
meets annually and has under it two Working Groups, the first one dealing with 
military-technical cooperation and the second with defence production in the 
fields of shipbuilding, aviation and land systems. It exercises coordination and 
10 Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, p. 3.
11 Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, in Vladimir Radyuhin, ‘India, Russia to Renew Defense 
Programme’, The Hindu, 18  November 2005, available at <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2005/11/18/
stories/2005111817131400.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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control of bilateral military-technical cooperation, facilitates its development, 
resolves problems emerging in the course of implementation of military-
technical cooperation, and assists in accelerating decision-making.12
The important feature of the long-term military-technical cooperation agreement 
was that it covered new areas of mutual cooperation such as naval and nuclear 
technologies and anti-ballistic missile systems.13 It paved the way for enhancing 
the joint research and development (R&D) capabilities of India and Russia in 
the production of new weapon systems, leading, in the first instance, to the 
production of the BrahMos ASCM. The successful co-production of BrahMos 
has further propelled New Delhi and Moscow to co-develop a fifth-generation 
fighter aircraft. In this way, the defence relationship is set to further deepen in 
the years ahead and subsequently expand the existing ties between Russia and 
India,14 most probably in the form of more military joint ventures, continued 
arms contracts and ongoing Indian military personnel training in Russia. The 
remaining three agreements were specifically related to military platforms and 
covered delivery and license production of Su-30MKI aircraft, the refit and 
delivery of the Admiral Gorshkov carrier with supporting MiG-29K aircraft, and 
the delivery of 310 T-90 MBTs. 
As stated by Indo-Russian relations expert Rouben Azizian: ‘The January 1993 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the October 2000 Declaration on 
Strategic Partnership serve as the two guiding documents of the Post-Cold War 
Russo-Indian partnership.’15
These documents state that the partnership between Russia and India is 
founded on complementary national interests and geopolitical priorities. For 
example, ‘Russia’s high standing as a world power’ and India’s leading role in 
the ‘immediate neighborhood, in Asia and beyond’, display the complementary 
natures of the two states.16 Moscow continues to consider South Asia as an 
Indian dominated domain and openly supports India’s bid for permanent 
membership on the United Nations Security Council. Meanwhile, India uses its 
growing input into the SCO to lend support to Russia’s pre-eminent role in the 
former Soviet states, particularly in Central Asia. This way, Russia and India 
support each other’s sphere of influence and maintain healthy relations with 
one another.
In 2004 the Russian Federation appointed a new ambassador, Vyacheslav 
Trubnikov, to India. His credentials were impressive: an ex-director of Russian 
12 ‘India and Russia sign four defence agreements’, 2001, available at <http://mod.nic.in/samachar/nov15-
20/html/ch16.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
13 Jain, ‘India and Russia: Reassessing the time tested ties’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3, Fall 2003, p. 382.
14 ‘India and Russia sign four defence agreements’
15 Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, p. 3.
16 Azizian, ‘Russia-India Relations: Stability amidst Strategic Uncertainty’, p. 4.
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special services, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, colleague and 
confidant of Yevgeny Primakov, and one of the leading experts on Hindustan. 
Trubnikov’s appointment as Russian ambassador to India was a sign of the 
importance that Moscow devoted to relations with New Delhi.17
Military sales form the keystone of the Indo-Russia relationship. From 1990–96, 
India’s arms purchases from Russia totaled US$3.5 billion. During this period, 
Russia committed itself to supplying India with 50 Su-30 multifunctional fighters 
and agreed that an Indian enterprise could produce a modified version of the 
plane under licence. The modified Su-30 became the Su-30MKI—a very capable 
platform boasting Western avionics, thrust-vectoring engines, and canards to 
assist in dog-fighting capabilities. By the end of 1999, the strength of Indo-
Russian military cooperation had returned to its Cold War level, with all three 
branches of the Indian military involved in major procurement programs with 
Russia. Of paramount concern for Indian naval planners was the requirement for 
a new ADS to replace the INS Vikrant—one of two former British light aircraft 
carriers owned by India that was decommissioned in 1997. The Indian Navy, 
with almost 85 per  cent of its vessels of Soviet-Russian origin, was quick to 
rejuvenate the sagging Indo-Russian bond. To fill the gap in capability between 
the decommissioning of the Vikrant and the commissioning of the ADS, India 
acquired the 44  500 tonne Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier from Russia, 
which is to be renamed the INS Vikramaditya and commissioned in 2010.18 In 
conjunction with the delivery of the three Talwar frigates between 2001 and 
2004 and the subsequent contract signed in 2006 for three more, it is evident 
that India lacks the construction capacity and ability to meet the construction 
timelines necessary to replace ageing Soviet-supplied ships. Therefore, with the 
delivery of more Russian built vessels, the Indo-Russian naval bond will remain 
for several more decades.19
While India maintains a vast pool of engineering and scientific knowledge, its 
defence industry habitually struggles in its attempts to coordinate the various 
research elements involved in a project’s development. This shortcoming in 
project management is exacerbated by the absence of market-based efficiency 
since India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation provides the 
primary R&D for all of India’s indigenous military projects. Technical and 
financial considerations mean that very few countries are able to develop and 
field completely indigenous weapon systems. So, while India is still forced to 
rely on external support for many of its indigenous projects, it continues to 
simultaneously promote the idea of self-reliance. The tension resulting from 
17 Maunk, ‘Military Cooperation of Russia and India In 1991–2005’.
18 Jerome M. Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2001, 
p. 69.
19 Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation, p. 70.
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heavy reliance on external support and the failures of project management 
is highlighted by one of India’s most publicised and criticised indigenous 
projects: the Arjun MBT,20 which has been in development for over 25 years, 
and continues to be plagued with mechanical faults. In response to Pakistan’s 
procurement of the T-80UD MBT from the Ukraine, and its inability to field 
the Arjun MBT, India turned yet again to Russia for an interim capability. 
Russia offered the T-90S MBT, and 310 were delivered by 2004, with a further 
690 to be licence-produced from 2007.21 The Indian Government has called 
for the remaining Indian T-72 MBT fleet to be upgraded, and as the preferred 
supplier, Russia looks set to gain more Indian business at the expense of the 
unfortunate Indian Arjun indigenous tank program. The far more capable T-90S 
cost the Indians US$2.4 million each, and was ready when required, whilst the 
Arjun cost US$5.3 million each.22 India remains unable to rapidly progress in 
the development of its indigenous military production. As one retired Indian 
army officer stated: ‘No country, however wealthy, can afford to produce three 
different tanks simultaneously.’23
The Arjun tanks may be shelved permanently due to these issues, and a contract 
for yet another 330 T-90S kits was signed in October 2006 for US$600 million,24 
suggesting that the Indian Army could be moving towards an exclusive T-72/ 
T-90S MBT fleet. Furthermore, at the seventh meeting of the Indo-Russian Inter-
Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation, it was agreed 
to co-develop a next generation MBT based on Russia’s highly secretive T-95. 
This will ensure that India maintains its MBT edge over its rivals well into the 
twenty-first century.
The previously discussed Indo-Russian reaffirmation of their commitment 
to continued military cooperation in October 2000 occurred despite the 
apprehension of some Indian policy-makers about the modernisation of the 
Indian military and the ongoing heavy reliance on Russia to usher in this 
modernisation. Russia’s interest in maintaining its crucial arms market presence 
in India led it to present India with a unique lease agreement for two Akula II 
nuclear attack submarines and four Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire strategic bombers, 
of which only the submarine lease has been officially agreed upon. Despite 
Indian reticence to accept the Backfire lease, the Indian Air Force continues to 
fly a predominantly Russian aircraft fleet. The large number of MiG and Sukhoi 
aircraft makes continued Indo-Russian cooperation in this field highly likely.
20 Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation, p. 66.
21 ‘Army to acquire nearly 1000 additional T90 tanks by 2020’, 4 October 2006, available at <http://www.
india-defence.com/reports/2577>, accessed 28 April 2009.
22 Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation, p. 72.
23 Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation, p. 72.
24 ‘India Buys 330 Russian Tanks’, MosNews, 27  October 2006, available at <http://www.defenceindia.
com/23-oct-2k6/news15.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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International Policy Considerations
Indian international policy advisors reiterate India’s need to realise full 
cooperative potential with Russia and to develop relations to the fullest extent. 
They advocate that India is an almost perfect military-industrial partner for 
Russia.25 Compared to China, the Indo-Russian relationship is practically void of 
military-political complications and Russia’s extensive history of joint projects 
with India holds it in good stead for future cooperation. Speaking in Russia 
during a high profile visit in December 2005 that focused on an intellectual 
property rights agreement Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that:
Our perspective … is to move towards collaborative projects involving 
design, development and production of the next generation military 
products. India and Russia have identified the medium-range transport 
aircraft and the fifth-generation fighter aircraft as two such projects.26
The agreement regarding intellectual property rights has opened the doors 
to large-scale cooperation between their respective armed forces and defence 
industries. During the 2005 meeting, Putin and Singh affirmed their commitment 
to continue to foster defence cooperation by describing it as ‘a vital pillar’ of 
Indo-Russian strategic partnership and another manifestation of deep mutual 
trust and commonality of interests between the two states.27 It would seem, 
therefore, that the concerns aired by some Indian defence officials regarding 
the reliance of the armed forces on Russian platforms are unfounded, as the 
two states appear to be moving down similar strategic paths. The reliance is 
seemingly reciprocal, as opposed to one-sided, as Russia requires the Indian 
arms market as a customer as much as India requires Russian military equipment 
as a supplier.
India was placed under a US arms embargo from 1998, following Indian nuclear 
tests. The lifting of this embargo in 2001 saw the potential for US competition 
within the Indian arms market. Russia, therefore, sought to secure as many 
agreements with India as possible: hence the 10-year deals. In particular, 
Russia has endeavoured to streamline the acquisition process for parts, with 
the creation of Rosoboronservice, a Rosoboronexport subsidiary that is based 
in India with a mandate to repair Russian-sourced military equipment. Russian 
arms manufacturers also hope to wield the lower costs of their products as a 
marketing tool against the more expensive US weapons. Finally, Russia has 
25 Maunk, ‘Military Cooperation of Russia and India In 1991–2005’.
26 Indian Prime Minister Mammohan Singh, in ‘India, Russia to Develop New Generation Weapons 
Together—Indian PM’, MosNews, 6 December 2005, available at <http://engforum.pravda.ru/archive/index.
php/t-152220.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
27 ‘Indian Russia leaders see military, technical ties as ‘vital pillar’’, New Delhi PTI News Agency, 
7 December 2005.
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offered to export highly sophisticated technology to India, including non-lethal 
microwave-beam weapons, and to sell advanced air-defence systems that can 
counteract the proposed US missile-defence shield.28
From a military perspective, the Russian relationship with India is one that the 
United States cannot hope to match. Washington found itself in a quandary 
during its embargo of India following the latter’s 1998 nuclear tests. The 
predicament was that the Indo-Russian arms connection could only be severed 
by the United States through counteroffers of third-party arms (because of 
the US arms embargo on India) or by the slow emergence of Indian military 
self-sufficiency. Even with the lifting of the US embargo, India remains heavily 
reliant upon Russian sourced weapon systems and its indigenous production 
will continue to be far from providing self-sufficiency over the next decade at 
least. For the foreseeable future, it is Russia, not the United States, which will 
hold the premier source of Indian arms status—a role it has held since the 1960s. 
It seems that the United States may have missed the opportunity to forge an 
Indo-American relationship as strong and interdependent as the Indo-Russian 
relationship.
Future Prospects
The Indian market [for arms] will remain capacious enough for Russia at least as 
long as we live.29
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov’s statement is a strong indication of 
where the prospects for Indo-Russian arms transfers are headed into the future. 
In the near term, India’s Chief of Air Force, Shashindra Pal Tyagi, announced 
India’s intention to buy 80 Mi-17 utility helicopters from Russia, with a contract 
signed in October 2006. The deal was estimated at US$662 million.30 However, 
by far the biggest request for tender in the history of the Indian armed forces is 
the much anticipated requirement for 126 multi-role combat aircraft, estimated 
to cost between US$7 and US$11 billion. The Indian Government should make 
a decision on the choice of aircraft in 2009, and the highly maneuverable and 
significantly upgraded MiG-29 variant, the MiG-35  Fulcrum, is tipped to be 
one of the favourites. Supporting its chances is the fact that the Indian Air 
Force already has 66 in its inventory and the Indian Navy will be receiving the 
navalised variant for the carrier operations. The biggest boost for MiG, however, 
28 Tom Lansford, ‘US-Russian Rivalry in the Arms Trade of South Asia’, Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 2, 
June 2002, p. 135.
29 Sergei Ivanov in, ‘Russian-Indian commission to address promising projects in military-technical 
cooperation’, Press Release, Interfax, 14 November 2005.
30 Alexandra Gritskova and Konstantin Lantratov, ‘Russian Mi-17 to land in India’, Kommersant, 11 July 
2006, p. 10.
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came in September 2006, when India signed a contract to licence-produce the 
MiG power plant—the RD-33 engine. As one of the stipulations for the fighter 
contract is licence-production in India, the fact that it will already be producing 
the power plants could tip the scales in favour of the MiG tender.
In the longer term, India has indicated a preference for MiG as the producer 
of its joint fifth-generation fighter. This is an interesting development, as the 
Russian Government backed the Sukhoi’s PAK-FA fifth-generation fighter. 
However Indian defence officials have stated that this aircraft is too heavy 
for their requirements: hence the MiG preference. Defence Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee publicly acknowledged that India was keen to take part in the 
development and financing of a MiG fifth-generation fighter with Russia during 
his November 2005 visit to Moscow.31 Half of the financing will be provided by 
India, in return for joint production rights and potentially technology transfer. 
MiG’s booming sales through very large orders from India, Yemen and Algeria 
in the last year would suggest that it may have enough funds to finance the 
remaining half of the project even without Russian governmental assistance. 
This would suggest that, in the long-term, Russia will have two fifth-generation 
fighters (medium and heavy) at its disposal—an unaffordable luxury prior to 
India’s decision to help fund the MiG project. The PAK-FA and MiG projects 
will likely replace the Su-27/30 and MiG-29/35 families respectively, once they 
reach initial operating capability.
Furthermore, the comprehensive agreement for the creation of the medium 
transport aircraft (MTA) occurred in January 2007. The MTA would be designed, 
developed and manufactured jointly and would fulfill airlift requirements for 
both the Russian and Indian Air Forces. The aircraft is designed to replace 
Russia and India’s An-12 Cub, An-24 Coke and An-32 Curl medium transports. 
Russia recently reneged on its obligations to a joint project with the Ukraine 
for a similar transport aircraft. This action is an indication of the importance 
that Russia is placing on the MTA, now the favoured future transport aircraft 
for Russian requirements and due to make its maiden flight in 2012.32 In terms 
of land systems, India is interested in acquiring the potent S-300 Grumble/
Gargoyle theatre air defence unit to complement the short and medium range 
systems already purchased from Russia. There is also talk of a contract for the 
upgrade of India’s T-72 fleet of MBTs to complement the licensed production of 
the T-90S MBT.
31 ‘Mukherjee invites RAC MiG to present concept of fifth-gen plane’, 2005, available at <http://www.
outlookindia.com>, accessed 12 December 2006.
32 ‘Russia, India may sign military transport plane deal in August’, RIA Novosti, 1 August 2007, available 
at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/india/2007/india-070801-rianovosti01.htm>, accessed 
28 April 2009.
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As highlighted by the 2005 meetings in Moscow, India will continue to procure 
traditional weapon systems from Russia, such as tanks, heavy artillery and 
aircraft, and will collaborate in further joint ventures for at least the next 
decade. Until India is able to secure a reliable indigenous production base for its 
military needs, and unless other suppliers of major weapon systems are willing 
to offer India licensing rights as well as end items, India’s reliance upon Russia 
as a weaponry provider will persist.33 Future Indo-Russian ties are likely to meet 
with greater success, especially in the strategic defence field, as the two states 
currently have no direct conflict of interest. Their defence ties are not restricted 
to the mere buyer-seller relationship but are, more significantly, expanding 
and deepening in terms of co-production of state-of-the-art weaponry. Their 
approaches to vital strategic issues such as the multipolar world structure, 
counter-terrorism and the development of nuclear technology cooperation will 
serve to further solidify their ties.34
33 Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation, p. 74.
34 Jain, ‘India and Russia: Reassessing the time tested ties’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3, Fall 2003, p. 396.
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Chapter 6 
External Drivers for OPK Success: 
Emerging Markets
Other than the lucrative Indian and Chinese markets, there are a number of 
other markets that have been cultivated by the Putin Administration since 
2000. With widespread expectations that the Chinese market in particular 
will begin to level out within the next 5–10 years, concerted marketing drives 
have been made into the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America by 
Rosoboronexport and the leading Russian defence enterprises. These efforts are 
beginning to pay dividends, as major arms contracts in 2006 signed by Algeria 
and Venezuela are expected to trigger further exports in these regions. As for 
Southeast Asia, a Russian offer of a US$1  billion export credit for arms was 
accepted by Indonesia in December 2006, and ratified in September 2007. This 
agreement, in conjunction with other Russian arms sales to China, Myanmar, 
and Malaysia, bodes well for future Russian arms exports to Southeast Asia. 
While the sheer volume of Russian arms sales is a clear economic indicator, it 
also demonstrates the extent of Russia’s growing influence around the world. 
Recent arms deals show that Russia is building on its former influence in the 
Middle East, and forging ahead in the relatively untapped markets of Southeast 
Asia and Latin America. These markets have not only conducted business with 
Rosoboronexport, but also with individual manufacturers such as Sukhoi and 
RSK MiG. In 2005, Russia sold weapons to 61 countries, some of which are now 
challenging the likes of India and China in terms of financial recompense for 
Russia.1 Both the Venezuelan and Algerian contracts were multi-billion dollar 
affairs, showing that Russia’s market diversification efforts are now beginning 
to pay handsome dividends.
Russia’s foreign order book for arms had reached approximately US$20 billion 
by the time of publication. Alexander Fomin, Deputy Director of the Russian 
Federation Military-Technical Service, indicated that actual sales were likely 
to reach US$8.5  billion in 2009. This would account for 40  per  cent of the 
workload of Russia’s Oboronnyi-promyshennyi kompleks (OPK) and he suggested 
that defence industries would be able to manage this demand comfortably.2
1 Victor Yasmann, ‘Russia: Putin Pushes Greater Arms Exports’, 4 April 2006, available at <http://www.
globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2006/russia-060404-rferl01.htm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
2 ‘Russia Optimistically Targeting $8.5 Billion in Arms Exports in 2009’, Defence Talk, 17 February 2009, 
available at <http://www.defencetalk.com/russia-optimistically-targeting-85-billion-in-arms-exports-
in-2009-16578/>, accessed 7 December 2009; and Nikolai Novichkov, ‘Russian defence exports surpass 
targets’, Jane’s Defence Industry, 1 March 2006.
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Vladimir Putin maintains a keen interest in Russian arms sales around the world 
and to date has successfully lobbied for the sale of weapon systems during visits 
to Algeria, Libya, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Turkey and several other 
Middle Eastern countries.3 Key to this diversification success has been the efforts 
in recent years by Putin, Sergei Ivanov, and indeed ex-Rosoboronexport chief, 
Sergei Chemezov, to provide more flexible and creative financing and payment 
options for prospective arms clients. This has been a major contributing factor 
to the recent boom in arms sales. As stated by Richard Grimmett in his report 
to the US Congress regarding arms transfers to developing nations, the Russians 
have
agreed to engage in counter trade [with China], offsets [with Malaysia], 
debt-swapping [with South Korea], and in key cases [China and India], 
to make significant licensed production agreements in order to sell it 
weapons.4
This flexibility, coupled with an export drive focused on market diversification 
has not only increased sales but also expanded the market. In 2002 the geography 
of cooperation of the world arms market included 30 countries, but, according 
to Ivanov, as of January 2006 Russia was exporting arms to 82 countries.5
Moreover, the Russian export credit offer of US$1 billion was formally accepted 
by Indonesia in December 2006. Such credit offers represent yet another funding 
option that Russia can offer its arms clients in the future. This flexible financing 
policy, in conjunction with its liberal export policy, (it rarely lets political 
considerations such as those related to human rights or ‘rogue states’ affect its 
export policies) makes Russia a more attractive option as an arms source than 
the United States for many countries around the world.
Assisting Russia’s booming arms export receipts are economic and political 
developments within three of the world’s geopolitical regions. In the Middle 
East, the steady rise in the price of oil and natural gas has ensured that the 
oil-rich Gulf States and Algeria have the financial capability to procure large 
amounts of military hardware. Furthermore, within Latin America, these high 
oil prices have ensured that Venezuela has the financial capability to satisfy its 
arms requirements, with at least US$3 billion worth of arms contracts signed 
with Russia in the last four years, and more likely to follow. Such a large volume 
of arms will almost certainly upset the balance of power in Latin America, 
3 Yasmann, ‘Russia: Putin Pushes Greater Arms Exports’.
4 Richard Grimmett in ‘Asia overtakes Middle East as developing world’s arms market’, 3 September 2005, 
available at <http://www.inq7.net>, accessed 22 February 2006.
5 Rosoboronexport Representative in, ‘Russian Arms Exports up 15-Fold in Last Three Years—State 
Agency’, 21  November 2005, available at <http://www.mosnews.com>, accessed 22  February 2006; and 
‘Ivanov says Russia’s 2005 arms exports up 9% on year’, available at <http://www.prime-tass.com>, accessed 
6 March 2006.
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and will probably trigger further sales to the region. In Southeast Asia, the 
traditional procurement of ‘prestige pieces’ of military hardware has resumed, 
following the recovery from the 1997–98 Asian financial economic crisis, and 
the subsequent growth in defence budgets. 
Regional Sales Drives
The Middle East
Marketing arms to the conflict prone Middle East has never been particularly 
difficult for the world’s arms exporters. However, the region’s thirst for arms has 
been superseded in recent years by Asia, and market competition has ensured 
that Russian arms manufacturers have had to maintain a considerable sales drive 
within the Middle East.
The Middle East market includes states that have large debts to Russia, such as 
Libya and Syria. Others have important economic relations with Russia, such 
as Turkey and Iran. Of major importance to Russia are its relations with Turkey 
and Iran, particularly given their influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia 
and the potential threat they pose to Russia’s influence in those regions. In 
2002, Turkey was the largest market for Russian exports in the Middle East, 
accounting for nearly 48 per cent of Russian exports to the region. Sales to Iran 
accounted for 11 per cent.6 The Persian Gulf is also a Russian priority because 
the oil-rich states have the ability to pay. Moscow has sought, though not always 
successfully, to balance its policy among Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
states. Russia operates in the Middle East within the context of its Soviet legacy, 
but it cannot afford to offer the subsidies that the Soviet Union bestowed or that 
the United States provides through its military aid to Israel, Egypt, and other 
regional allies. Nonetheless, Russia’s newfound willingness to offer flexible 
finance may well support its position in Middle Eastern states such as Syria and 
Morocco, considered to be on the region’s financial periphery. 
Between 1992 and 2003, the Middle East was Russia’s third largest market, after 
China and India, and was worth about US$10 billion in 2003 prices, equating 
to 17 per cent of its total arms exports. The largest purchaser within the Middle 
East was Iran (US$3.7 billion) followed by Algeria (US$2.3  billion) and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) (US$1.8  billion). Other significant markets were 
Yemen, Syria, Kuwait, Sudan, Egypt, and Turkey.7 Between 1992 and 1999, 
6 Paul Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, Memorandum no. 79, Jafee Center 
for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, November 2005, p. 34, available at <http://www.inss.org.il/upload/
(FILE)1188301974.pdf>, accessed 28 April 2009.
7 Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, p. 34.
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Russian arms exports to the Middle East averaged about US$620 million a year. 
Between 1999 and 2003, they rose to nearly US$1.3 billion a year. The volume of 
Russian arms sales during this period was strongly influenced by the changing 
circumstances of each Middle East purchaser. As oil underpins most Middle 
Eastern economies, these changing conditions were largely due to fluctuating oil 
revenues, governed by changes in the price of oil. From 1992 until 1998, oil prices 
were weak; by 1998, oil prices had slumped to a low of about US$12 per barrel. 
Since then they have increased, and reached over US$140 per barrel in 2008. 
Predictably, therefore, arms sales share a positive correlation with the price of 
oil, which is likely to remain high for at least the next 25 years according to 
the International Energy Agency. Sales grew in the period from 1998, marked 
especially by purchases by Algeria, Iran, the UAE and Yemen.8
Sales to Iran and Syria are a politically sensitive issue for Russia because the 
United States perceives both states to be active supporters of terrorism. Russian 
sales have continued, however, as only weapons of a defensive nature are sold to 
these countries. ‘Defensive’ in this case is a somewhat loose term and over the last 
three years this has encompassed Kornet and Metis anti-tank guided weapons 
and Igla MANPADS to Syria and Su-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft and 
Tor M1 (SA-15) air defence systems to Iran.9 Interestingly, the Kornet and Metis 
systems were used to great effect by Hezbollah during the last Israeli incursion 
into Lebanon. Syria’s facilitation of arms deliveries to Hezbollah may see stricter 
export controls being exercised by the Russians, but ongoing negotiations for 
the delivery of MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft will probably continue until 
an agreement is made, as Hezbollah cannot utilise these platforms. On the other 
hand, Iran’s receipt of Russian weaponry looks set to continue. The Iranian Su-
25 and Tor M1 contracts were signed in 2005, despite US protestations, and 
were the first arms agreements signed by both states since 2000, suggesting a 
renewal of the old relationship. Iran’s interest in Russian S-300 long-range SAM 
systems, the upgrade of its Kilo-class submarines, and the past agreement with 
Russia in upgrading its Su-24 Fencer strike aircraft and T-72 MBT fleets, could 
see further sales, albeit under the watchful eye of the United States.
The two other key customers in the Middle East for Russia are Yemen and the 
UAE. Since 2002, Yemen and Russia have developed their relationship into that 
of traditional ‘buyer–seller’. Yemen has procured 22 MiG-29 fighter aircraft, as 
well as 180 BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) since 2002, and future sales 
are almost certain, with a US$1.3 billion order for 32 of the advanced MiG-29SMT 
variants close to agreement. Like many of the global MiG-29 operators, Yemen 
8 Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, p. 35.
9 Liam Devlin and Tom Cooper, ‘Iran bolsters Su-25 fleet’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 September 2006.
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is also upgrading its older MiG-29 fleet to SMT standard which, according to 
MiG officials, boosts the aircraft’s capability by more than 300 per cent, whilst 
reducing operating costs by 40 per cent.10
The UAE military relationship runs deeper than mere procurement, as the UAE is 
involved in funding Russian research and development (R&D). The UAE bought 
402 BMP-3  IFVs from Russia between 1994 and 2000 and, more importantly, 
signed a contract for the development and exclusive delivery of the Pantsyr-S1 
air defence system for US$500  million in mid-2000.11 This capable system 
comprises both missile and gun armaments on a mobile platform and has the 
capacity to track and engage four air targets simultaneously.12 To be delivered 
in 2009, the contract stipulates that the UAE and Russia will be the exclusive 
users for two years after the final delivery date. The systems manufacturer, 
KBP Tula, stated that it has concluded US$2.6 billion worth of contracts for 
the system,13 presumably with the UAE and other countries prepared to wait 
two years for delivery. The UAE’s relationship with Russia’s OPK is important 
not only for financial return and R&D funding; it is also an example of the 
traditional Western arms procuring countries that have now begun to diversify 
and procure Russian equipment. A new contract between Russia and the UAE 
for shore-based Klub (SS-N-27 Sizzler) missile systems signed in Abu Dhabi in 
October 2006,14 during Putin’s visit, demonstrates the strength of the two states’ 
burgeoning relationship.
The renewed Russian sales drive into the Middle East has been very fruitful 
due to the large number of Soviet and Russian sourced platforms in the region. 
Countries that operate such platforms include Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, 
Yemen, the UAE and Iran, whilst traditional Western procuring countries such as 
Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have begun to diversify by procuring niche 
Russian equipment such as air defence and multiple-launch rocket systems. 
This newfound interest in Russian weapons stems from a combination of 
competitively priced and durable products that in many cases have no Western 
analogue or equal. Morocco was looking to sign a US$1 billion arms deal with 
Russia following Putin’s visit to Casablanca in September 2006. Although still 
undecided, the contract was expected to include Mi-17 helicopters, BMP-3 
and BTR-90 vehicles, the Metis anti-tank guided missile system and a further 
10 B. Vogel and P. Butowski, ‘Yemen poised to order MiG 29SMTs’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 September 
2006.
11 Estimates put the cost at over US$800  million, as development was more expensive than was first 
anticipated.
12 M. Gyuros, ‘Delays but increased capability for Pantsir’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 August 2006.
13 ‘Russia Reports $2.6Bln Air Defense Sale Deal’, 21 September 2006, available at <http://www.news-rus.
com/2006/09/21/russia_reports_2_6bln_air_defense_sale_deal/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
14 Alexandra Gritskova and Konstantin Lantratov, ‘Russian Rockets Will Keep Emirates Shores Safe’, 
23  August 2006, available at <http://www.kommersant.com/p699605/r_1/Russian_Rockets_Will_Keep_
Emirates_Shores_Safe/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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tranche of Tunguska air-defence systems.15 It is likely that this as yet undecided 
deal is a direct response to Algeria’s large arms contract signed in 2006 and it 
bodes well for future Russian sales to North Africa. Moreover, Russia agreed to 
cancel Libya’s US$4.5 billion foreign debt in April 2008, paving the way for an 
arms and oil deal in similar structure to that of Algeria’s before the end of 2008.16
Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia is another geographic region focusing on military modernisation. 
During the 1990s the bulk of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
member states had ambitious programs for improving their armed forces 
capabilities. These programs were not merely responses to particular threats, 
but, for the most part, reflected long-established, domestically-based strategic 
rationales. These rationales included the increasing availability of funding, the 
military’s role in decision-making, internal security concerns, overall national 
modernisation and industrialisation and supplier pressure/corruption.17
The Asian financial crisis which permeated through the region in 1997–98 
reduced overall economic growth and cut state revenues, forcing several 
Southeast Asian governments to drastically curtail defence spending. At the 
same time, local currency depreciation against the dollar substantially reduced 
the international purchasing power of the remaining procurement funds. Most 
ASEAN member state economies have now recovered to pre-crisis levels and 
defence spending has resumed its pattern of growth in Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia 
Russia has been eager to exploit these newfound Southeast Asian fortunes by 
securing arms contracts. With only Vietnam a traditional user of its weaponry 
(Indonesia had transferred to Western-sourced equipment after Suharto came to 
power in the 1960s), Russia was almost entering an untried market. However, 
beginning with a delivery of MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Malaysia in 1993, and 
continuing after Putin’s election as President in 1999, Russia made considerable 
inroads into the Southeast Asian arms market. Russian MiG-29 and Su-27/ 
Su-30 combat aircraft are now present in the inventories of Myanmar, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Vietnam; and Thailand may well follow suit, in a traditional 
response to growing military capabilities across its borders. Indeed, the total 
15 Konstantin Lantratov, ‘The Moroccan minister arrived in Moscow for weapons’, Kommersant, Moscow, 
9 June 2006, p. 10.
16 O. Shchedrov, ‘Russia, Libya seal debt accord, eye arms deals’, Reuters, Tripoli, 18 April 2008, available 
at <http://www.polity.org.za/article/russia-libya-seal-debt-accord-eye-arms-deals-2008-04-18>, accessed 
28 April 2009.
17 Tim Huxley, ‘Southeast Asian Force Modernisation’, Global Forces 2005: Proceedings of the ASPI 
conference. Day 2—Strategic Change, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2005, p. 46.
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value of arms export contracts signed with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam 
in 2003 exceeded that of arms export contracts signed with China or India, 
heralding Southeast Asia as a new major destination for Russian arms.18
Other than aircraft contracts, Vietnam and Singapore have received Russian air-
defence systems, varying from the S-300 long-range unit to the Igla MANPADS. 
Myanmar and Malaysia are also considering contracts for medium-range 
systems. Traditionally, procurement of new capabilities in Southeast Asia has 
led other countries within the region to follow suit, such as the Singaporean 
submarine program being hotly followed by a Malaysian one. This would suggest 
that the aforementioned air-defence systems would spur other countries such 
as Indonesia and possibly Thailand to also embark upon improved air-defence 
programs of their own in an effort to keep up with the military developments of 
their neighbours—a trend that has occurred since the 1960s.
Russian naval exports to Southeast Asia have so far been exclusively to Vietnam; 
however Indonesia has ordered Kilo-class submarines within its US$1 billion 
export credit offer, and possibly a Steregushchyy frigate to be constructed in 
Spain as part of a separate deal.19 Moreover, Vietnam’s recent orders have been 
for 12  Tarantul fast-attack craft, two Gepard frigates, and interest has been 
shown for the Steregushchyy frigate: moves sure to spike the interest in the 
governments of the remaining Spratly Islands claimants, including those of 
the Philippines and Malaysia.20 Both of these countries have been subjected 
to heavy marketing (Russia sent its largest naval exhibition to Malaysia’s 
Langkawi-based biennial arms show—LIMA, in 2009) for Russian fast-attack 
vessels that are highly suited to operations in and around the Spratly Islands. Of 
course, other than regional one-upmanship and territorial disputes, there is the 
fact that China to the north and India to the west have devoted billions to their 
naval modernisation programs, which in turn has stimulated the requirement 
for naval vessels within Southeast Asia.
Latin America
The final corner of the Russian arms drive triangle is Latin America. Like 
Southeast Asia, this region has traditionally preferred Western-sourced 
equipment, but changing governments, aggressive US foreign policy and 
successful Russian marketing have seen many Latin American countries shift 
their procurement preference to Russian arms. Both Mexico and Uruguay have 
18 ‘Russia—Tightening State Control’, East Asian Strategic Review 2005, National Institute for Defense 
Studies, Tokyo, 2005, p. 184.
19 ‘Russia, Indonesia sign corvette construction agreement’, RIA Novosti, 29 June 2007, available at <http://
en.rian.ru/russia/20070629/68046148.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
20 ‘Russian Weapons for Southeast Asia’, Kommersant, 13  December 2005, available at <http://www.
kommersant.com/p634447/r_500/Russian_Weapons_for_Southeast_Asia/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
Book.indb   91 23/12/09   11:24 AM
Phoenix from the Ashes?
92
bought small numbers of Russian weapon systems in recent years. Mexico 
purchased a fleet of Mi-17 helicopters, whilst Uruguay focused on land systems 
such as trucks and IFVs. However, two recent developments in Mexico are 
worthy of further mention. First, Rosoboronexport agreed to build a service 
centre for Russian equipment in Mexico in 2004, indicating the likelihood of 
future sales there. Indeed, a new contract was signed in June 2006 with the 
Mexican Navy selecting a fleet of 10 Su-27 fighters to form its first air defence 
unit.21
Further evidence of Russian expansion into the Latin American arms market 
came from the SINPRODE 2006 arms expo, held in Argentina in September 
2006. Rosoboronexport sent its largest delegation to date and came away with a 
contract for the delivery of Mi-17 helicopters to the Chilean Army and Air force, 
and an agreement with Brazil to buy an unspecified model of the Sukhoi Flanker 
family of fighter aircraft.22 The Mexican and Brazilian pilots of these Sukhoi 
aircraft will apparently be trained in Venezuela. Furthermore, the SINPRODE 
exhibition gave Rosoboronexport the opportunity to showcase a number of 
weapon systems it is hoping to export to Argentina as part of an ‘arms for beef’ 
deal. Russia is currently the largest importer of Argentine beef and, after the 
2001 economic downturn in Argentina, the country could not fund its military 
procurement programs. Therefore, an ‘arms for beef’ barter deal was offered 
to Argentina. If Argentina agrees to the proposal, it could acquire Tor (SA-15), 
Buk (SA-11) or Tunguska (SA-19) air defence systems, Mi-35 attack helicopters, 
and unspecified number and class of naval craft as part of the contract. This 
offer follows on from an intergovernmental memorandum on military-technical 
cooperation signed in June 2004 and a presentation by Rosoboronexport to the 
Argentine military in 2005.23
By far the most important development within the Latin American market, 
however, has been Russia’s courting of Venezuela. An agreement signed by 
Hugo Chavez and Vladimir Putin in Moscow in 2001 laid the framework for 
military cooperation and it bore fruit in 2005 with the signing of contracts 
for small arms, transport and attack helicopters. Future deliveries may include 
submarines and fighter aircraft, as Caracas moves steadily away from the US 
camp. The last two years have seen arms contracts valued at over US$3 billion 
signed between Caracas and Moscow, at a time when rhetoric and arms embargo 
have soured US-Venezuela relations to an all-time low. Russia has exploited the 
US arms embargo, which has prevented President Hugo Chavez from procuring 
US and European equipment with US-sourced components. In particular, 
21 ‘Mexico: 10 Su-27s selected by Navy’, Military Procurement International, Switzerland, 1 June 2006, p. 3.
22 ‘Russia to Sell Sukhoi Warplanes to Mexico, Brazil—State Arms Exporter’, 28 September 2006, available 
at <http://www.mosnews.com>, accessed 30 September 2006.
23 ‘Russia offers Argentina e ‘weapons for beef’ barter deal’, Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Jane’s Information 
Group, Coulsdon, Surrey, 1 October 2006.
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the embargo has led to the collapse of a Spanish contract to provide CN-235 
transport aircraft with US components, and, for the same reason, could yet lead 
to a cancellation of a contract for Spanish built offshore patrol vessels. As the 
vast bulk of the Venezuelan military inventory is of US or European origin, 
Russia could yet gain even further arms contracts from Caracas. Contracts to 
date have included 100 000 AK-103 Kalashnikov derivative assault rifles, and 
an agreement to set up factories within Venezuela for their licence-production.24 
Moreover, the July 2006 visit by Chavez to Moscow yielded a contract for 30  
Su-30MK2 multi-role fighters and 33 helicopters to add to the 15 Mi-17 utility, 
Mi-35 attack and Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters signed for in 2005.25 Furthermore, 
the outcome of the July 2008 visit by Chavez to Moscow is a deal for an additional 
12 Su-30MK2, expected to be signed before the end of the year.26 These deals are 
no doubt partly responsible for the Mexican, Chilean and Brazilian decision to 
procure Russian equipment in response to Venezuela’s arms purchases and will 
have an impact on the balance of power in Latin America.
More Venezuelan arms deals with Russia are likely to follow, as the country has 
an ambitious military modernisation program, considerable oil revenues with 
which to pay and few sourcing options due to US restrictions. The Venezuelan 
Navy requires a number of frigates and three submarines and Jane’s sources 
in Venezuela indicated that the Russian Amur-class or Kilo-class diesel–electric 
submarine will be the preferred choice for the submarine requirement.27 
Furthermore, Tor M1 (SA-15) and S-300 (SA-10) air-defence systems are on the 
Venezuelan shopping list, with the total value of the armed forces modernisation 
program out to 2012 being some US$31 billion.28 This is a considerable sum and 
its completion will be heavily reliant upon world oil prices remaining high. 
Even so, from the Russian perspective it is an encouraging development and one 
that will likely see further Russian arms deliveries not only to Venezuela but also 
to its regional neighbours, who will need to respond to Caracas’ modernisation 
drive to remain militarily competitive.
24 ‘Chavez hails Russian arms deals’, 27 July 2006, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5221468.
stm>, accessed 28 April 2009.
25 ‘Venezuela Reportedly Finalises $1B Deal for Helicopters, SU-30s’, 27 July 2006, available at <http://
www.defenseindustrydaily.com>, accessed 28 April 2009.
26 J. Higuera, ‘Venezuela looks to Russia for new fighter, air defence systems’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
1 August 2008.
27 J. Higuera, ‘Russia poised to win Venezuelan contract’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 June 2006.
28 ‘Venezuela Poised to Take Over as Top Latin American Buyer’, 14 November 2005, Press Release, Forecast 
International, available at <http://www.forecastinternational.com/press/release.cfm?article=82>, accessed 
28 April 2009.
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Creative Export Practices
A key ingredient to the success in Russian arms export diversification has been 
a newfound willingness to accept flexible means of payment. The early 1990s 
saw barter trade with China as a component of its arms contracts, but Russian 
determination to earn hard currency ensured that barter trade only ever made 
up a percentage of an arms deal, never the total amount. Since 2000, efforts 
made by Putin and Ivanov have ensured that more diverse payment options 
are now available to Russia’s arms customers. Moreover, the global boom in oil 
and natural gas prices has given the Russian Government a stronger financial 
position, negating the old desperation for hard currency. Moscow’s flexibility 
has seen it explore finance options such as offsets, the clearing of Soviet-era 
foreign debt, and the offering of export credit to its arms customers.
As previously mentioned, Russia offered Indonesia an export credit for arms 
procurement in 2006. Interestingly, this was the first time Russia had offered 
its arms wholly on the basis of credit, indicating the strong desire to secure 
Indonesian business and the first example of a new arms export policy. The deal 
includes an offer of US$1 billion credit for the procurement of military equipment, 
to be paid back in two US$500 million installments over the next five years.29 
Indonesia has been interested in procuring Russian equipment such as the 
Su-30 Flanker, Russian Steregushchyy corvettes and submarines, but economic 
crises and natural disasters have continuously delayed government funding for 
such projects.30 The offer of credit means Russia can secure Indonesian business 
earlier than would be the case under a conventional agreement, thereby 
ensuring that Indonesia becomes a major regional customer. The details of the 
package were confirmed following Putin’s September 2007 visit to Jakarta, with 
10  Mi-17 utility and five Mi-35 attack helicopters, 20  BMP-3 IFVs, two Kilo 
636 submarines and a weapons package for the Su-27/30 Flanker fleet making 
up the costs.31 Outside of the credit agreement, Indonesia ordered six more Su-
27 Flanker aircraft at the MAKS 2007 airshow in Moscow; and in June 2007 
signed a contract for the design and construction of corvettes based on the 
Steregushchy-class frigate.32
Myanmar is another likely recipient of Russian flexible finance in exchange 
for arms. Following an historic April 2006 visit by high-ranking Burmese 
military officials to Moscow, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was 
29 ‘Russia will arms Indonesia on credit’, Kommersant, Moscow, 9 June 2006, p. 10.
30 ‘Exploring Russia, Forgetting Indonesia’, Tempo Magazine, 13 October 2005, available at <http://www.
antenna.nl/~amokmar/projecten/Indonesie/pers/Russia.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.
31 Donald Greenlees, ‘Russia Widens Its Asian Reach With Arms Deals’, New York Times, 6  September 
2007, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/06/world/asia/06indo.html?scp=5&sq=indonesia%20
russia%202007&st=cse>, accessed 28 April 2009.
32 RIA Novosti, 2 July 2007.
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signed between Russian oil giant Zaburezhneft and the Myanmar Ministry 
of Energy. The MoU included giving Russia access to the oil and gas fields in 
Myanmar. Several Russian media sources, including RIA Novosti, Pravda and 
Kommersant, suggested that this MoU was a means for Myanmar to repay Russia 
for a rumoured arms deal that also took place in April.33 There is speculation 
that Myanmar may opt for MiG-29 fighters and either the Tor (SA-15) or Buk 
(SA-11) air-defence systems.34 If true, it would imply that Russia is beginning to 
utilise an ‘arms for oil’ policy for its arms exports, because the Algerian contract 
signed a month earlier also incorporated an oil and gas component. Moreover, 
future arms deals with countries such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and 
Venezuela may also include oil and gas components, as each of these countries 
has large reserves of one or both of these fossil fuels.
However, the attraction of Russian arms to these new markets is by no means 
restricted to financial benefit. Russian military equipment is perceived as 
durable and now includes a slowly improving after-sales service reputation. 
More importantly, these weapon systems go to countries such as Iran, India, 
China, Venezuela and Indonesia who do not fear a Russian embargo in response 
to political or human rights abuses. Russia’s heedlessness to political factors, 
in conjunction with the aforementioned flexible finance policies, gives Russia, 
rather than the United States, preferred status as an arms supplier to these 
countries and to a growing number of other countries that are beginning to 
show a preference to the non-aligned camp.
The Algerian Deal: Russia’s Largest
Like Myanmar, Algeria has allowed Russian access to its oil and gas deposits 
as part of an arms procurement package. The US$7.5 billion deal is the biggest 
single contract in the field of military-technical cooperation in Russian post-
Soviet history.35 It was signed in March 2006, during Putin’s visit to Algiers, and 
includes a further US$2-3 billion option package for further arms. As Ruslan 
Pukhov, the Director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 
has stated: ‘The contract will be Russia’s triumphant return to North Africa … 
[And] the deal will trigger a pride race among the North African nations.’36
33 Dmitry Kosyrev, ‘Myanmar: new field of Russia, China Cooperation’, RIA Novosti, 5 April 2006, available 
at <http://www.news-rus.com/2006/04/05/myanmar_new_field_of_russia_china_cooperation/>, accessed 
28 April 2009; and ‘Foreign ministers of Russia, Myanmar meet in Moscow’, 3 April 2006, available at <http://
english.pravda.ru/news/world/03-04-2006/78266-%20Myanmar-0>, accessed 28 April 2009.
34 Guy Anderson, ‘Russia eyes arms for energy deal with Myanmar’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 April 2006.
35 ‘Putin rates highly results of his ‘lightning visit’ to Algeria’, Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 
11 March 2006.
36 Ruslan Pukhov, in an interview conducted at the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 
Moscow, 6 June 2006, and Ruslan Pukhov, in Nabi Abdullaev, ‘Russia eyes debt-for-deals strategy’, 20 March 
2006, available at <http://www.cast.ru/eng/?id=231>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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The US$7.5 billion deal for arms signed with Algeria in March 2006 included 
the suspension of Algeria’s US$4.7  billion Soviet-era foreign debt, and this 
action could trigger further arms for debt suspension deals in the region, 
with Libya and Syria also being recipients of Soviet-era loans. Therefore, one 
of the important factors impinging upon the Algerian deal is the response it 
may trigger from Morocco, Libya and Egypt, who are all currently discussing 
arms packages of varying size with the Russians. This will ensure that the 
North African market takes some of the strain from the projected downturn 
in arms transfers to China. The other important factor is the way the deal was 
structured. Like many Russian arms deals, only some of the specific details have 
been disclosed to the public. What is known, however, is that it includes the 
writing-off of US$4.7 billion worth of Soviet-era foreign debt and that this was 
the key component of the deal that ensured Algerian agreement to take the 
Russian arms package. Furthermore, Algeria extracted from Russia an assurance 
that Moscow would not object to Algeria’s early payment of its US$8 billion 
debt to the Paris Club.37
Other than the above concessions, Algeria is to receive a US$3.5  billion air 
package, including 34  MiG-29SMT fighters, 28  Su-30MKA fighters, and 14   
Yak-130 advanced jet trainers between now and 2009. A US$2-3 billion option 
package was also signed and, if Algeria exercises these options, it is predicted 
that it will receive a further 20 MiG-29SMTs and 16 Yak-130s.38 Coupled with 
the original deal is a ground package of Metis and Kornet anti-tank guided 
missiles, 180 T-90S MBTs, the upgrade of 250 T-72 MBTs, and an air defence 
package of 30 Tunguska (SA-19) and eight batteries of S-300 (SA-10) air-defence 
systems.39 This ground component is worth in excess of US$2  billion. The 
contract also includes unspecified work on various Algerian naval vessels. 
Furthermore, Algeria has agreed to part with another US$400 million as part 
of a separate contract for two more Kilo-class submarines, signed in June 2006. 
Clearly, Algeria is undertaking a near total refurbishment of its largely Cold War 
era armed forces including naval, ground and air components, and Russia is the 
facilitator.
37 Andrei Maslov, ‘Risk Factors of the Delivery of Russian Arms to Algeria’, Moscow Defense Brief, Issue 2, 
2006, available at <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2006/item3/item2/>, accessed 28 April 2009. The Paris Club 
(and thus the name) arose out of crisis talks that were held in Paris in 1956 between Argentina and its various 
creditors. It is an informal group of financial officials from 19 countries, with the current permanent member-
nations being: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
38 Konstantin Makienko and Dmitry Vasiliev, ‘The Algerian Deal’, Moscow Defense Brief, Issue  2, 2006, 
available at <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2006/item3/item1/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
39 ‘Algerian Arms Deal Brings Russia US$7.5 billion, Gas Market Leverage’, 15 March 2006, available at 
<http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/algerian-arms-deal-brings-russia-75-billion-gas-market-
leverage-02024/>, accessed 28 April 2009.
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Russia receives three major returns in its structuring of the Algerian deal. First, 
it has probably gained access to Algeria’s oil and gas fields. Accompanying 
Putin on his Algiers visit were the heads of Gazprom, Lukoil and Itera—three 
of Russia’s largest oil and gas companies.40 Despite few official statements from 
either government, the presence of the gas and oil chiefs and a subsequent 
MoU signed between Algerian gas giant Sonatrach and Gazprom in August 
200641 indicate a developing relationship within the oil and gas sector. The 
final arrangement is that Algiers will probably give those Russian oil and gas 
companies access to Algerian deposits, with the proceeds split between the 
producers and the Algerian Government.42 The Algerian Government is then 
bound to immediately transfer the revenues to Russian arms manufacturers until 
such time as the debt is paid off. Moreover, Algeria will also share its expertise 
in gas liquefaction (a legacy of French rule and subsequent investment), and 
Sonatrach has already promised to help build infrastructure for the production 
of liquefied natural gas in Russia.43 Despite Russia’s huge natural gas reserves, 
its knowledge and experience in gas liquefaction remains relatively limited 
compared to the West and Sonatrach will help to rectify these deficiencies 
within the Russian gas fields. 
The second return Russia will receive from the Algerian deal is yet another 
boost to the OPK, with more concrete orders ensuring continued work and 
finance for several weapons production lines. It has given RSK MiG valuable 
orders, which will assist the company in its quest to gain the lucrative 
US$5-9  billion contract for India’s 126  Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft 
tender. The Algerian deal also gave Yakovlev its first export customer for the 
Yak-130 advanced jet trainer, necessitating the opening of a second production 
line for the aircraft. As important, the deal touched every facet of the Russian 
OPK: aerospace, naval and ground—something very rare in terms of arms 
contracts, which are not normally so universal and usually only favour one of 
the three sectors. 
Finally, both Ivan Safranchuk (the head of the Moscow branch of the Centre 
for Defence Information) and Ruslan Pukhov concurred that the Algerian deal 
will bring further regional orders for Russian arms because of the impact the 
deal will have on the balance of power in North Africa. The next most likely 
customers for a ‘debt for arms’ swap are Libya and, to a lesser extent, Egypt and 
Morocco, because of their close proximity to Algeria, possession of Soviet-era 
40 Nabi Abdullaev, ‘Russia eyes debt-for-deals strategy’, Defense News, 20 March 2006, available at <http://
www.cast.ru/eng/comments/?id=231>, accessed 28 April 2009.
41 ‘Gazprom, Algeria’s Sonatrach Sign Official Cooperation Accord’, 14 August 2006, available at <http://
www.mosnews.com>, accessed 8 October 2006.
42 ‘Algerian Arms Deal Brings Russia US$7.5 billion, Gas Market Leverage’, 15 March 2006.
43 ‘Algeria signs $5 billion arms-for-energy deal with Russia’, Military Procurement International, vol. 16, 
no. 6, 15 April 2006, p. 1.
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foreign debt, and largely Russian sourced weapon systems. Libya in particular 
is likely to be Russia’s next major North African arms customer, as it has large 
gas and oil deposits, an outdated military, and a recently forgiven US$4.3 billion 
Soviet-era foreign debt to Moscow.
Arms Market Diversification: A Return to 
Soviet Policy?
Russia’s newfound willingness to accept recompense other than hard currency 
for its military hardware is clearly apparent. However, the reasoning behind 
such a policy shift remains a mystery. There is no doubt that that arms-market 
diversification has assisted Russia’s OPK with more weapons orders, but the 
meshing of energy sector agreements with arms agreements, export credits, and 
the growing use of Russian weapon systems around the globe is also contributing 
to Russia’s growing political influence. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States used arms transfers 
and military assistance as one element in foreign and security policies that was 
primarily intended to further a political and ideological competition.44 The 
traditional arms clients of the former Soviet Union were more often than not 
poorer developing countries valued more for their ideological tendencies and 
desire for Soviet weaponry, rather than for their financial credentials. Today, 
Russia’s arms exports to Myanmar in exchange for oil concessions and Indonesia 
for export credit are reminiscent of the deals struck with the developing countries 
during the Soviet era. Many of the Soviet client-states received substantial 
military aid grants and significant discounts on their arms purchases, although 
this trend is yet to appear within current Russian arms exports. 
Russia’s regional sales drive is proof that arms exports are no longer just about 
receiving hard currency. Argentina’s potential ‘arms for beef’ deal, Algeria’s 
debt reduction and ‘arms for oil’ deal, Burma’s likely ‘arms for oil’ deal and 
Indonesia’s export credit all offer concrete examples of the Russian policy 
change. Whether or not political considerations or energy politics are at play 
when Russia decides upon new arms contracts remains unclear; however the 
thirst for hard currency has certainly been quenched since those anxious years 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. What is clear is that the increasingly 
concerted effort by Russia to cast it arms out to a wider net, in anticipation of 
an eventual Chinese market closure, is proving to be of great assistance to the 
longevity and success of the Russian OPK.
44 See press release for Ian Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, available at <http://editors.sipri.se/
pubs/pressre/iabk2.html>, accessed 28 April 2009.




Russia’s Oboronnyi-promyshennyi kompleks (OPK) has embarked on a pathway to 
recovery and resurgence. It has emerged from its bleak post-Soviet reputation 
as a fragmented and disintegrating behemoth into a more streamlined, centrally 
controlled institution worthy of its status as one of the world’s most prominent 
arms suppliers. Whilst the OPK’s long-term success is far from assured, the 
doubts surrounding its continued existence have quickly dissolved as its 
economic position has gone from strength to strength. Reliable economic links 
have been forged with India and China through regular military orders and the 
emerging markets that Rosoboronexport has fought hard to cultivate in Latin 
America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are all beginning to pay dividends.
Domestically, the key drivers required for the OPK are all underway in some 
capacity. The Russian Government has finally realised the importance of linking 
OPK restructure with military reform. State structures and new Commissions, 
such as the Military Industrial Commission chaired by former Defence Minister 
Sergei Ivanov, are now coming into play and will greatly assist the required 
linkage. Corruption remains endemic, but a more aggressive government approach 
to kerbing it, through high profile arrests and the introduction of Western 
auditors, are proof that the issue is being taken seriously. Restructuring the OPK 
is also well underway, with the government pushing for greater state control, 
and the creation of large, sector specific conglomerates such as Obyedinyonnaya 
Aviasroitelnaya Korporatsiya (OAK). Finally, the urgent requirement for larger 
domestic orders is also being tackled, with the State Defence Order (SDO) 
finally devoting the bulk of its finances towards equipment replacement or 
refurbishment. It is too early to say whether or not the long-term success of 
the OPK is assured, but the domestic drivers that are required for this are all 
currently being implemented or built upon.
The external drivers have all been implemented and the OPK will continue to 
benefit from the Russian Government’s efforts at consolidation in this field. 
China remains an important external driver due to its unquenchable desire 
for military capability and expansion. However, Russia remains savvy to the 
inherent economic and strategic risks associated with over-reliance upon the 
Chinese market. These factors, in conjunction with greater Chinese military 
self-reliance past 2012, suggest that the Chinese market will contract after this 
timeframe. In the meantime, however, it will remain a valuable customer.
India shares a more intimate relationship with Russia than does China, and this 
factor is shaping the growing military ties between the two countries. A similar 
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strategic footing, Russian technical input and joint ventures, and heavy Indian 
reliance upon Russian weapon systems are the major tenets that shape Indo-
Russian relations. These tenets will ensure that India remains the key Russian 
weapons customer in the long-term.
The growth in arms sales to Russia’s emerging markets is irrefutable. The multi-
billion dollar deals struck between 2006 and 2008 have the real potential to 
alter regional balances of power, and in turn generate further sales. This bodes 
well for the OPK, but the dynamics of the arms deals are generating questions 
about Russian motives. The more generous terms offered to Indonesia, the oil 
components of the arms deal with Algeria and Myanmar and the possible beef 
barter deal with Argentina are all indicators of a Russian policy change, because 
the constant in all previous arms deals since 1991—large cash components—are 
no longer a feature of these arms deals. However, regardless of Russian motives, 
the advances in exports are most beneficial to the OPK.
The final link will be complementing these export initiatives with more robust 
domestic demand. Here, Putin’s plan to invest in R&D, and subsequently to 
modernise the armed forces, is beginning to bear early fruit, as indicated by the 
rapidly rising SDO figures. 
Over the next decade it will be interesting to observe the OPK’s ongoing 
development and market diversification in the face of Chinese indigenous 
competition and Russian domestic influences. It would be premature to suggest 
that the future of the OPK is assured. The new export opportunities will need 
to be consolidated. It will also be important for President Dmitry Medvedev 
and Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov to continue the strong commitment 
shown by their predecessors towards the OPK’s future development. A change 
of leadership policy, or problems with pushing through the reforms could 
arise. However, the diversity of the market and the emerging domestic demand 
suggest that the OPK is likely to endure and probably prosper beyond the next 
decade. At the close of 2008, the Russian Defence Industrial Complex stood at 
the cusp of greatness—an unimaginable prospect in 1998. It may just become 
the ‘phoenix from the ashes’.
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Glossary
Akula Capable Soviet-era nuclear attack submarine. The Indian Navy is 
acquiring two refurbished hulls from the Russian Navy under a lease 
contract
Baltiysky Zavod Baltic Shipyards, St. Petersburg
BMP-1/2/3 Russia’s primary tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle family
Buk SA-11 Medium-range air defence system also known as SA-11, and 
accommodating the Gadfly or Grizzly missile
Goskomstat The Soviet state statistical agency
Gosplan The Soviet state central planning agency
Irkut Irkutsk based company and production facility for advanced variants 
of the Su-30 aircraft
KBP Tula Tula based company specialising in the construction of armoured 
vehicles
Klub A submarine-based fire-control system that includes the potent 3M-
14 series missile, also known as the SS-N-27 Sizzler
KnAAPO Komsomolsk-na-Amur based company and production facility for 
relatively advanced and base variants of the Su-27/30 aircraft
MiG Mikoyan-im-Gureyevich, company specialising in the construction of 
combat aircraft
MiG-AT Advanced trainer built with French collaboration
MiG-29 Fulcrum 1970s-era multi-role fighter aircraft that has seen prolific export and 
a series of upgrade programs (including MiG-29 SMT) maintaining its 
combat capabilities into the twenty-first century
MiG-35 Fulcrum The pinnacle of Fulcrum development, currently being offered to India
OPK Oboronnyi-promyshennyi kompleks (defence-industrial complex) is 
Russia’s renamed VPK (military-industrial complex)
Pechora SA-3 Extensive upgrade package for the ageing S-125 SA-3 Goa SAM 
system
Project 677 Amur Latest generation single hulled diesel-electric submarine, also known 
as Lada
Project 877/636 Kilo Upgradeable 1980s-era double-hulled diesel-electric submarine
S-300 SA-10/20 Long range air defence system capable of accommodating the Grumble 
and Gargoyle family of missiles
SDO State Defence Order: The allocation of budget funds to military 
procurement and research and development
Severnaya Verf Russia’s primary shipyards in St. Petersburg and producer of Kilo-
class submarines
Stereguschyy New generation of light frigate incorporating radar absorption 
technologies. Large export sales expected
Sukhoi Russian aircraft design bureau, now conglomerated with production 
facilities
Su-24 Fencer Sukhoi designed, 1970s-era deep penetration strike aircraft
Su-27/30 Flanker Sukhoi designed 1980s-era air superiority and now multi-role combat 
aircraft. Widely exported and respected
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Sovremennyy Potent Russian destroyer designed to combat US carrier battle groups 
during the Cold War. Exported to China
T-72/80/90 Russia’s main battle tank family, of which the T-72 and T-90 are still 
in production
Talwar Advanced frigate based on the Soviet-era Krivak hull and built in 
Russia exclusively for the Indian Navy
Tor SA-15 Potent short-range high-altitude Russian air defence system also 
known as the SA-15, and accommodating the Gauntlet missile
Tupolev Soviet-era aircraft design bureau focusing chiefly on bomber 
development
Uralvagonzavod Ural’s based company specialising in the construction of armoured 
vehicles
VPK Voennyi-promyshlennyi kompleks (military-industrial complex) 
was a formal institutional network connecting the Soviet General 
Staff, Ministry of Defence, military enterprises, civilian firms, and 
construction, communications, planning, civil defence, military 
intelligence and other security organisations into a cohesive 
structurally militarised entity. The integration of the VPK is higher than 
its US counterpart, which is based on a loose community of interest
Yakovlev Soviet-era aircraft design bureau
Yak-130 Russia’s new generation advanced combat trainer, also known as 
Mitten
Yantar Kaliningrad based Russian shipyard recently awarded with a contract 
to build three Talwar frigates for the Indian Navy
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